The Consciousness Atlas is an interactive web app that visualizes more
than 450 theories of consciousness. It is based on Robert Lawrence
Kuhn's 2024 paper,
"A Landscape of Consciousness". The Atlas maps theories that address phenomenal consciousness - the
subjective feel of experience, such as the redness of red.
What the Atlas is
The Atlas is a visual reference built on Kuhn's taxonomy. It presents
the full set of theories at once so you can explore the field visually
and open any theory to read its entry, like an encyclopedia with
structured entries. Each theory entry shows a concise identity line,
conceptual ground, suggested mechanism, empirical notes, implications,
and sources.
Why this exists
Consciousness is studied across disciplines - neuroscience,
philosophy, and sometimes spiritual or anomalous-state research.
Kuhn's paper collects and organizes hundreds of theories along a
spectrum from most physical to least physical. The Atlas puts that
organization into a visual form so readers, students, and researchers
can quickly see how different positions relate and where each theory
sits on the spectrum.
How it works
Theories are grouped into ten main categories, arranged by their
stance on the physical-to-nonphysical spectrum. Examples of categories
include Materialism, Non-Reductive Physicalism, Functionalism,
Quantum-based theories, Panpsychism, Monism, Dualism, Idealism,
Anomalous States, and Challenge Theories. The app shows the whole map
at once. Click any theory to read its structured entry, which includes
references to canonical sources and named thinkers.
Who it is for
- Students learning philosophy of mind and cognitive science
-
Researchers and lecturers looking for an at-a-glance comparative
resource
-
Journalists and writers who need a quick reference to the range of
positions
-
Curious readers who want a clear view of what people mean when they
talk about consciousness
What the Atlas does not do
The Atlas does not endorse or rank theories. It is a visualization and
reference based on Kuhn's taxonomy - collect and present, not judge.
It does not attempt to settle the hard problem of consciousness. It is
a tool for exploration and comparison.
A note from Kuhn
Kuhn explicitly states the project's purpose: "collect and categorize,
not assess and adjudicate." The Consciousness Atlas follows that
approach. The data and structure are derived from Kuhn's paper;
feedback and suggested corrections are welcome, but the app is a
visualization layer on top of Kuhn's work.
Kuhn was not involved in the design or content of the Consciousness
Atlas, other than his original paper, 'A Landscape of Consciousness,'
which is the sole source.
FAQ
What is phenomenal consciousness?
Phenomenal consciousness refers to subjective experience - the
qualitative feel of being aware, like the taste of coffee or the
redness of red.
How many theories does the Atlas include?
The Atlas visualizes over 220 individual theories, grouped into ten
broad categories.
Does the Atlas show which theory is true?
No. The Atlas presents theories neutrally. It is a map, not an
argument for any single position.
Is the Atlas academic?
The Atlas is based on an academic source - Robert Kuhn's 2024 paper,
"A Landscape of Consciousness" - and links to canonical sources
where available.
Summary
The Consciousness Atlas is a straightforward visualization tool: it
presents Kuhn's taxonomy as a single, explorable map and lets users
open individual theory entries to read structured, referenced
summaries. It is designed to make this complex field easier to survey
and to serve as a practical reference.
Materialism › Mind-Brain
Feigl's Double Knowledge of Raw Feels
Raw Feels and Neural Processes as One Event Known Twice
Herbert Feigl holds that ‘raw feels’, the directly lived qualities of color, pain, emotion and thought, are empirically identical with configurations of neural processes. Phenomenal and neurophysiological terms differ in meaning and evidence but refer to the same event, as ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ both name Venus; the subject knows it by acquaintance, science by description.
Herbert Feigl
What consciousness is
Raw feels are identical with configurational features of neural processes. The identity is empirical and contingent, not logical.
Mind and body
One referent, two epistemic routes. The only dualism Feigl allows is a dualism of evidence, never of substance or property.
Mechanism
The distinction between evidence and reference: the evidence for ascribing a mental state is not the state ascribed, and acquaintance and description can converge on a single referent.
Core claims
- Phenomenal and neurophysiological vocabularies are neither synonymous nor intertranslatable, yet can share a referent.
- Eliminative materialism and radical behaviorism are ‘reductive fallacies’ that dispose of the explanandum.
- Dualist correlation laws would be ‘nomological danglers’, and parsimony opposes positing two sets of entities where evidence is fully correlated.
- Feigl holds that the choice between monism and dualism is settled pragmatically, while specific identifications belong to science.
Criticisms
Paul Meehl's autocerebroscope thought experiment pressed Feigl to clarify how phenomenal predicates relate to raw feels, and the semantics of acquaintance remains contested. Privileging qualia as epistemically basic invites the charge of sliding toward panpsychism, which Feigl answers by calling the privilege epistemological, not ontological.
Implications
- AI consciousness: Uncertain
- Feigl identifies raw feels with configurations of neural processes and leaves the specific identifications to science, so whether a machine could have them is open.
- Survival beyond death: No
- Since raw feels are neural events, they cannot persist once the brain stops.
- Meaning and purpose: Humanistic only
- The view integrates experience into a scientific, physicalist world picture without cosmic purpose.
- Virtual immortality: Uncertain
- It depends on whether a simulation reproduces the neural configurations that raw feels are identical with, which the theory does not settle.
Related theories
Sources
- The ‘mental’ and the ‘physical’, Herbert Feigl (1958)
- The Mental and the Physical: The Essay and a Postscript, Herbert Feigl (1967)
- The logical analysis of the psycho-physical problem, Herbert Feigl (1934)
- Mind-body, not a pseudoproblem, Herbert Feigl (1960)
- The compleat autocerebroscopist: A thought-experiment on Professor Feigl's mind-body identity thesis, P. E. Meehl (1966)
- Austria vs. Australia: Two versions of the identity theory, L. Stubenberg (1997)
- Mind in a Physical World, J. Kim (1998)
- General Theory of Knowledge, M. Schlick (1918)
Explore all theories on the Consciousness Atlas
