Head to head
Eliminative Materialism vs Russellian Monism
Churchland’s Eliminative Materialism and Russellian Monism, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Eliminative Materialism belongs to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Russellian Monism to Neutral Monism.
- On life after death, Eliminative Materialism says “No” and Russellian Monism says “Conditional”.
- On meaning and purpose, Eliminative Materialism says “Humanistic only” and Russellian Monism says “Uncertain”.
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The claim
In brief
Eliminative MaterialismPaul and Patricia Churchland hold that common-sense psychology, our everyday talk of beliefs, desires, and experiences, is a radically false theory that a completed neuroscience will displace rather than smoothly reduce. Consciousness as we ordinarily conceive it is a brain-generated picture shaped by evolution, and our self-understanding, introspection included, will be rebuilt in neuroscientific terms.
Russellian MonismRussellian Monism posits that the physical world, described by physics only in terms of structure and relations, has an intrinsic nature (quiddities) that is phenomenal or proto-phenomenal. This approach integrates consciousness into the fundamental reality while avoiding the traditional problems of dualism and reductive materialism.
What consciousness is
Eliminative MaterialismWhat we call consciousness, as folk psychology describes it, does not exist in that form. The real phenomena are neural processes, which only a mature neuroscience will describe correctly.
Russellian MonismConsciousness (or proto-consciousness) is the intrinsic, categorical nature or property ('quiddities' or 'inscrutables') underlying the relational structure of physical reality described by physics.
Big questions
Eliminative MaterialismNo position
Russellian MonismLikelyIf consciousness is intrinsic to matter/energy, and the combination problem can be technologically harnessed, then artificial systems built from physical substrates should achieve consciousness.
Eliminative MaterialismNoSince the mind is the brain, nothing mental survives the brain’s death.
Russellian MonismConditionalSurvival is unlikely for the individual conscious aggregate unless the combination mechanism is preserved or the theory aligns with a cosmic monist view, as individual consciousness (the macroscopic combination) would likely dissolve upon biological death.
Eliminative MaterialismNo position
Russellian MonismLikelyA single-stuff reality should permit virtual immortality, provided advanced technology can manipulate and harness the micropsychic properties to accurately reproduce the macroscopic conscious aggregate digitally.
Eliminative MaterialismHumanistic onlyPatricia Churchland urges us to see ourselves as organisms in nature, understood by scientific methods, with no cosmic purpose.
Russellian MonismUncertainMonisms generally allow for ultimate meaning/purpose/value. If RM takes a priority monist form with evolving consciousness, cosmic purpose may be implied.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Eliminative MaterialismPhysicalism (eliminative)
Russellian MonismNeutral Monism or Physical Monism or Phenomenal Monism (variant dependent); fundamentally Monistic.
Mind and body
Eliminative MaterialismThe mind is the brain. Patricia Churchland calls her program a ‘unified theory of the mind-brain’ and treats claims that mind goes beyond brain as the residue of folk myths.
Russellian MonismMind and physical world are deeply intertwined, with mental properties constituting the intrinsic nature of fundamental physical entities (the categorical bases of physical dispositions).
Fundamental or emergent
Eliminative MaterialismNeither
Russellian MonismPrimitive (at the fundamental level of reality, as phenomenal or proto-phenomenal properties of micro-entities).
Qualia
Eliminative MaterialismQualia as folk psychology and philosophers conceive them are expected to give way to neuroscientific description; the view treats consciousness as a kind of illusion generated by the brain.
Russellian MonismQualia correspond to the phenomenal properties (or their precursors) that constitute the intrinsic nature of fundamental matter.
How it works
Mechanism
Eliminative MaterialismTheory displacement. Folk psychology will be replaced the way outdated scientific theories were, its principles and ontology discarded rather than mapped onto brain states.
Russellian MonismThe key principle is the existence of unobserved, intrinsic categorical properties ('quiddities') of matter that are phenomenal, thereby grounding consciousness in fundamental reality without expanding the physical ontology of relations.
Where it is
Eliminative MaterialismIn the brain.
Russellian MonismLocated in the intrinsic properties of fundamental micro-level physical entities or potentially instantiated by the universe as a whole (priority monism).
What it does
Eliminative MaterialismBehavior is caused by neural processes; neuroscience is expected to explain it better than folk psychology does.
Russellian MonismAvoids the causal exclusion problem of dualism by embedding consciousness into the fundamental properties of the physical world, meaning consciousness underlies physical reality itself.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Eliminative MaterialismConceptually testable
Russellian MonismSpeculative/Conceptual. Its fundamental claims regarding intrinsic properties are generally beyond empirical access or mathematical modeling.
Tests so far
Eliminative MaterialismThe view stakes its claim on the future course of neuroscience; whether folk categories survive in mature brain science is the long-run test.
Russellian MonismNot stated
Criticisms
Eliminative MaterialismCritics say denying subjective experience defies both intuition and direct evidence; Galen Strawson calls the denial of experience ‘the strangest thing that has ever happened in the whole history of human thought’. There is also tension between Patricia Churchland’s talk of reduction to neurobiology and the eliminativist claim that folk psychology will be displaced rather than reduced.
Russellian MonismThe primary challenge is the combination problem, which is critical: explaining how microphysical properties combine to form complex, integrated macro-level consciousness. If Panprotopsychism is assumed, it faces the problem of deriving consciousness (qualia) from proto-phenomenal properties.
Sources
Key sources
Eliminative Materialism
- Neurophilosophy, Patricia Churchland (1986)
- Churchland’s Eliminative Materialism (Landscape of Consciousness), Patricia Churchland
Russellian Monism
- What is Russellian Monism?, T. Alter and Y. Nagasawa (2012)
- Russellian Monism, T. Alter and D. Pereboom (2019)
- Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism, D. Chalmers (2016)