Head to head
Eliminative Materialism vs Functionalism
Churchland’s Eliminative Materialism and Functionalism, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Both belong to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness.
- They give the same kind of answer on meaning and purpose.
- On life after death, Eliminative Materialism says “No” and Functionalism says “Conditional”.
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The claim
In brief
Eliminative MaterialismPaul and Patricia Churchland hold that common-sense psychology, our everyday talk of beliefs, desires, and experiences, is a radically false theory that a completed neuroscience will displace rather than smoothly reduce. Consciousness as we ordinarily conceive it is a brain-generated picture shaped by evolution, and our self-understanding, introspection included, will be rebuilt in neuroscientific terms.
FunctionalismFunctionalism posits that mental states are defined by their causal relations to one another, to sensory inputs, and to behavioral outputs, independent of the physical medium (substrate) in which they are realized. The essence of consciousness is determined by how mental states function or operate, rather than by what they are materially composed of.
What consciousness is
Eliminative MaterialismWhat we call consciousness, as folk psychology describes it, does not exist in that form. The real phenomena are neural processes, which only a mature neuroscience will describe correctly.
FunctionalismMental states are identified as functional states, constituted by their causal relations, roles, results, and outputs, implying they are realizable in any substrate that supports those functions.
Big questions
Eliminative MaterialismNo position
FunctionalismYesFunctionalism holds that consciousness is based on function, not biology. If the correct functions can be realized computationally in non-biological substrates, AI consciousness is possible in principle and certain if Materialism is true.
Eliminative MaterialismNoSince the mind is the brain, nothing mental survives the brain’s death.
FunctionalismConditionalAs a physicalist theory, consciousness is tied to the substrate. Survival beyond death of the biological body is only possible if the functional mental state can be successfully transferred (uploaded) to a new, continuing substrate (virtual immortality).
Eliminative MaterialismNo position
FunctionalismLikelyFunctionalism serves as the theoretical basis for virtual immortality. If the functional role of the mental self can be perfectly duplicated and uploaded to a new medium, the first-person mental self is preserved.
Does it give life meaning?Both agree
Eliminative MaterialismHumanistic onlyPatricia Churchland urges us to see ourselves as organisms in nature, understood by scientific methods, with no cosmic purpose.
FunctionalismHumanistic onlyFunctionalism describes the mechanism by which mind/consciousness operates within a physical world, providing capacities for agency and reflection, but offers no rationale for ultimate cosmic meaning or teleology, aligning with the general stance of Materialism.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Eliminative MaterialismPhysicalism (eliminative)
FunctionalismPhysicalism (broadly, agnostic to substance). The theory is classified under Materialism, but it is metaphysically agnostic regarding nonphysical substances, focusing primarily on the functional description of mental states.
Mind and body
Eliminative MaterialismThe mind is the brain. Patricia Churchland calls her program a ‘unified theory of the mind-brain’ and treats claims that mind goes beyond brain as the residue of folk myths.
FunctionalismMental states are functional states identical to the functional roles that are realized or instantiated in a physical substrate, leading to 'functional state identity theses'.
Fundamental or emergent
Eliminative MaterialismNeither
FunctionalismEmergent. Consciousness arises from the functional organization realized by a sufficiently complex substrate (like neural tissue or computer chips).
Qualia
Eliminative MaterialismQualia as folk psychology and philosophers conceive them are expected to give way to neuroscientific description; the view treats consciousness as a kind of illusion generated by the brain.
FunctionalismThe theory traditionally struggles to account for phenomenal qualia, often addressing them by asserting that the qualitative feel is entirely exhausted by the functional role, or by coupling with representational theories.
How it works
Mechanism
Eliminative MaterialismTheory displacement. Folk psychology will be replaced the way outdated scientific theories were, its principles and ontology discarded rather than mapped onto brain states.
FunctionalismThe principle of multiple realizability, stating that mental state realization is independent of the physical substrate, contingent only upon the required function being instantiated.
Where it is
Eliminative MaterialismIn the brain.
FunctionalismDistributed wherever the functional organization is successfully realized, regardless of whether the substrate is neural tissue or hardwired computing components.
What it does
Eliminative MaterialismBehavior is caused by neural processes; neuroscience is expected to explain it better than folk psychology does.
FunctionalismFunctions, roles, and outputs are dispositive. Mental states are causally effective because they are defined by their causal relations within the system (functional role).
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Eliminative MaterialismConceptually testable
FunctionalismConceptually and empirically testable. Thought experiments (like substrate replacement) probe its conceptual limits, and computational realization (AI) tests its empirical application.
Tests so far
Eliminative MaterialismThe view stakes its claim on the future course of neuroscience; whether folk categories survive in mature brain science is the long-run test.
FunctionalismThe silicon chip replacement thought experiment is used conceptually to test whether phenomenal consciousness is preserved when the functional role is maintained across a change in substrate.
Criticisms
Eliminative MaterialismCritics say denying subjective experience defies both intuition and direct evidence; Galen Strawson calls the denial of experience ‘the strangest thing that has ever happened in the whole history of human thought’. There is also tension between Patricia Churchland’s talk of reduction to neurobiology and the eliminativist claim that folk psychology will be displaced rather than reduced.
FunctionalismIt is criticized heavily for failing to account for phenomenal consciousness (qualia) by describing only the functional role, leading to the 'hard problem' challenge that functional roles may not exhaust the nature of conscious experience.
Sources
Key sources
Eliminative Materialism
- Neurophilosophy, Patricia Churchland (1986)
- Churchland’s Eliminative Materialism (Landscape of Consciousness), Patricia Churchland
Functionalism
- What is functionalism? (N. Block) (1980)
- What Is Functionalism? Consciousness, Function, and Representation (N. Block) (2007)
- Functionalism (J. Levin) (2023)