The Consciousness Atlas is an interactive web app that visualizes more
than 450 theories of consciousness. It is based on Robert Lawrence
Kuhn's 2024 paper,
"A Landscape of Consciousness". The Atlas maps theories that address phenomenal consciousness - the
subjective feel of experience, such as the redness of red.
What the Atlas is
The Atlas is a visual reference built on Kuhn's taxonomy. It presents
the full set of theories at once so you can explore the field visually
and open any theory to read its entry, like an encyclopedia with
structured entries. Each theory entry shows a concise identity line,
conceptual ground, suggested mechanism, empirical notes, implications,
and sources.
Why this exists
Consciousness is studied across disciplines - neuroscience,
philosophy, and sometimes spiritual or anomalous-state research.
Kuhn's paper collects and organizes hundreds of theories along a
spectrum from most physical to least physical. The Atlas puts that
organization into a visual form so readers, students, and researchers
can quickly see how different positions relate and where each theory
sits on the spectrum.
How it works
Theories are grouped into ten main categories, arranged by their
stance on the physical-to-nonphysical spectrum. Examples of categories
include Materialism, Non-Reductive Physicalism, Functionalism,
Quantum-based theories, Panpsychism, Monism, Dualism, Idealism,
Anomalous States, and Challenge Theories. The app shows the whole map
at once. Click any theory to read its structured entry, which includes
references to canonical sources and named thinkers.
Who it is for
- Students learning philosophy of mind and cognitive science
-
Researchers and lecturers looking for an at-a-glance comparative
resource
-
Journalists and writers who need a quick reference to the range of
positions
-
Curious readers who want a clear view of what people mean when they
talk about consciousness
What the Atlas does not do
The Atlas does not endorse or rank theories. It is a visualization and
reference based on Kuhn's taxonomy - collect and present, not judge.
It does not attempt to settle the hard problem of consciousness. It is
a tool for exploration and comparison.
A note from Kuhn
Kuhn explicitly states the project's purpose: "collect and categorize,
not assess and adjudicate." The Consciousness Atlas follows that
approach. The data and structure are derived from Kuhn's paper;
feedback and suggested corrections are welcome, but the app is a
visualization layer on top of Kuhn's work.
Kuhn was not involved in the design or content of the Consciousness
Atlas, other than his original paper, 'A Landscape of Consciousness,'
which is the sole source.
FAQ
What is phenomenal consciousness?
Phenomenal consciousness refers to subjective experience - the
qualitative feel of being aware, like the taste of coffee or the
redness of red.
How many theories does the Atlas include?
The Atlas visualizes over 220 individual theories, grouped into ten
broad categories.
Does the Atlas show which theory is true?
No. The Atlas presents theories neutrally. It is a map, not an
argument for any single position.
Is the Atlas academic?
The Atlas is based on an academic source - Robert Kuhn's 2024 paper,
"A Landscape of Consciousness" - and links to canonical sources
where available.
Summary
The Consciousness Atlas is a straightforward visualization tool: it
presents Kuhn's taxonomy as a single, explorable map and lets users
open individual theory entries to read structured, referenced
summaries. It is designed to make this complex field easier to survey
and to serve as a practical reference.
Materialism › Relational
Fish’s Naïve Realism
Experience as Direct Relation to the World
William Fish holds that a conscious perceptual experience is a direct relation between the perceiver and mind-independent objects, so the redness you see is the apple’s own redness rather than an inner representation of it. Hallucinations lack that relation and so differ in kind from genuine perception, and Fish argues that treating phenomenal properties as relational lets a functionalist story close the explanatory gap.
William Fish
What consciousness is
In veridical perception, consciousness is a relation of acquaintance with external objects and their properties, and the phenomenal character of the experience is constituted by those objects.
Mind and body
Fish pairs a functionalist account of the perceiver with a relational account of phenomenal properties, so the felt side of experience is located partly in the world rather than in an inner mental medium.
Mechanism
Disjunctivism: veridical perception involves a direct relation to real objects, while hallucination lacks that relational component and is a different kind of state.
Core claims
- In veridical perception, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by the external objects perceived.
- Veridical perception and hallucination are fundamentally different kinds of state, since only the former involves a relation to a real object.
- The phenomenology of episodic memory is probably inherited from prior perceptual acquaintance rather than involving direct acquaintance with past events.
- Supplementing functionalism with relational phenomenal properties yields a naturalistic theory that answers the hard problem and the explanatory gap in an intuitively satisfying way.
Criticisms
Disjunctivism must explain why a hallucination can feel indistinguishable from a perception if the two states differ in kind. Representationalists hold that a common inner content explains both cases more simply.
Implications
- AI consciousness: Uncertain
- Fish does not address machines; an artificial system would need both the right functional organization and genuine perceptual relations to objects.
- Survival beyond death: Unlikely
- Since experience consists in a living perceiver’s relation to physical objects within a naturalistic account, nothing in the view supports experience after the perceiver is gone.
- Meaning and purpose: Humanistic only
- The view is a naturalistic theory of perception and implies no cosmic purpose.
- Virtual immortality: Unlikely
- A simulation would present no real external objects, so its states would resemble hallucinations rather than genuine perceptual experience on this view.
Related theories
Sources
- Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion, William Fish
- Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction, William Fish
- Perception: Critical Concepts in Philosophy, William Fish (ed.)
- Fish’s Naïve Realism, Landscape of Consciousness, William Fish (2008)
Explore all theories on the Consciousness Atlas
