Head to head
Russellian Monism vs Strawson’s Panpsychism
Russellian Monism and Strawson’s Panpsychism Theory, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Russellian Monism belongs to the Neutral Monism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Strawson’s Panpsychism to Panpsychism.
- Both treat consciousness as fundamental.
- They give the same kind of answer on AI consciousness, mind uploading and meaning and purpose.
- On life after death, Russellian Monism says “Conditional” and Strawson’s Panpsychism says “Unlikely”.
Add more theories to this comparisonCompare other theories
The claim
In brief
Russellian MonismRussellian Monism posits that the physical world, described by physics only in terms of structure and relations, has an intrinsic nature (quiddities) that is phenomenal or proto-phenomenal. This approach integrates consciousness into the fundamental reality while avoiding the traditional problems of dualism and reductive materialism.
Strawson’s PanpsychismStrawson argues that any philosopher taking a realistic view of physicalism must accept that all physical phenomena are intrinsically experiential or phenomenal, leading to panpsychism (or panexperientialism) as a necessary conclusion of 'Real Materialism'. The existence of conscious experience, being the most certain fact, cannot be denied by genuine physicalism .
What consciousness is
Russellian MonismConsciousness (or proto-consciousness) is the intrinsic, categorical nature or property ('quiddities' or 'inscrutables') underlying the relational structure of physical reality described by physics.
Strawson’s PanpsychismConsciousness (experience) is identified as an intrinsic, non-reducible phenomenal property of all fundamental physical stuff or energy (panexperientialism).
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Both agree
Russellian MonismLikelyIf consciousness is intrinsic to matter/energy, and the combination problem can be technologically harnessed, then artificial systems built from physical substrates should achieve consciousness.
Strawson’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an irreducible property of every elementary physical entity, then AI, being composed of physical matter, should also have inner awareness, provided the combination problem can be solved and micropsychic aspects can be manipulated by advanced technology .
Russellian MonismConditionalSurvival is unlikely for the individual conscious aggregate unless the combination mechanism is preserved or the theory aligns with a cosmic monist view, as individual consciousness (the macroscopic combination) would likely dissolve upon biological death.
Strawson’s PanpsychismUnlikelyAlthough the world is infused with consciousness, survival requires reversing the complex process of microscopic elements coalescing into macroscopic consciousness, which seems difficult for first-person survival upon brain dissolution .
Could a mind be uploaded?Both agree
Russellian MonismLikelyA single-stuff reality should permit virtual immortality, provided advanced technology can manipulate and harness the micropsychic properties to accurately reproduce the macroscopic conscious aggregate digitally.
Strawson’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an intrinsic, regular property of the fabric of reality, advanced technology could potentially learn the regularities needed to aggregate or manipulate micropsychic forces to duplicate or upload consciousness .
Does it give life meaning?Both agree
Russellian MonismUncertainMonisms generally allow for ultimate meaning/purpose/value. If RM takes a priority monist form with evolving consciousness, cosmic purpose may be implied.
Strawson’s PanpsychismUncertainPanpsychism is positioned between Materialism (no ultimate purpose) and Dualism/Idealism (ultimate purpose), suggesting possible ultimate meaning/purpose/value .
Nature of mind
Ontology
Russellian MonismNeutral Monism or Physical Monism or Phenomenal Monism (variant dependent); fundamentally Monistic.
Strawson’s PanpsychismRealistic Monism / Real Materialism
Mind and body
Russellian MonismMind and physical world are deeply intertwined, with mental properties constituting the intrinsic nature of fundamental physical entities (the categorical bases of physical dispositions).
Strawson’s PanpsychismIdentity Theory (Strong Sense). Mental phenomena are considered concrete physical phenomena because real physicalism encompasses all real phenomena, including experience.
Fundamental or emergent
Russellian MonismPrimitive (at the fundamental level of reality, as phenomenal or proto-phenomenal properties of micro-entities).
Strawson’s PanpsychismPrimitive/Fundamental
Qualia
Russellian MonismQualia correspond to the phenomenal properties (or their precursors) that constitute the intrinsic nature of fundamental matter.
Strawson’s PanpsychismQualia are real, concrete, and physical properties of the world; their denial is considered the 'silliest claim ever made'.
How it works
Mechanism
Russellian MonismThe key principle is the existence of unobserved, intrinsic categorical properties ('quiddities') of matter that are phenomenal, thereby grounding consciousness in fundamental reality without expanding the physical ontology of relations.
Strawson’s PanpsychismThe principle that all concrete phenomena are physical, combined with the fact that experience is a concrete phenomenon and cannot radically emerge, dictates that experience is intrinsic to fundamental physics.
Where it is
Russellian MonismLocated in the intrinsic properties of fundamental micro-level physical entities or potentially instantiated by the universe as a whole (priority monism).
Strawson’s PanpsychismUbiquitous, associated with every part or aspect of physical reality, akin to fundamental fields and particles .
What it does
Russellian MonismAvoids the causal exclusion problem of dualism by embedding consciousness into the fundamental properties of the physical world, meaning consciousness underlies physical reality itself.
Strawson’s PanpsychismConsciousness, being physical, fits unproblematically into the natural world. (The specific causal role of individual experiences is implied through their physical status but not detailed in the sources).
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Russellian MonismSpeculative/Conceptual. Its fundamental claims regarding intrinsic properties are generally beyond empirical access or mathematical modeling.
Strawson’s PanpsychismConceptually testable. It is a metaphysical proposal derived from philosophical premises about the nature of the physical world. Nagasawa notes that panpsychism, even if true, may reach a 'cognitive dead end' because it cannot be proven .
Tests so far
Russellian MonismNot stated
Strawson’s PanpsychismNot stated
Criticisms
Russellian MonismThe primary challenge is the combination problem, which is critical: explaining how microphysical properties combine to form complex, integrated macro-level consciousness. If Panprotopsychism is assumed, it faces the problem of deriving consciousness (qualia) from proto-phenomenal properties.
Strawson’s PanpsychismWidely held to be 'absurd' by some critics . It suffers from the combination problem, requiring an explanation of how micro-level experiences aggregate to yield macrophenomenal properties.
Sources
Key sources
Russellian Monism
- What is Russellian Monism?, T. Alter and Y. Nagasawa (2012)
- Russellian Monism, T. Alter and D. Pereboom (2019)
- Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism, D. Chalmers (2016)
Strawson’s Panpsychism
- Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism, Galen Strawson (2009)
- Real Materialism and Other Essays, Galen Strawson (2008)
- The Consciousness Deniers, Galen Strawson (2018)