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Functionalism vs Goff’s Panpsychism

Functionalism and Goff's Panpsychism, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.

At a glance

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Materialism Functionalism Ned Block, J.J.C. Smart, Janet Levin

The claim

In brief
FunctionalismFunctionalism posits that mental states are defined by their causal relations to one another, to sensory inputs, and to behavioral outputs, independent of the physical medium (substrate) in which they are realized. The essence of consciousness is determined by how mental states function or operate, rather than by what they are materially composed of.
Goff’s PanpsychismGoff argues that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world, positioning it as the best hope for solving the hard problem that materialism fails to address. He asserts that the physical sciences, with their purely quantitative language, cannot account for the qualitative nature (qualitivity) or subjective aspect of experience, requiring a change in our fundamental understanding of science (Galileo's Error).
What consciousness is
FunctionalismMental states are identified as functional states, constituted by their causal relations, roles, results, and outputs, implying they are realizable in any substrate that supports those functions.
Goff’s PanpsychismConsciousness is identified as a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world. Specifically, Goff explores Panpsychism through the lens of Russellian Monism, where phenomenal or protomenal properties are the intrinsic nature of fundamental matter.

Big questions

FunctionalismYesFunctionalism holds that consciousness is based on function, not biology. If the correct functions can be realized computationally in non-biological substrates, AI consciousness is possible in principle and certain if Materialism is true.
Goff’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an intrinsic property of matter/energy, then the physical components of AI systems would possess proto-conscious properties. The realization of full AI consciousness would depend on whether advanced technology can resolve the combination problem in the artificial substrate.
FunctionalismConditionalAs a physicalist theory, consciousness is tied to the substrate. Survival beyond death of the biological body is only possible if the functional mental state can be successfully transferred (uploaded) to a new, continuing substrate (virtual immortality).
Goff’s PanpsychismUnlikelyWhile consciousness is fundamental, the survival of individual, unified, personal consciousness (the macro-subject) is challenging given the theory relies on a specific organizational structure (the brain) for macro-experience. Success depends on whether the emergent subject persists outside the biological mechanism.
FunctionalismLikelyFunctionalism serves as the theoretical basis for virtual immortality. If the functional role of the mental self can be perfectly duplicated and uploaded to a new medium, the first-person mental self is preserved.
Goff’s PanpsychismLikelySince the physical substrate (digital hardware) is composed of fundamentally conscious components (proto-consciousness), virtual immortality is achievable if the conscious organization (solving the combination problem) can be perfectly replicated in the new medium.
FunctionalismHumanistic onlyFunctionalism describes the mechanism by which mind/consciousness operates within a physical world, providing capacities for agency and reflection, but offers no rationale for ultimate cosmic meaning or teleology, aligning with the general stance of Materialism.
Goff’s PanpsychismCosmic/UltimateGoff's Agentive/Teleological Cosmopsychism implies that the universe itself is a conscious mind with goal-directed intent, suggesting an ultimate, cosmic meaning and purpose.

Nature of mind

Ontology
FunctionalismPhysicalism (broadly, agnostic to substance). The theory is classified under Materialism, but it is metaphysically agnostic regarding nonphysical substances, focusing primarily on the functional description of mental states.
Goff’s PanpsychismPanpsychism (often formalized as a variant of Russellian Monism, leading to Hybrid Panpsychism or Agentive Cosmopsychism, where the universe is a conscious agent)
Mind and body
FunctionalismMental states are functional states identical to the functional roles that are realized or instantiated in a physical substrate, leading to 'functional state identity theses'.
Goff’s PanpsychismMind (consciousness/protoconsciousness) is the intrinsic nature of the physical world. This relationship avoids the causal difficulties of Dualism by positing that mental properties are inseparable from the physical fabric, aligning with extended materialism.
Fundamental or emergent
FunctionalismEmergent. Consciousness arises from the functional organization realized by a sufficiently complex substrate (like neural tissue or computer chips).
Goff’s PanpsychismConsciousness is Primitive/Fundamental at the lowest level of reality. However, human subjects of experience are considered Strongly Emergent entities, while their phenomenal properties are Weakly Emergent (Hybrid Panpsychism).
Qualia
FunctionalismThe theory traditionally struggles to account for phenomenal qualia, often addressing them by asserting that the qualitative feel is entirely exhausted by the functional role, or by coupling with representational theories.
Goff’s PanpsychismQualia (sensory qualities or qualitivity) are fundamental properties of reality and cannot be reduced to the purely quantitative language of physics, which has an inherent explanatory limitation. Panpsychism solves the hard problem by postulating that these qualities exist fundamentally.

How it works

Mechanism
FunctionalismThe principle of multiple realizability, stating that mental state realization is independent of the physical substrate, contingent only upon the required function being instantiated.
Goff’s PanpsychismThe primary principle is metaphysical necessity: consciousness must be fundamental to avoid the explanatory gap and solve the hard problem. In Agentive Cosmopsychism, teleological causation (goal-directed intent) by the conscious cosmos explains fine-tuning.
Where it is
FunctionalismDistributed wherever the functional organization is successfully realized, regardless of whether the substrate is neural tissue or hardwired computing components.
Goff’s PanpsychismConsciousness is ubiquitous, permeating the physical world. In Cosmopsychism, the fundamental consciousness is located in the universe as a whole.
What it does
FunctionalismFunctions, roles, and outputs are dispositive. Mental states are causally effective because they are defined by their causal relations within the system (functional role).
Goff’s PanpsychismAt the cosmic level (Agentive Cosmopsychism), consciousness functions as an agent explaining cosmic fine-tuning and the emergence of life/mind. For individual subjects, consciousness is the source of value and identity. The combination problem must be resolved to establish coherent causation from micro- to macro-subjects.

Evidence and criticism

Testability
FunctionalismConceptually and empirically testable. Thought experiments (like substrate replacement) probe its conceptual limits, and computational realization (AI) tests its empirical application.
Goff’s PanpsychismSpeculative. The theory aims to solve conceptual and metaphysical tensions (like the hard problem) , but the fundamental claim that consciousness is ubiquitous is difficult to test empirically, leading to critiques that panpsychism reaches a 'cognitive dead end'.
Tests so far
FunctionalismThe silicon chip replacement thought experiment is used conceptually to test whether phenomenal consciousness is preserved when the functional role is maintained across a change in substrate.
Goff’s PanpsychismNot stated
Criticisms
FunctionalismIt is criticized heavily for failing to account for phenomenal consciousness (qualia) by describing only the functional role, leading to the 'hard problem' challenge that functional roles may not exhaust the nature of conscious experience.
Goff’s PanpsychismThe main tension is the Combination Problem: how do micro-phenomenal properties combine or aggregate to form complex macro-phenomenal properties (such as human consciousness). Goff's rejection of quantitative descriptions being able to capture quality is also critiqued by proponents of information-based theories.

Sources

Key sources
Functionalism
  • What is functionalism? (N. Block) (1980)
  • What Is Functionalism? Consciousness, Function, and Representation (N. Block) (2007)
  • Functionalism (J. Levin) (2023)
Goff’s Panpsychism
  • Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness, Philip Goff (2019)
  • Why? the Purpose of the Universe, Philip Goff (2023)
  • Putting consciousness first: replies to critics, Philip Goff (2021)

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