Head to head
Crick and Koch’s NCC vs Russellian Monism
Crick and Koch’s Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC) and Russellian Monism, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Crick and Koch’s NCC belongs to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Russellian Monism to Neutral Monism.
- Crick and Koch’s NCC treats consciousness as emergent; Russellian Monism treats it as fundamental.
- They give the same kind of answer on AI consciousness and mind uploading.
- On life after death, Crick and Koch’s NCC says “No” and Russellian Monism says “Conditional”.
- On meaning and purpose, Crick and Koch’s NCC says “Humanistic only” and Russellian Monism says “Uncertain”.
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The claim
In brief
Crick and Koch’s NCCThis theory proposes a scientific agenda to identify the Neural Correlate of Consciousness (NCC), defined as the minimum activities in the brain that are jointly sufficient and necessary for any specific conscious perception or subjective experience. It asserts that consciousness is entirely physical and can be fully reduced to these specific brain activities.
Russellian MonismRussellian Monism posits that the physical world, described by physics only in terms of structure and relations, has an intrinsic nature (quiddities) that is phenomenal or proto-phenomenal. This approach integrates consciousness into the fundamental reality while avoiding the traditional problems of dualism and reductive materialism.
What consciousness is
Crick and Koch’s NCCConsciousness (phenomenal consciousness/qualia) is identified as the Neural Correlate of Consciousness (NCC), the precise minimum pattern of neural activity in the brain necessary and sufficient for subjective experience.
Russellian MonismConsciousness (or proto-consciousness) is the intrinsic, categorical nature or property ('quiddities' or 'inscrutables') underlying the relational structure of physical reality described by physics.
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Both agree
Crick and Koch’s NCCYesIf consciousness is entirely reducible to physical organizational patterns (NCC), then non-biological systems capable of replicating those precise patterns should also become conscious, barring technological constraints.
Russellian MonismLikelyIf consciousness is intrinsic to matter/energy, and the combination problem can be technologically harnessed, then artificial systems built from physical substrates should achieve consciousness.
Crick and Koch’s NCCNoAs a Materialist theory, consciousness is wholly dependent on the physical brain; cessation of brain function entails the end of consciousness.
Russellian MonismConditionalSurvival is unlikely for the individual conscious aggregate unless the combination mechanism is preserved or the theory aligns with a cosmic monist view, as individual consciousness (the macroscopic combination) would likely dissolve upon biological death.
Could a mind be uploaded?Both agree
Crick and Koch’s NCCYesIf the NCC states can be perfectly measured and replicated in a digital or artificial medium (mind uploading), the resulting system would be functionally and phenomenally identical, achieving virtual immortality in principle.
Russellian MonismLikelyA single-stuff reality should permit virtual immortality, provided advanced technology can manipulate and harness the micropsychic properties to accurately reproduce the macroscopic conscious aggregate digitally.
Crick and Koch’s NCCHumanistic onlyConsistent with Materialism, consciousness is a biological product of evolution and physics, conferring no ultimate cosmic meaning or teleology beyond that which humans create for themselves.
Russellian MonismUncertainMonisms generally allow for ultimate meaning/purpose/value. If RM takes a priority monist form with evolving consciousness, cosmic purpose may be implied.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Crick and Koch’s NCCReductive Physicalism/Materialism. The NCC approach is considered macroscopic materialism.
Russellian MonismNeutral Monism or Physical Monism or Phenomenal Monism (variant dependent); fundamentally Monistic.
Mind and body
Crick and Koch’s NCCIdentity Theory. Mental states are wholly identical to and fully explained by the physical NCC states.
Russellian MonismMind and physical world are deeply intertwined, with mental properties constituting the intrinsic nature of fundamental physical entities (the categorical bases of physical dispositions).
Fundamental or emergent
Crick and Koch’s NCCEmergent
Russellian MonismPrimitive (at the fundamental level of reality, as phenomenal or proto-phenomenal properties of micro-entities).
Qualia
Crick and Koch’s NCCQualia (the qualitative feel of experience) are identified with the minimum neural activities (NCC) that are jointly sufficient for specific conscious perception, although the mechanism for this identity remains the central 'hard problem' challenge.
Russellian MonismQualia correspond to the phenomenal properties (or their precursors) that constitute the intrinsic nature of fundamental matter.
How it works
Mechanism
Crick and Koch’s NCCThe search for and definition of the Neural Correlate of Consciousness (NCC): the specific minimum neural activities necessary and sufficient for subjective experience.
Russellian MonismThe key principle is the existence of unobserved, intrinsic categorical properties ('quiddities') of matter that are phenomenal, thereby grounding consciousness in fundamental reality without expanding the physical ontology of relations.
Where it is
Crick and Koch’s NCCLocalized in specific brain areas. Early candidates included the claustrum (as a 'conductor' coordinating percepts); later candidates focused on the posterior cerebral cortex (temporo-parietal-occipital hot zone).
Russellian MonismLocated in the intrinsic properties of fundamental micro-level physical entities or potentially instantiated by the universe as a whole (priority monism).
What it does
Crick and Koch’s NCCConsciousness is directly caused by, and is identical to, the NCC activity. NCC mechanisms (spikes, flows, circuits) are seen as constitutive of phenomenal consciousness.
Russellian MonismAvoids the causal exclusion problem of dualism by embedding consciousness into the fundamental properties of the physical world, meaning consciousness underlies physical reality itself.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Crick and Koch’s NCCEmpirically testable. The search for the NCC is defined as a scientific program seeking testable biological bases for consciousness.
Russellian MonismSpeculative/Conceptual. Its fundamental claims regarding intrinsic properties are generally beyond empirical access or mathematical modeling.
Tests so far
Crick and Koch’s NCCIdentifying specific clusters of neurons or brain regions (like the claustrum or posterior cortex) that are active during conscious experience.,Measuring electrophysiological activity (e.g., action potentials and neural circuits).
Russellian MonismNot stated
Criticisms
Crick and Koch’s NCCThe primary tension is the 'explanatory gap': identifying a correlation (NCC) does not explain the identity statement of how physical activity (spikes/chemicals) literally generates phenomenal feel (qualia). The failure to identify a 'clear' NCC after decades of research is a practical limitation.
Russellian MonismThe primary challenge is the combination problem, which is critical: explaining how microphysical properties combine to form complex, integrated macro-level consciousness. If Panprotopsychism is assumed, it faces the problem of deriving consciousness (qualia) from proto-phenomenal properties.
Sources
Key sources
Crick and Koch’s NCC
- Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness, F. Crick and C. Koch (1990)
- What is the function of the claustrum?, F. Crick and C. Koch (2005)
- The Quest for Consciousness: a Neurobiological Approach, C. Koch (2004)
Russellian Monism
- What is Russellian Monism?, T. Alter and Y. Nagasawa (2012)
- Russellian Monism, T. Alter and D. Pereboom (2019)
- Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism, D. Chalmers (2016)