Head to head
Chalmers’s Panpsychism vs Strawson’s Panpsychism
Chalmers’s Panpsychism and Strawson’s Panpsychism Theory, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Both belong to the Panpsychism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness.
- Both treat consciousness as fundamental.
- They give the same kind of answer on meaning and purpose.
- On AI consciousness, Chalmers’s Panpsychism says “Conditional” and Strawson’s Panpsychism says “Likely”.
- On life after death, Chalmers’s Panpsychism says “Uncertain” and Strawson’s Panpsychism says “Unlikely”.
- On mind uploading, Chalmers’s Panpsychism says “Uncertain” and Strawson’s Panpsychism says “Likely”.
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The claim
In brief
Chalmers’s PanpsychismDavid Chalmers argues that consciousness may be a fundamental feature of physical reality, carried by the intrinsic properties of its most basic entities. He treats panpsychism, and its cousin panprotopsychism, as a synthesis of materialism and dualism, and holds that it would become the most promising answer to the mind-body problem if someone solves the combination problem.
Strawson’s PanpsychismStrawson argues that any philosopher taking a realistic view of physicalism must accept that all physical phenomena are intrinsically experiential or phenomenal, leading to panpsychism (or panexperientialism) as a necessary conclusion of 'Real Materialism'. The existence of conscious experience, being the most certain fact, cannot be denied by genuine physicalism .
What consciousness is
Chalmers’s PanpsychismChalmers identifies consciousness with the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities, the categorical bases of the dispositions that physics describes. Physics tells us what basic entities do; on this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are what they are.
Strawson’s PanpsychismConsciousness (experience) is identified as an intrinsic, non-reducible phenomenal property of all fundamental physical stuff or energy (panexperientialism).
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Chalmers’s PanpsychismConditionalSince every physical system has phenomenal or protophenomenal properties at its base, an AI is built from the same ingredients as a brain. Whether it forms a unified conscious subject depends on how the unsolved combination problem is answered.
Strawson’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an irreducible property of every elementary physical entity, then AI, being composed of physical matter, should also have inner awareness, provided the combination problem can be solved and micropsychic aspects can be manipulated by advanced technology .
Chalmers’s PanpsychismUncertainThe fundamental properties outlast any body, but nothing in the view says whether the particular combined subject survives once the brain's structure breaks down.
Strawson’s PanpsychismUnlikelyAlthough the world is infused with consciousness, survival requires reversing the complex process of microscopic elements coalescing into macroscopic consciousness, which seems difficult for first-person survival upon brain dissolution .
Chalmers’s PanpsychismUncertainAn upload would be made of the same fundamental properties, but whether it reconstitutes the same subject turns on the unsolved combination problem.
Strawson’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an intrinsic, regular property of the fabric of reality, advanced technology could potentially learn the regularities needed to aggregate or manipulate micropsychic forces to duplicate or upload consciousness .
Does it give life meaning?Both agree
Chalmers’s PanpsychismUncertainPlacing experience in the basic fabric of nature gives it a cosmic footing, but Chalmers draws no conclusions about meaning or purpose.
Strawson’s PanpsychismUncertainPanpsychism is positioned between Materialism (no ultimate purpose) and Dualism/Idealism (ultimate purpose), suggesting possible ultimate meaning/purpose/value .
Nature of mind
Ontology
Chalmers’s PanpsychismPanpsychism (Russellian monism)
Strawson’s PanpsychismRealistic Monism / Real Materialism
Mind and body
Chalmers’s PanpsychismMind and matter are two sides of one fundamental stuff that has both physical and phenomenal properties. Chalmers places this ‘monism’ in the sixth of his six classes of views, the nonreductive ones that expand or reconceive physical ontology.
Strawson’s PanpsychismIdentity Theory (Strong Sense). Mental phenomena are considered concrete physical phenomena because real physicalism encompasses all real phenomena, including experience.
Fundamental or emergent
Chalmers’s PanpsychismPrimitive
Strawson’s PanpsychismPrimitive/Fundamental
Qualia
Chalmers’s PanpsychismQualia are real and irreducible. In the panpsychist version they exist in simple form at the fundamental level; in the panprotopsychist version, basic entities have protophenomenal properties that are not themselves experiences but can ground them.
Strawson’s PanpsychismQualia are real, concrete, and physical properties of the world; their denial is considered the 'silliest claim ever made'.
How it works
Mechanism
Chalmers’s PanpsychismChalmers reasons dialectically. Materialism (thesis) meets dualism (antithesis) and yields panpsychism; panprotopsychism challenges it and yields Russellian monism; the combination problem then challenges Russellian monism, with no settled resolution yet.
Strawson’s PanpsychismThe principle that all concrete phenomena are physical, combined with the fact that experience is a concrete phenomenon and cannot radically emerge, dictates that experience is intrinsic to fundamental physics.
Where it is
Chalmers’s PanpsychismThroughout physical reality, at the level of its most basic entities.
Strawson’s PanpsychismUbiquitous, associated with every part or aspect of physical reality, akin to fundamental fields and particles .
What it does
Chalmers’s PanpsychismBecause phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are the categorical bases of physical dispositions, consciousness sits at the base of physical causation itself.
Strawson’s PanpsychismConsciousness, being physical, fits unproblematically into the natural world. (The specific causal role of individual experiences is implied through their physical status but not detailed in the sources).
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Chalmers’s PanpsychismConceptually testable
Strawson’s PanpsychismConceptually testable. It is a metaphysical proposal derived from philosophical premises about the nature of the physical world. Nagasawa notes that panpsychism, even if true, may reach a 'cognitive dead end' because it cannot be proven .
Tests so far
Chalmers’s PanpsychismNot stated
Strawson’s PanpsychismNot stated
Criticisms
Chalmers’s PanpsychismThe combination problem is the central difficulty, and Chalmers concedes it is unsolved. He also calls panpsychism initially counterintuitive, holding that the sense of oddity fades on reflection.
Strawson’s PanpsychismWidely held to be 'absurd' by some critics . It suffers from the combination problem, requiring an explanation of how micro-level experiences aggregate to yield macrophenomenal properties.
Sources
Key sources
Chalmers’s Panpsychism
- Chalmers’s Panpsychism, David Chalmers (Landscape of Consciousness entry)
Strawson’s Panpsychism
- Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism, Galen Strawson (2009)
- Real Materialism and Other Essays, Galen Strawson (2008)
- The Consciousness Deniers, Galen Strawson (2018)