Head to head
Chalmers’s Panpsychism vs Goff’s Panpsychism
Chalmers’s Panpsychism and Goff's Panpsychism, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Both belong to the Panpsychism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness.
- On AI consciousness, Chalmers’s Panpsychism says “Conditional” and Goff’s Panpsychism says “Likely”.
- On life after death, Chalmers’s Panpsychism says “Uncertain” and Goff’s Panpsychism says “Unlikely”.
- On mind uploading, Chalmers’s Panpsychism says “Uncertain” and Goff’s Panpsychism says “Likely”.
- On meaning and purpose, Chalmers’s Panpsychism says “Uncertain” and Goff’s Panpsychism says “Cosmic/Ultimate”.
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The claim
In brief
Chalmers’s PanpsychismDavid Chalmers argues that consciousness may be a fundamental feature of physical reality, carried by the intrinsic properties of its most basic entities. He treats panpsychism, and its cousin panprotopsychism, as a synthesis of materialism and dualism, and holds that it would become the most promising answer to the mind-body problem if someone solves the combination problem.
Goff’s PanpsychismGoff argues that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world, positioning it as the best hope for solving the hard problem that materialism fails to address. He asserts that the physical sciences, with their purely quantitative language, cannot account for the qualitative nature (qualitivity) or subjective aspect of experience, requiring a change in our fundamental understanding of science (Galileo's Error).
What consciousness is
Chalmers’s PanpsychismChalmers identifies consciousness with the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities, the categorical bases of the dispositions that physics describes. Physics tells us what basic entities do; on this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are what they are.
Goff’s PanpsychismConsciousness is identified as a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world. Specifically, Goff explores Panpsychism through the lens of Russellian Monism, where phenomenal or protomenal properties are the intrinsic nature of fundamental matter.
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Chalmers’s PanpsychismConditionalSince every physical system has phenomenal or protophenomenal properties at its base, an AI is built from the same ingredients as a brain. Whether it forms a unified conscious subject depends on how the unsolved combination problem is answered.
Goff’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an intrinsic property of matter/energy, then the physical components of AI systems would possess proto-conscious properties. The realization of full AI consciousness would depend on whether advanced technology can resolve the combination problem in the artificial substrate.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismUncertainThe fundamental properties outlast any body, but nothing in the view says whether the particular combined subject survives once the brain's structure breaks down.
Goff’s PanpsychismUnlikelyWhile consciousness is fundamental, the survival of individual, unified, personal consciousness (the macro-subject) is challenging given the theory relies on a specific organizational structure (the brain) for macro-experience. Success depends on whether the emergent subject persists outside the biological mechanism.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismUncertainAn upload would be made of the same fundamental properties, but whether it reconstitutes the same subject turns on the unsolved combination problem.
Goff’s PanpsychismLikelySince the physical substrate (digital hardware) is composed of fundamentally conscious components (proto-consciousness), virtual immortality is achievable if the conscious organization (solving the combination problem) can be perfectly replicated in the new medium.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismUncertainPlacing experience in the basic fabric of nature gives it a cosmic footing, but Chalmers draws no conclusions about meaning or purpose.
Goff’s PanpsychismCosmic/UltimateGoff's Agentive/Teleological Cosmopsychism implies that the universe itself is a conscious mind with goal-directed intent, suggesting an ultimate, cosmic meaning and purpose.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Chalmers’s PanpsychismPanpsychism (Russellian monism)
Goff’s PanpsychismPanpsychism (often formalized as a variant of Russellian Monism, leading to Hybrid Panpsychism or Agentive Cosmopsychism, where the universe is a conscious agent)
Mind and body
Chalmers’s PanpsychismMind and matter are two sides of one fundamental stuff that has both physical and phenomenal properties. Chalmers places this ‘monism’ in the sixth of his six classes of views, the nonreductive ones that expand or reconceive physical ontology.
Goff’s PanpsychismMind (consciousness/protoconsciousness) is the intrinsic nature of the physical world. This relationship avoids the causal difficulties of Dualism by positing that mental properties are inseparable from the physical fabric, aligning with extended materialism.
Fundamental or emergent
Chalmers’s PanpsychismPrimitive
Goff’s PanpsychismConsciousness is Primitive/Fundamental at the lowest level of reality. However, human subjects of experience are considered Strongly Emergent entities, while their phenomenal properties are Weakly Emergent (Hybrid Panpsychism).
Qualia
Chalmers’s PanpsychismQualia are real and irreducible. In the panpsychist version they exist in simple form at the fundamental level; in the panprotopsychist version, basic entities have protophenomenal properties that are not themselves experiences but can ground them.
Goff’s PanpsychismQualia (sensory qualities or qualitivity) are fundamental properties of reality and cannot be reduced to the purely quantitative language of physics, which has an inherent explanatory limitation. Panpsychism solves the hard problem by postulating that these qualities exist fundamentally.
How it works
Mechanism
Chalmers’s PanpsychismChalmers reasons dialectically. Materialism (thesis) meets dualism (antithesis) and yields panpsychism; panprotopsychism challenges it and yields Russellian monism; the combination problem then challenges Russellian monism, with no settled resolution yet.
Goff’s PanpsychismThe primary principle is metaphysical necessity: consciousness must be fundamental to avoid the explanatory gap and solve the hard problem. In Agentive Cosmopsychism, teleological causation (goal-directed intent) by the conscious cosmos explains fine-tuning.
Where it is
Chalmers’s PanpsychismThroughout physical reality, at the level of its most basic entities.
Goff’s PanpsychismConsciousness is ubiquitous, permeating the physical world. In Cosmopsychism, the fundamental consciousness is located in the universe as a whole.
What it does
Chalmers’s PanpsychismBecause phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are the categorical bases of physical dispositions, consciousness sits at the base of physical causation itself.
Goff’s PanpsychismAt the cosmic level (Agentive Cosmopsychism), consciousness functions as an agent explaining cosmic fine-tuning and the emergence of life/mind. For individual subjects, consciousness is the source of value and identity. The combination problem must be resolved to establish coherent causation from micro- to macro-subjects.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Chalmers’s PanpsychismConceptually testable
Goff’s PanpsychismSpeculative. The theory aims to solve conceptual and metaphysical tensions (like the hard problem) , but the fundamental claim that consciousness is ubiquitous is difficult to test empirically, leading to critiques that panpsychism reaches a 'cognitive dead end'.
Tests so far
Chalmers’s PanpsychismNot stated
Goff’s PanpsychismNot stated
Criticisms
Chalmers’s PanpsychismThe combination problem is the central difficulty, and Chalmers concedes it is unsolved. He also calls panpsychism initially counterintuitive, holding that the sense of oddity fades on reflection.
Goff’s PanpsychismThe main tension is the Combination Problem: how do micro-phenomenal properties combine or aggregate to form complex macro-phenomenal properties (such as human consciousness). Goff's rejection of quantitative descriptions being able to capture quality is also critiqued by proponents of information-based theories.
Sources
Key sources
Chalmers’s Panpsychism
- Chalmers’s Panpsychism, David Chalmers (Landscape of Consciousness entry)
Goff’s Panpsychism
- Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness, Philip Goff (2019)
- Why? the Purpose of the Universe, Philip Goff (2023)
- Putting consciousness first: replies to critics, Philip Goff (2021)