Head to head
Dennett’s Illusionism vs Tegmark’s State of Matter
Dennett’s Illusionism and Tegmark’s State of Matter, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Dennett’s Illusionism belongs to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Tegmark’s State of Matter to Neutral Monism.
- Both treat consciousness as emergent.
- They give the same kind of answer on life after death and meaning and purpose.
- On AI consciousness, Dennett’s Illusionism says “Possible” and Tegmark’s State of Matter says “Yes”.
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The claim
In brief
Dennett’s IllusionismDaniel Dennett argues that qualia, conceived as intrinsic, ineffable, private, and immediately known properties of experience, do not exist; they are philosophers’ inventions. Experience is real, but it is not what it seems from the inside: the brain’s unconscious processes produce a benign ‘user illusion’, and there is nothing to consciousness beyond the functions and dispositions involved.
Tegmark’s State of MatterTegmark proposes that consciousness can be understood as a specific state of matter, coined 'perceptronium,' which is defined by distinctive information-processing abilities. Starting from the premise that all existence is physical, the theory seeks principles that distinguish conscious, complex information processing from non-conscious processing.
What consciousness is
Dennett’s IllusionismConsciousness is the functional activity of the brain, which presents itself to us as a user illusion. ‘There are no qualia.’
Tegmark’s State of MatterConsciousness is identified as the subjective experience or 'feeling' that arises when information is being processed in certain complex ways, constituting the state of matter termed 'perceptronium'.
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Dennett’s IllusionismPossibleSince consciousness is nothing beyond functions and dispositions, a machine with the right functional organization could have it; Dennett does not take this up here.
Tegmark’s State of MatterYesThe theory is strictly physicalist ('It's all physics') and defines consciousness as a state of matter achievable through complex information processing. Therefore, artificial systems can achieve this state in principle.
Does consciousness survive death?Both agree
Dennett’s IllusionismNoSince consciousness is a product of the brain’s processes, it ends when they end.
Tegmark’s State of MatterNoConsciousness is an emergent state of matter (perceptronium) of the physical brain. The irreversible death and dissolution of the physical substrate would entail the cessation of consciousness.
Dennett’s IllusionismNo position
Tegmark’s State of MatterLikelyIf consciousness is a specific informational state of matter defined by mathematical/physical principles, that state could potentially be perfectly duplicated or uploaded into a non-biological medium by advanced technology.
Does it give life meaning?Both agree
Dennett’s IllusionismHumanistic onlyDennett’s materialism, and his place among the New Atheists, leave no room for cosmic purpose.
Tegmark’s State of MatterHumanistic onlyThe foundation in physics and mathematical structure typically suggests no ultimate cosmic purpose, consistent with deflationary physicalist views. The theory does not explicitly propose cosmic teleology.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Dennett’s IllusionismPhysicalism (illusionist)
Tegmark’s State of MatterPhysicalism / Monism
Mind and body
Dennett’s IllusionismConsciousness is wholly a product of the brain’s unconscious processes. Dennett rejects any inner, non-physical domain of felt properties.
Tegmark’s State of MatterAn identity relationship is implied, where subjective experience (mind) is identified as a specific physical state (a state of matter/information processing).
Fundamental or emergent
Dennett’s IllusionismEmergent
Tegmark’s State of MatterEmergent
Qualia
Dennett’s IllusionismThere are no qualia in the traditional sense. Dennett calls the supposed intrinsic, ineffable, private properties ‘nothing but philosophers’ inventions’.
Tegmark’s State of MatterQualia are implicitly the 'feeling' (subjective experience) associated with perceptronium's specific information processing configurations, formalized through four principles: information, integration, independence, and dynamics.
How it works
Mechanism
Dennett’s IllusionismThe user illusion. As a computer’s desktop icons stand in for complex underlying processes, the brain presents itself to us in a simplified form we mistake for an inner world of qualities.
Tegmark’s State of MatterThe definition of perceptronium via the application of four distinct principles (information, integration, independence, and dynamics) to information processing in physical systems.
Where it is
Dennett’s IllusionismIn the brain’s unconscious processes, with no inner theater.
Tegmark’s State of MatterLocalized to physical systems (e.g., neural networks or arbitrary quantum systems) that achieve the specific information-processing criteria defining perceptronium.
What it does
Dennett’s IllusionismThe user illusion is benign: it lets us manage ourselves without access to the brain’s underlying complexity.
Tegmark’s State of MatterConsciousness is crucial for information assessment and is viewed as functionally important for critical needs like caring for comatose patients or communicating with advanced AI. Causation is strictly physical.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Dennett’s IllusionismConceptually testable
Tegmark’s State of MatterEmpirically testable
Tests so far
Dennett’s IllusionismNot stated
Tegmark’s State of MatterThe generalization of Integrated Information Theory implies relevance to IIT's measurement function (quantifying degrees of consciousness). The theory is intended to address concrete problems like assessing comatose patients and advanced AI.
Criticisms
Dennett’s IllusionismDennett is often read as denying that experience exists, and critics reply that an illusion of experience would itself be an experience. Dennett resisted the eliminativist label, though many philosophers apply it to his rejection of qualia.
Tegmark’s State of MatterAs a generalization of IIT, it inherits existing critiques, such as the difficulty in explaining subjective feeling purely through physical and informational principles.
Sources
Key sources
Dennett’s Illusionism
- Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett
- I've Been Thinking, Daniel Dennett (2023)
- Dennett’s Illusionism (Landscape of Consciousness), Daniel Dennett (1992)
Tegmark’s State of Matter
- Consciousness is a state of matter (2015)
- Our Mathematical Universe: My Quest for the Ultimate Nature of Reality (2014)