Feser’s Neo-Thomistic, Neo-Aristotelian, Common-Sense Dualism
Dualism › Neo-Thomistic, Neo-Aristotelian, Common-Sense Dualism
Consciousness via Immaterial Intellect and Objective Qualities
This dualist theory posits that human intellect (abstract concepts and reasoning) is an immaterial faculty and cannot be reduced to material processes. It solves the 'hard problem' by advocating a return to Aristotelian common-sense realism, where sensory qualities (qualia) are objective properties of the external material world, thereby dissolving the dilemma caused by the modern austere, quantitative conception of matter.
What consciousness is
Consciousness is identified as a composite reality consisting of an immaterial intellectual faculty, responsible for determinate thought, and material sensory faculties perceiving objective, qualitative properties in the world.
Mind and body
The soul is a substantial, unified reality that acts as the form of the body (Thomistic view). The intellectual faculty (a subset of mental states) is irreducible to material processes. The theory challenges the materialist conception of matter that generated the mind-body problem.
Mechanism
The argument that the necessity of determinate content in thought (logic, mathematics) entails the irreducibility and immateriality of the intellectual faculty.
Core claims
- The hard problem is a pseudo-problem arising from a flawed modern conception of matter (Galileo's Error).
- Intellectual activity cannot be reduced to material processes because this reduction inevitably denies the existence of determinate or unambiguous content in thought.
- Secondary qualities (like color and sound) are objective properties of matter, consistent with common sense.
Criticisms
Critics argue that neuroscience will eventually close the explanatory gap without needing an immaterial intellect. It must provide a coherent account of mental causation, although it attempts to avoid the Cartesian interaction problem by redefining matter.
Implications
- AI consciousness: Unlikely
- If the intellect (required for determinate thought and abstract concepts) is fundamentally immaterial and irreducible to material processes , then purely computational/material AI cannot instantiate the complete human consciousness described by the theory.
- Survival beyond death: Yes
- The soul is defined as an immaterial and subsistent entity, capable of existing and exercising cognitive function on its own apart from the body, though this is considered unnatural to it.
- Meaning and purpose: Cosmic/Ultimate
- The preservation of determinate content in thought, logic, and intellectual universals, coupled with the ontological commitment to the soul, implies a non-deflationary view of meaning that avoids materialistic nihilism.
- Virtual immortality: No
- Virtual immortality relies on computational functionalism. Since Feser argues that intellectual consciousness is not reducible to, or explicable by, material processes , the complete human self cannot be digitally uploaded.
Related theories
- Stump's Thomistic Dualism (Compatible)
- Cartesian Dualism (Critique)
- Eliminative/Illusionism (Critique)
- Mind-Brain Identity (Critique)
Sources
- Think, McFly, think, Edward Feser (2012)
- Aristotle, call your office, Edward Feser (2012)
- Chomsky on consciousness, Edward Feser (2022)
- Non-cartesian substance dualism and materialism without reductionism, Eleonore Stump (1995)
Explore all theories on the Consciousness Atlas · Compare Feser’s Neo-Thomistic, Neo-Aristotelian, Common-Sense Dualism with other theories · Which theory of consciousness fits you?