Head to head
Dennett’s Illusionism vs Strawson’s Panpsychism
Dennett’s Illusionism and Strawson’s Panpsychism Theory, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Dennett’s Illusionism belongs to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Strawson’s Panpsychism to Panpsychism.
- Dennett’s Illusionism treats consciousness as emergent; Strawson’s Panpsychism treats it as fundamental.
- They give the same kind of answer on life after death.
- On AI consciousness, Dennett’s Illusionism says “Possible” and Strawson’s Panpsychism says “Likely”.
- On meaning and purpose, Dennett’s Illusionism says “Humanistic only” and Strawson’s Panpsychism says “Uncertain”.
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The claim
In brief
Dennett’s IllusionismDaniel Dennett argues that qualia, conceived as intrinsic, ineffable, private, and immediately known properties of experience, do not exist; they are philosophers’ inventions. Experience is real, but it is not what it seems from the inside: the brain’s unconscious processes produce a benign ‘user illusion’, and there is nothing to consciousness beyond the functions and dispositions involved.
Strawson’s PanpsychismStrawson argues that any philosopher taking a realistic view of physicalism must accept that all physical phenomena are intrinsically experiential or phenomenal, leading to panpsychism (or panexperientialism) as a necessary conclusion of 'Real Materialism'. The existence of conscious experience, being the most certain fact, cannot be denied by genuine physicalism .
What consciousness is
Dennett’s IllusionismConsciousness is the functional activity of the brain, which presents itself to us as a user illusion. ‘There are no qualia.’
Strawson’s PanpsychismConsciousness (experience) is identified as an intrinsic, non-reducible phenomenal property of all fundamental physical stuff or energy (panexperientialism).
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Dennett’s IllusionismPossibleSince consciousness is nothing beyond functions and dispositions, a machine with the right functional organization could have it; Dennett does not take this up here.
Strawson’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an irreducible property of every elementary physical entity, then AI, being composed of physical matter, should also have inner awareness, provided the combination problem can be solved and micropsychic aspects can be manipulated by advanced technology .
Does consciousness survive death?Both agree
Dennett’s IllusionismNoSince consciousness is a product of the brain’s processes, it ends when they end.
Strawson’s PanpsychismUnlikelyAlthough the world is infused with consciousness, survival requires reversing the complex process of microscopic elements coalescing into macroscopic consciousness, which seems difficult for first-person survival upon brain dissolution .
Dennett’s IllusionismNo position
Strawson’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an intrinsic, regular property of the fabric of reality, advanced technology could potentially learn the regularities needed to aggregate or manipulate micropsychic forces to duplicate or upload consciousness .
Dennett’s IllusionismHumanistic onlyDennett’s materialism, and his place among the New Atheists, leave no room for cosmic purpose.
Strawson’s PanpsychismUncertainPanpsychism is positioned between Materialism (no ultimate purpose) and Dualism/Idealism (ultimate purpose), suggesting possible ultimate meaning/purpose/value .
Nature of mind
Ontology
Dennett’s IllusionismPhysicalism (illusionist)
Strawson’s PanpsychismRealistic Monism / Real Materialism
Mind and body
Dennett’s IllusionismConsciousness is wholly a product of the brain’s unconscious processes. Dennett rejects any inner, non-physical domain of felt properties.
Strawson’s PanpsychismIdentity Theory (Strong Sense). Mental phenomena are considered concrete physical phenomena because real physicalism encompasses all real phenomena, including experience.
Fundamental or emergent
Dennett’s IllusionismEmergent
Strawson’s PanpsychismPrimitive/Fundamental
Qualia
Dennett’s IllusionismThere are no qualia in the traditional sense. Dennett calls the supposed intrinsic, ineffable, private properties ‘nothing but philosophers’ inventions’.
Strawson’s PanpsychismQualia are real, concrete, and physical properties of the world; their denial is considered the 'silliest claim ever made'.
How it works
Mechanism
Dennett’s IllusionismThe user illusion. As a computer’s desktop icons stand in for complex underlying processes, the brain presents itself to us in a simplified form we mistake for an inner world of qualities.
Strawson’s PanpsychismThe principle that all concrete phenomena are physical, combined with the fact that experience is a concrete phenomenon and cannot radically emerge, dictates that experience is intrinsic to fundamental physics.
Where it is
Dennett’s IllusionismIn the brain’s unconscious processes, with no inner theater.
Strawson’s PanpsychismUbiquitous, associated with every part or aspect of physical reality, akin to fundamental fields and particles .
What it does
Dennett’s IllusionismThe user illusion is benign: it lets us manage ourselves without access to the brain’s underlying complexity.
Strawson’s PanpsychismConsciousness, being physical, fits unproblematically into the natural world. (The specific causal role of individual experiences is implied through their physical status but not detailed in the sources).
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Dennett’s IllusionismConceptually testable
Strawson’s PanpsychismConceptually testable. It is a metaphysical proposal derived from philosophical premises about the nature of the physical world. Nagasawa notes that panpsychism, even if true, may reach a 'cognitive dead end' because it cannot be proven .
Tests so far
Dennett’s IllusionismNot stated
Strawson’s PanpsychismNot stated
Criticisms
Dennett’s IllusionismDennett is often read as denying that experience exists, and critics reply that an illusion of experience would itself be an experience. Dennett resisted the eliminativist label, though many philosophers apply it to his rejection of qualia.
Strawson’s PanpsychismWidely held to be 'absurd' by some critics . It suffers from the combination problem, requiring an explanation of how micro-level experiences aggregate to yield macrophenomenal properties.
Sources
Key sources
Dennett’s Illusionism
- Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett
- I've Been Thinking, Daniel Dennett (2023)
- Dennett’s Illusionism (Landscape of Consciousness), Daniel Dennett (1992)
Strawson’s Panpsychism
- Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism, Galen Strawson (2009)
- Real Materialism and Other Essays, Galen Strawson (2008)
- The Consciousness Deniers, Galen Strawson (2018)