Head to head
Epiphenomenalism vs Strawson’s Panpsychism
Epiphenomenalism Theory and Strawson’s Panpsychism Theory, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Epiphenomenalism belongs to the Dualism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Strawson’s Panpsychism to Panpsychism.
- Epiphenomenalism treats consciousness as emergent; Strawson’s Panpsychism treats it as fundamental.
- They give the same kind of answer on AI consciousness, life after death and mind uploading.
- On meaning and purpose, Epiphenomenalism says “Humanistic only” and Strawson’s Panpsychism says “Uncertain”.
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The claim
In brief
EpiphenomenalismThis theory posits that consciousness is a non-reducible product of the biological brain, but mental states have absolutely no causal power over physical reality. Our subjective awareness is real, yet our perception that our thoughts cause actions is mistaken, as consciousness is entirely inert, like foam on an ocean wave.
Strawson’s PanpsychismStrawson argues that any philosopher taking a realistic view of physicalism must accept that all physical phenomena are intrinsically experiential or phenomenal, leading to panpsychism (or panexperientialism) as a necessary conclusion of 'Real Materialism'. The existence of conscious experience, being the most certain fact, cannot be denied by genuine physicalism .
What consciousness is
EpiphenomenalismConsciousness is identified as phenomenal properties that are ontologically distinct from physical properties but are causally dependent on them (Physical → Phenomenal).
Strawson’s PanpsychismConsciousness (experience) is identified as an intrinsic, non-reducible phenomenal property of all fundamental physical stuff or energy (panexperientialism).
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Both agree
EpiphenomenalismLikelyIf consciousness is merely a non-causal byproduct (foam) of physical processes in the brain , replicating those physical processes in AI should produce the same conscious states without the non-causal mental states hindering functional replication.
Strawson’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an irreducible property of every elementary physical entity, then AI, being composed of physical matter, should also have inner awareness, provided the combination problem can be solved and micropsychic aspects can be manipulated by advanced technology .
Does consciousness survive death?Both agree
EpiphenomenalismNoConsciousness is entirely physical and solely the product of biological brains. This physical dependence precludes survival beyond bodily death.
Strawson’s PanpsychismUnlikelyAlthough the world is infused with consciousness, survival requires reversing the complex process of microscopic elements coalescing into macroscopic consciousness, which seems difficult for first-person survival upon brain dissolution .
Could a mind be uploaded?Both agree
EpiphenomenalismLikelyThe inert nature of consciousness means that uploading the physical states would necessarily duplicate the epiphenomenal mental states. The inert 'foam' should have little impact on achieving virtual immortality.
Strawson’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an intrinsic, regular property of the fabric of reality, advanced technology could potentially learn the regularities needed to aggregate or manipulate micropsychic forces to duplicate or upload consciousness .
EpiphenomenalismHumanistic onlyAs a philosophical materialism theory, it provides no ultimate meaning or purpose. Since consciousness is causally inert, it cannot confer cosmic teleological value.
Strawson’s PanpsychismUncertainPanpsychism is positioned between Materialism (no ultimate purpose) and Dualism/Idealism (ultimate purpose), suggesting possible ultimate meaning/purpose/value .
Nature of mind
Ontology
EpiphenomenalismWeak form of Dualism or Non-Reductive Physicalism. It affirms the complete causal closure of the physical.
Strawson’s PanpsychismRealistic Monism / Real Materialism
Mind and body
EpiphenomenalismMental states are entirely the product of biological brains. Physical states cause phenomenal states, but phenomenal states have no causal effect on the physical (one-directional causation).
Strawson’s PanpsychismIdentity Theory (Strong Sense). Mental phenomena are considered concrete physical phenomena because real physicalism encompasses all real phenomena, including experience.
Fundamental or emergent
EpiphenomenalismEmergent. Consciousness is solely the product of biological brains.
Strawson’s PanpsychismPrimitive/Fundamental
Qualia
EpiphenomenalismPhenomenal properties (qualia) are real and ontologically distinct from physical properties , but they are epiphenomena and thus causally inert.
Strawson’s PanpsychismQualia are real, concrete, and physical properties of the world; their denial is considered the 'silliest claim ever made'.
How it works
Mechanism
EpiphenomenalismThe principle of the 'causal closure of the physical' dictates that mental states, whatever their nature, must be entirely inert byproducts.
Strawson’s PanpsychismThe principle that all concrete phenomena are physical, combined with the fact that experience is a concrete phenomenon and cannot radically emerge, dictates that experience is intrinsic to fundamental physics.
Where it is
EpiphenomenalismEntirely located in the physical, biological brain.
Strawson’s PanpsychismUbiquitous, associated with every part or aspect of physical reality, akin to fundamental fields and particles .
What it does
EpiphenomenalismMental states have no causal powers. The mind is entirely inert and there is no 'top-down causation'; consciousness is a non-functional byproduct.
Strawson’s PanpsychismConsciousness, being physical, fits unproblematically into the natural world. (The specific causal role of individual experiences is implied through their physical status but not detailed in the sources).
Evidence and criticism
Testability
EpiphenomenalismConceptually challenged. Its primary claim—that conscious states lack causal force—is counterintuitive and difficult to test empirically, as it involves proving a negative causal link.
Strawson’s PanpsychismConceptually testable. It is a metaphysical proposal derived from philosophical premises about the nature of the physical world. Nagasawa notes that panpsychism, even if true, may reach a 'cognitive dead end' because it cannot be proven .
Tests so far
EpiphenomenalismNot stated
Strawson’s PanpsychismNot stated
Criticisms
EpiphenomenalismThe theory is counterintuitive because it strongly seems to us that our phenomenally conscious states causally matter. It forces the acceptance that our sense of mental causation (thoughts causing things) is a 'kind of illusion or trick'.
Strawson’s PanpsychismWidely held to be 'absurd' by some critics . It suffers from the combination problem, requiring an explanation of how micro-level experiences aggregate to yield macrophenomenal properties.
Sources
Key sources
Epiphenomenalism
- Consciousness (2019)
- Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness (1995)
- What Is Consciousness? (Little Debates about Big Questions), A. Kind and D. Stoljar (2023)
Strawson’s Panpsychism
- Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism, Galen Strawson (2009)
- Real Materialism and Other Essays, Galen Strawson (2008)
- The Consciousness Deniers, Galen Strawson (2018)