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Dennett’s Illusionism vs Goff’s Panpsychism

Dennett’s Illusionism and Goff's Panpsychism, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.

At a glance

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The claim

In brief
Dennett’s IllusionismDaniel Dennett argues that qualia, conceived as intrinsic, ineffable, private, and immediately known properties of experience, do not exist; they are philosophers’ inventions. Experience is real, but it is not what it seems from the inside: the brain’s unconscious processes produce a benign ‘user illusion’, and there is nothing to consciousness beyond the functions and dispositions involved.
Goff’s PanpsychismGoff argues that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world, positioning it as the best hope for solving the hard problem that materialism fails to address. He asserts that the physical sciences, with their purely quantitative language, cannot account for the qualitative nature (qualitivity) or subjective aspect of experience, requiring a change in our fundamental understanding of science (Galileo's Error).
What consciousness is
Dennett’s IllusionismConsciousness is the functional activity of the brain, which presents itself to us as a user illusion. ‘There are no qualia.’
Goff’s PanpsychismConsciousness is identified as a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world. Specifically, Goff explores Panpsychism through the lens of Russellian Monism, where phenomenal or protomenal properties are the intrinsic nature of fundamental matter.

Big questions

Dennett’s IllusionismPossibleSince consciousness is nothing beyond functions and dispositions, a machine with the right functional organization could have it; Dennett does not take this up here.
Goff’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an intrinsic property of matter/energy, then the physical components of AI systems would possess proto-conscious properties. The realization of full AI consciousness would depend on whether advanced technology can resolve the combination problem in the artificial substrate.
Dennett’s IllusionismNoSince consciousness is a product of the brain’s processes, it ends when they end.
Goff’s PanpsychismUnlikelyWhile consciousness is fundamental, the survival of individual, unified, personal consciousness (the macro-subject) is challenging given the theory relies on a specific organizational structure (the brain) for macro-experience. Success depends on whether the emergent subject persists outside the biological mechanism.
Dennett’s IllusionismNo position
Goff’s PanpsychismLikelySince the physical substrate (digital hardware) is composed of fundamentally conscious components (proto-consciousness), virtual immortality is achievable if the conscious organization (solving the combination problem) can be perfectly replicated in the new medium.
Dennett’s IllusionismHumanistic onlyDennett’s materialism, and his place among the New Atheists, leave no room for cosmic purpose.
Goff’s PanpsychismCosmic/UltimateGoff's Agentive/Teleological Cosmopsychism implies that the universe itself is a conscious mind with goal-directed intent, suggesting an ultimate, cosmic meaning and purpose.

Nature of mind

Ontology
Dennett’s IllusionismPhysicalism (illusionist)
Goff’s PanpsychismPanpsychism (often formalized as a variant of Russellian Monism, leading to Hybrid Panpsychism or Agentive Cosmopsychism, where the universe is a conscious agent)
Mind and body
Dennett’s IllusionismConsciousness is wholly a product of the brain’s unconscious processes. Dennett rejects any inner, non-physical domain of felt properties.
Goff’s PanpsychismMind (consciousness/protoconsciousness) is the intrinsic nature of the physical world. This relationship avoids the causal difficulties of Dualism by positing that mental properties are inseparable from the physical fabric, aligning with extended materialism.
Fundamental or emergent
Dennett’s IllusionismEmergent
Goff’s PanpsychismConsciousness is Primitive/Fundamental at the lowest level of reality. However, human subjects of experience are considered Strongly Emergent entities, while their phenomenal properties are Weakly Emergent (Hybrid Panpsychism).
Qualia
Dennett’s IllusionismThere are no qualia in the traditional sense. Dennett calls the supposed intrinsic, ineffable, private properties ‘nothing but philosophers’ inventions’.
Goff’s PanpsychismQualia (sensory qualities or qualitivity) are fundamental properties of reality and cannot be reduced to the purely quantitative language of physics, which has an inherent explanatory limitation. Panpsychism solves the hard problem by postulating that these qualities exist fundamentally.

How it works

Mechanism
Dennett’s IllusionismThe user illusion. As a computer’s desktop icons stand in for complex underlying processes, the brain presents itself to us in a simplified form we mistake for an inner world of qualities.
Goff’s PanpsychismThe primary principle is metaphysical necessity: consciousness must be fundamental to avoid the explanatory gap and solve the hard problem. In Agentive Cosmopsychism, teleological causation (goal-directed intent) by the conscious cosmos explains fine-tuning.
Where it is
Dennett’s IllusionismIn the brain’s unconscious processes, with no inner theater.
Goff’s PanpsychismConsciousness is ubiquitous, permeating the physical world. In Cosmopsychism, the fundamental consciousness is located in the universe as a whole.
What it does
Dennett’s IllusionismThe user illusion is benign: it lets us manage ourselves without access to the brain’s underlying complexity.
Goff’s PanpsychismAt the cosmic level (Agentive Cosmopsychism), consciousness functions as an agent explaining cosmic fine-tuning and the emergence of life/mind. For individual subjects, consciousness is the source of value and identity. The combination problem must be resolved to establish coherent causation from micro- to macro-subjects.

Evidence and criticism

Testability
Dennett’s IllusionismConceptually testable
Goff’s PanpsychismSpeculative. The theory aims to solve conceptual and metaphysical tensions (like the hard problem) , but the fundamental claim that consciousness is ubiquitous is difficult to test empirically, leading to critiques that panpsychism reaches a 'cognitive dead end'.
Tests so far
Dennett’s IllusionismNot stated
Goff’s PanpsychismNot stated
Criticisms
Dennett’s IllusionismDennett is often read as denying that experience exists, and critics reply that an illusion of experience would itself be an experience. Dennett resisted the eliminativist label, though many philosophers apply it to his rejection of qualia.
Goff’s PanpsychismThe main tension is the Combination Problem: how do micro-phenomenal properties combine or aggregate to form complex macro-phenomenal properties (such as human consciousness). Goff's rejection of quantitative descriptions being able to capture quality is also critiqued by proponents of information-based theories.

Sources

Key sources
Dennett’s Illusionism
  • Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett
  • I've Been Thinking, Daniel Dennett (2023)
  • Dennett’s Illusionism (Landscape of Consciousness), Daniel Dennett (1992)
Goff’s Panpsychism
  • Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness, Philip Goff (2019)
  • Why? the Purpose of the Universe, Philip Goff (2023)
  • Putting consciousness first: replies to critics, Philip Goff (2021)

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