Head to head
Chalmers’s Panpsychism vs Tegmark’s State of Matter
Chalmers’s Panpsychism and Tegmark’s State of Matter, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Chalmers’s Panpsychism belongs to the Panpsychism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Tegmark’s State of Matter to Neutral Monism.
- Chalmers’s Panpsychism treats consciousness as fundamental; Tegmark’s State of Matter treats it as emergent.
- On AI consciousness, Chalmers’s Panpsychism says “Conditional” and Tegmark’s State of Matter says “Yes”.
- On life after death, Chalmers’s Panpsychism says “Uncertain” and Tegmark’s State of Matter says “No”.
- On mind uploading, Chalmers’s Panpsychism says “Uncertain” and Tegmark’s State of Matter says “Likely”.
- On meaning and purpose, Chalmers’s Panpsychism says “Uncertain” and Tegmark’s State of Matter says “Humanistic only”.
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The claim
In brief
Chalmers’s PanpsychismDavid Chalmers argues that consciousness may be a fundamental feature of physical reality, carried by the intrinsic properties of its most basic entities. He treats panpsychism, and its cousin panprotopsychism, as a synthesis of materialism and dualism, and holds that it would become the most promising answer to the mind-body problem if someone solves the combination problem.
Tegmark’s State of MatterTegmark proposes that consciousness can be understood as a specific state of matter, coined 'perceptronium,' which is defined by distinctive information-processing abilities. Starting from the premise that all existence is physical, the theory seeks principles that distinguish conscious, complex information processing from non-conscious processing.
What consciousness is
Chalmers’s PanpsychismChalmers identifies consciousness with the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities, the categorical bases of the dispositions that physics describes. Physics tells us what basic entities do; on this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are what they are.
Tegmark’s State of MatterConsciousness is identified as the subjective experience or 'feeling' that arises when information is being processed in certain complex ways, constituting the state of matter termed 'perceptronium'.
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Chalmers’s PanpsychismConditionalSince every physical system has phenomenal or protophenomenal properties at its base, an AI is built from the same ingredients as a brain. Whether it forms a unified conscious subject depends on how the unsolved combination problem is answered.
Tegmark’s State of MatterYesThe theory is strictly physicalist ('It's all physics') and defines consciousness as a state of matter achievable through complex information processing. Therefore, artificial systems can achieve this state in principle.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismUncertainThe fundamental properties outlast any body, but nothing in the view says whether the particular combined subject survives once the brain's structure breaks down.
Tegmark’s State of MatterNoConsciousness is an emergent state of matter (perceptronium) of the physical brain. The irreversible death and dissolution of the physical substrate would entail the cessation of consciousness.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismUncertainAn upload would be made of the same fundamental properties, but whether it reconstitutes the same subject turns on the unsolved combination problem.
Tegmark’s State of MatterLikelyIf consciousness is a specific informational state of matter defined by mathematical/physical principles, that state could potentially be perfectly duplicated or uploaded into a non-biological medium by advanced technology.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismUncertainPlacing experience in the basic fabric of nature gives it a cosmic footing, but Chalmers draws no conclusions about meaning or purpose.
Tegmark’s State of MatterHumanistic onlyThe foundation in physics and mathematical structure typically suggests no ultimate cosmic purpose, consistent with deflationary physicalist views. The theory does not explicitly propose cosmic teleology.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Chalmers’s PanpsychismPanpsychism (Russellian monism)
Tegmark’s State of MatterPhysicalism / Monism
Mind and body
Chalmers’s PanpsychismMind and matter are two sides of one fundamental stuff that has both physical and phenomenal properties. Chalmers places this ‘monism’ in the sixth of his six classes of views, the nonreductive ones that expand or reconceive physical ontology.
Tegmark’s State of MatterAn identity relationship is implied, where subjective experience (mind) is identified as a specific physical state (a state of matter/information processing).
Fundamental or emergent
Chalmers’s PanpsychismPrimitive
Tegmark’s State of MatterEmergent
Qualia
Chalmers’s PanpsychismQualia are real and irreducible. In the panpsychist version they exist in simple form at the fundamental level; in the panprotopsychist version, basic entities have protophenomenal properties that are not themselves experiences but can ground them.
Tegmark’s State of MatterQualia are implicitly the 'feeling' (subjective experience) associated with perceptronium's specific information processing configurations, formalized through four principles: information, integration, independence, and dynamics.
How it works
Mechanism
Chalmers’s PanpsychismChalmers reasons dialectically. Materialism (thesis) meets dualism (antithesis) and yields panpsychism; panprotopsychism challenges it and yields Russellian monism; the combination problem then challenges Russellian monism, with no settled resolution yet.
Tegmark’s State of MatterThe definition of perceptronium via the application of four distinct principles (information, integration, independence, and dynamics) to information processing in physical systems.
Where it is
Chalmers’s PanpsychismThroughout physical reality, at the level of its most basic entities.
Tegmark’s State of MatterLocalized to physical systems (e.g., neural networks or arbitrary quantum systems) that achieve the specific information-processing criteria defining perceptronium.
What it does
Chalmers’s PanpsychismBecause phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are the categorical bases of physical dispositions, consciousness sits at the base of physical causation itself.
Tegmark’s State of MatterConsciousness is crucial for information assessment and is viewed as functionally important for critical needs like caring for comatose patients or communicating with advanced AI. Causation is strictly physical.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Chalmers’s PanpsychismConceptually testable
Tegmark’s State of MatterEmpirically testable
Tests so far
Chalmers’s PanpsychismNot stated
Tegmark’s State of MatterThe generalization of Integrated Information Theory implies relevance to IIT's measurement function (quantifying degrees of consciousness). The theory is intended to address concrete problems like assessing comatose patients and advanced AI.
Criticisms
Chalmers’s PanpsychismThe combination problem is the central difficulty, and Chalmers concedes it is unsolved. He also calls panpsychism initially counterintuitive, holding that the sense of oddity fades on reflection.
Tegmark’s State of MatterAs a generalization of IIT, it inherits existing critiques, such as the difficulty in explaining subjective feeling purely through physical and informational principles.
Sources
Key sources
Chalmers’s Panpsychism
- Chalmers’s Panpsychism, David Chalmers (Landscape of Consciousness entry)
Tegmark’s State of Matter
- Consciousness is a state of matter (2015)
- Our Mathematical Universe: My Quest for the Ultimate Nature of Reality (2014)