Head to head
Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos vs Strawson’s Panpsychism
Nagel's Mind and Cosmos and Strawson’s Panpsychism Theory, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos belongs to the Challenge family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Strawson’s Panpsychism to Panpsychism.
- Both treat consciousness as fundamental.
- On AI consciousness, Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos says “Uncertain” and Strawson’s Panpsychism says “Likely”.
- On life after death, Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos says “Conditional” and Strawson’s Panpsychism says “Unlikely”.
- On mind uploading, Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos says “Unlikely” and Strawson’s Panpsychism says “Likely”.
- On meaning and purpose, Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos says “Cosmic/Ultimate” and Strawson’s Panpsychism says “Uncertain”.
Add more theories to this comparisonCompare other theories
The claim
In brief
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosThis perspective challenges the prevailing materialist Neo-Darwinian conception of nature, arguing that it fails to account for the irreducible nature of subjective experience, or 'what it is like' to be a conscious organism. It proposes that mind must be incorporated as a fundamental principle of nature itself.
Strawson’s PanpsychismStrawson argues that any philosopher taking a realistic view of physicalism must accept that all physical phenomena are intrinsically experiential or phenomenal, leading to panpsychism (or panexperientialism) as a necessary conclusion of 'Real Materialism'. The existence of conscious experience, being the most certain fact, cannot be denied by genuine physicalism .
What consciousness is
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosConsciousness is fundamentally subjective experience—'how it is for the subject himself'—which resists reduction to purely physical, third-person descriptions.
Strawson’s PanpsychismConsciousness (experience) is identified as an intrinsic, non-reducible phenomenal property of all fundamental physical stuff or energy (panexperientialism).
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosUncertainAs a critique of functionalism and reductionism, Nagel's view suggests that purely computational entities lacking fundamental mental properties are likely philosophical zombies; outcome depends on whether future AI can instantiate the hypothesized universal mental principles.
Strawson’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an irreducible property of every elementary physical entity, then AI, being composed of physical matter, should also have inner awareness, provided the combination problem can be solved and micropsychic aspects can be manipulated by advanced technology .
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosConditionalIf consciousness is a universal, fundamental property rather than a biological emergent, its essence may persist after bodily dissolution (inferred from panpsychist leanings), though likely without retention of personal identity.
Strawson’s PanpsychismUnlikelyAlthough the world is infused with consciousness, survival requires reversing the complex process of microscopic elements coalescing into macroscopic consciousness, which seems difficult for first-person survival upon brain dissolution .
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosUnlikelyThe irreducibility of subjective experience means duplication of physical/functional patterns alone would fail to transfer the original first-person consciousness.
Strawson’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an intrinsic, regular property of the fabric of reality, advanced technology could potentially learn the regularities needed to aggregate or manipulate micropsychic forces to duplicate or upload consciousness .
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosCosmic/UltimateExplicitly seeks to incorporate mind as a fundamental natural principle to overcome the 'pointlessness' implied by materialism, suggesting a non-theistic, inherent cosmic purpose or value.
Strawson’s PanpsychismUncertainPanpsychism is positioned between Materialism (no ultimate purpose) and Dualism/Idealism (ultimate purpose), suggesting possible ultimate meaning/purpose/value .
Nature of mind
Ontology
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosPhilosophical Challenge (leaning towards Universal Monism/Panpsychism)
Strawson’s PanpsychismRealistic Monism / Real Materialism
Mind and body
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosCritiques the current conception of the mind-body relationship, asserting that we lack any conception of how physical and phenomenological aspects could be related or identical.
Strawson’s PanpsychismIdentity Theory (Strong Sense). Mental phenomena are considered concrete physical phenomena because real physicalism encompasses all real phenomena, including experience.
Fundamental or emergent
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosPrimitive (or fundamental)
Strawson’s PanpsychismPrimitive/Fundamental
Qualia
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosQualia (felt qualities) are the core of the problem, and Nagel argues that no objective or physicalist explanation currently formulated can account for their subjective reality.
Strawson’s PanpsychismQualia are real, concrete, and physical properties of the world; their denial is considered the 'silliest claim ever made'.
How it works
Mechanism
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosPrimarily focuses on exposing the conceptual limits of physical reductionism rather than positing a definitive mechanism. Mechanistically, his solution suggests consciousness arises through the composition of fundamental, panpsychic-like elements.
Strawson’s PanpsychismThe principle that all concrete phenomena are physical, combined with the fact that experience is a concrete phenomenon and cannot radically emerge, dictates that experience is intrinsic to fundamental physics.
Where it is
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosUniversal/Systemic (inferred from universal monism/panpsychism leanings) or inherent in the fabric of nature.
Strawson’s PanpsychismUbiquitous, associated with every part or aspect of physical reality, akin to fundamental fields and particles .
What it does
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosPrimarily critical, arguing against the materialist view that consciousness is an inert epiphenomenon. If mind is a fundamental principle, it implies an irreducible, organizing role in the cosmos.
Strawson’s PanpsychismConsciousness, being physical, fits unproblematically into the natural world. (The specific causal role of individual experiences is implied through their physical status but not detailed in the sources).
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosUncertain/Primarily Conceptual. The theory's strength lies in its diagnosis of the explanatory gap, not in empirical verification. His suggested alternative (panpsychism) is highly speculative.
Strawson’s PanpsychismConceptually testable. It is a metaphysical proposal derived from philosophical premises about the nature of the physical world. Nagasawa notes that panpsychism, even if true, may reach a 'cognitive dead end' because it cannot be proven .
Tests so far
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosNot stated
Strawson’s PanpsychismNot stated
Criticisms
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosCriticized for retreating to 'mysterianism' and for rejecting established scientific frameworks (Neo-Darwinian materialism) without offering a concrete, robust, and detailed secular ontology as an alternative.
Strawson’s PanpsychismWidely held to be 'absurd' by some critics . It suffers from the combination problem, requiring an explanation of how micro-level experiences aggregate to yield macrophenomenal properties.
Sources
Key sources
Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos
- What Is It Like to Be a Bat? (1974)
- The View from Nowhere (1986)
- Mind & Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False (2012)
Strawson’s Panpsychism
- Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism, Galen Strawson (2009)
- Real Materialism and Other Essays, Galen Strawson (2008)
- The Consciousness Deniers, Galen Strawson (2018)