Hardcastle’s Argument Against Materialism Skeptics
Materialism › Philosophical
Skeptical intuition is a conceptual failure, not a materialist flaw
This position argues that the persistent disagreement between materialists and skeptics (such as those concerned with the explanatory gap) is fundamentally a difference in attitude regarding the scientific enterprise. Hardcastle asserts that consciousness is a nonmysterious physical phenomenon that empirical science will eventually explain, and the skeptics' difficulty in accepting this outcome stems from a failure of their own conceptual framework, not a failure of materialism itself.
What consciousness is
Consciousness is a part of the physical world, just like everything else, and materialists presume an identity statement will eventually be discovered for it.
Mind and body
The relationship is one of identity, where conscious states are identical to physical states. The current lack of an 'intelligible' identity statement is seen as a problem of attitude rather than ontology.
Mechanism
The principle is methodological and attitudinal: to accept the premises of naturalism and scientific explanation, thereby dissolving the 'hard problem' as a non-issue. The underlying physical mechanism is based on dynamical structure and information processing.
Core claims
- The division between materialists and skeptics turns on basic differences in understanding the scientific enterprise.
- Materialists have absolute faith that science will eventually explain consciousness as it has other mysteries.
- The explanatory gap is sustained by skeptics' antecedent conviction in the mysteriousness of consciousness.
- To resolve the difficulty, skeptics 'need to alter their concepts' or risk having their ideas dismissed by science.
Criticisms
Skeptics argue that materialists fail to make the required identity statement 'intelligible, plausible, reasonable', thereby failing to close the explanatory gap. Her view risks being labeled as simply a matter of 'attitude' rather than a substantive philosophical argument.
Implications
- AI consciousness: Yes
- Hardcastle's position is firmly Materialist, asserting that consciousness is a product of the physical world. Therefore, in principle, any sufficiently complex physical system, biological or artificial, must be capable of consciousness if the requisite physical structures are realized.
- Survival beyond death: No
- Materialism holds that consciousness is solely the product of the biological brain. Once the brain dies, consciousness ceases to exist.
- Meaning and purpose: Humanistic only
- As a Materialist theory, it does not entail ultimate or cosmic meaning/purpose, but recognizes that humans can create humanistic meaning, purpose, and value for themselves.
- Virtual immortality: Yes
- Since consciousness is fully physical and nonmysterious, the first-person self is reducible to physical patterns. If these patterns can be perfectly duplicated and uploaded to a non-biological medium, virtual immortality is possible.
Related theories
- Papineau's Mind-Brain Identity (Compatible)
- David Chalmers's Hard Problem Arguments (Critique)
- Eliminative/Illusionism (Overlap (Shares a deflationary attitude toward subjective intuition))
- Block's Biological Reductionism (Compatible)
Sources
- The why of consciousness: a non-issue for materialists (1996)
- Locating Consciousness (1995)
- On the matter of minds and mental causation (1998)
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