Andrews's Consciousness Without Complex Brains
Materialism › Phylogenetic
Consciousness realized via multiple simple systems
This perspective critiques the neurocentric bias in consciousness studies, which assumes that only complex mammalian brains can support consciousness. It proposes that consciousness is multiply realizable across diverse physical systems and advocates for studying simpler animals (like bees or octopuses) to identify fundamental, rather than contingent, features of sentience.
What consciousness is
Consciousness is identified as the underlying capacity that enables robust behavioral profiles (e.g., pain avoidance, nutrient seeking), which can be instantiated by very different physical systems (multiple realizability).
Mind and body
Consciousness correlates with, and is instantiated by, physical processes, but this relationship is flexible, allowing for non-complex and phylogenetically distant neural substrates (multiple realizability) in contrast to strict identity theories focused only on complex brains.
Mechanism
The principle of multiple realizability, asserting that mental capacities are not confined to complex mammalian neural architecture, guiding research toward identifying universal behavioral markers of consciousness in phylogenetically distant species.
Core claims
- Focusing exclusively on complex mammalian brains (like primates) results in an 'N = 1 problem' that prevents identifying truly essential features of consciousness.
- Sentience likely evolved only a few times on Earth, or perhaps only once in a distant common ancestor.
- Robust behavioral profiles (e.g., moving away from painful stimuli) warrant the hypothesis that simpler animals are conscious.
Criticisms
Contradicts the prevailing conventional wisdom in consciousness studies that requires a complex brain for consciousness. If consciousness is found in distant ancestors, theories relying on specialized brain regions (like the cerebral cortex for information integration) are challenged.
Implications
- AI consciousness: Likely
- If consciousness is multiply realizable across diverse biological systems, it is highly probable it can be instantiated in non-biological (artificial) systems that achieve the necessary functional organization and behavioral complexity, though understanding animal minds is crucial for this goal.
- Survival beyond death: No
- As a theory rooted in Materialism and phylogenetic evolution, consciousness is fundamentally dependent on physical/biological hardware and does not postulate a non-physical substance capable of post-mortem survival.
- Meaning and purpose: Humanistic only
- The focus is on the evolved functional and adaptive role of consciousness in promoting survival and thriving, which supports humanistic meaning derived from biological existence rather than cosmic teleology.
- Virtual immortality: Likely
- The central concept of 'multiple realizability' implies that the conscious mental self could be reproduced in non-biological hardware, provided the functional properties are accurately duplicated.
Related theories
- Functionalism (Compatible)
- Crick and Koch's Neural Correlates of Consciousness (Critique)
- Dennett's Evolution of Minds (Overlap)
Sources
- What is it like to be a crab?, Kristin Andrews
- How to Study Animal Minds, Kristin Andrews (2020)
- What has feelings?, Kristin Andrews and Jonathan Birch (2023)
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