The Consciousness Atlas is an interactive web app that visualizes more
than 450 theories of consciousness. It is based on Robert Lawrence
Kuhn's 2024 paper,
"A Landscape of Consciousness". The Atlas maps theories that address phenomenal consciousness - the
subjective feel of experience, such as the redness of red.
What the Atlas is
The Atlas is a visual reference built on Kuhn's taxonomy. It presents
the full set of theories at once so you can explore the field visually
and open any theory to read its entry, like an encyclopedia with
structured entries. Each theory entry shows a concise identity line,
conceptual ground, suggested mechanism, empirical notes, implications,
and sources.
Why this exists
Consciousness is studied across disciplines - neuroscience,
philosophy, and sometimes spiritual or anomalous-state research.
Kuhn's paper collects and organizes hundreds of theories along a
spectrum from most physical to least physical. The Atlas puts that
organization into a visual form so readers, students, and researchers
can quickly see how different positions relate and where each theory
sits on the spectrum.
How it works
Theories are grouped into ten main categories, arranged by their
stance on the physical-to-nonphysical spectrum. Examples of categories
include Materialism, Non-Reductive Physicalism, Functionalism,
Quantum-based theories, Panpsychism, Monism, Dualism, Idealism,
Anomalous States, and Challenge Theories. The app shows the whole map
at once. Click any theory to read its structured entry, which includes
references to canonical sources and named thinkers.
Who it is for
- Students learning philosophy of mind and cognitive science
-
Researchers and lecturers looking for an at-a-glance comparative
resource
-
Journalists and writers who need a quick reference to the range of
positions
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Curious readers who want a clear view of what people mean when they
talk about consciousness
What the Atlas does not do
The Atlas does not endorse or rank theories. It is a visualization and
reference based on Kuhn's taxonomy - collect and present, not judge.
It does not attempt to settle the hard problem of consciousness. It is
a tool for exploration and comparison.
A note from Kuhn
Kuhn explicitly states the project's purpose: "collect and categorize,
not assess and adjudicate." The Consciousness Atlas follows that
approach. The data and structure are derived from Kuhn's paper;
feedback and suggested corrections are welcome, but the app is a
visualization layer on top of Kuhn's work.
Kuhn was not involved in the design or content of the Consciousness
Atlas, other than his original paper, 'A Landscape of Consciousness,'
which is the sole source.
FAQ
What is phenomenal consciousness?
Phenomenal consciousness refers to subjective experience - the
qualitative feel of being aware, like the taste of coffee or the
redness of red.
How many theories does the Atlas include?
The Atlas visualizes over 220 individual theories, grouped into ten
broad categories.
Does the Atlas show which theory is true?
No. The Atlas presents theories neutrally. It is a map, not an
argument for any single position.
Is the Atlas academic?
The Atlas is based on an academic source - Robert Kuhn's 2024 paper,
"A Landscape of Consciousness" - and links to canonical sources
where available.
Summary
The Consciousness Atlas is a straightforward visualization tool: it
presents Kuhn's taxonomy as a single, explorable map and lets users
open individual theory entries to read structured, referenced
summaries. It is designed to make this complex field easier to survey
and to serve as a practical reference.
Materialism › Mind-Brain
Kripke’s Modal Argument Against Mind–Brain Identity
Pain Is Essentially Felt, So Not a Brain State
Kripke argues that if pain were identical with a brain state such as C-fiber firing, the identity would have to be necessary, yet it seems contingent. For water and H2O that appearance can be explained away, but pain is picked out by how it feels, and for a sensation feeling like pain just is being pain. So the appearance of contingency cannot be explained away, and the identity theory is false.
Saul Kripke
What consciousness is
Kripke offers no positive account of what consciousness is. His claim is negative: a conscious state such as pain is essentially characterized by its felt character, and so cannot be identical with a brain state.
Mind and body
Pain and C-fiber firing are not identical. The argument leaves open correlation, supervenience, or realization, and Kripke built no positive dualist system on it.
Mechanism
Rigid designation plus the necessity of identity. If ‘pain’ and ‘C-fiber firing’ both rigidly designate, ‘pain = C-fiber firing’ must be necessary if true, and the felt character of pain blocks the usual way of explaining away its apparent contingency.
Core claims
- A rigid designator refers to the same thing in every possible world where it exists, so identities between rigid designators such as ‘water = H2O’ are necessary if true, though known only a posteriori.
- The apparent contingency of ordinary scientific identities is explained away as imagining something else that plays the same superficial role, such as watery stuff that is not H2O.
- That reinterpretation fails for pain, because anything that feels like pain is pain, so there is no look-alike scenario to redirect the intuition to.
- If pain and C-fiber firing can even seem to come apart, the necessity of identity implies they can come apart, so they are not identical.
Criticisms
Scott Soames argues that Kripke conflates epistemic with metaphysical possibility, so the seeming separability of pain and C-fiber firing shows only an epistemic gap. Type-B materialists, including Hill and McLaughlin, hold that the identity can be metaphysically necessary without being knowable a priori. Others question whether both terms are genuinely rigid.
Related theories
Sources
- Naming and Necessity, Saul A. Kripke (1980)
- Meditations on First Philosophy, René Descartes (1641)
- Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap, J. Levine (1983)
- The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, D. J. Chalmers (1996)
- There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy, C. S. Hill and B. P. McLaughlin (1999)
- Kripke on Mind–Body Identity, S. Soames (2015)
- Kripke’s Argument Against Materialism (course handout), J. Speaks (2018)
- Physicalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), D. Stoljar (2021)
Explore all theories on the Consciousness Atlas
