Open the map

Head to head

Epiphenomenalism vs Goff’s Panpsychism

Epiphenomenalism Theory and Goff's Panpsychism, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.

At a glance

Add more theories to this comparisonCompare other theories

Dualism Epiphenomenalism Theory David Chalmers (Classifier), Frank Jackson (Related Thinker)

The claim

In brief
EpiphenomenalismThis theory posits that consciousness is a non-reducible product of the biological brain, but mental states have absolutely no causal power over physical reality. Our subjective awareness is real, yet our perception that our thoughts cause actions is mistaken, as consciousness is entirely inert, like foam on an ocean wave.
Goff’s PanpsychismGoff argues that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world, positioning it as the best hope for solving the hard problem that materialism fails to address. He asserts that the physical sciences, with their purely quantitative language, cannot account for the qualitative nature (qualitivity) or subjective aspect of experience, requiring a change in our fundamental understanding of science (Galileo's Error).
What consciousness is
EpiphenomenalismConsciousness is identified as phenomenal properties that are ontologically distinct from physical properties but are causally dependent on them (Physical → Phenomenal).
Goff’s PanpsychismConsciousness is identified as a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world. Specifically, Goff explores Panpsychism through the lens of Russellian Monism, where phenomenal or protomenal properties are the intrinsic nature of fundamental matter.

Big questions

EpiphenomenalismLikelyIf consciousness is merely a non-causal byproduct (foam) of physical processes in the brain , replicating those physical processes in AI should produce the same conscious states without the non-causal mental states hindering functional replication.
Goff’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an intrinsic property of matter/energy, then the physical components of AI systems would possess proto-conscious properties. The realization of full AI consciousness would depend on whether advanced technology can resolve the combination problem in the artificial substrate.
EpiphenomenalismNoConsciousness is entirely physical and solely the product of biological brains. This physical dependence precludes survival beyond bodily death.
Goff’s PanpsychismUnlikelyWhile consciousness is fundamental, the survival of individual, unified, personal consciousness (the macro-subject) is challenging given the theory relies on a specific organizational structure (the brain) for macro-experience. Success depends on whether the emergent subject persists outside the biological mechanism.
EpiphenomenalismLikelyThe inert nature of consciousness means that uploading the physical states would necessarily duplicate the epiphenomenal mental states. The inert 'foam' should have little impact on achieving virtual immortality.
Goff’s PanpsychismLikelySince the physical substrate (digital hardware) is composed of fundamentally conscious components (proto-consciousness), virtual immortality is achievable if the conscious organization (solving the combination problem) can be perfectly replicated in the new medium.
EpiphenomenalismHumanistic onlyAs a philosophical materialism theory, it provides no ultimate meaning or purpose. Since consciousness is causally inert, it cannot confer cosmic teleological value.
Goff’s PanpsychismCosmic/UltimateGoff's Agentive/Teleological Cosmopsychism implies that the universe itself is a conscious mind with goal-directed intent, suggesting an ultimate, cosmic meaning and purpose.

Nature of mind

Ontology
EpiphenomenalismWeak form of Dualism or Non-Reductive Physicalism. It affirms the complete causal closure of the physical.
Goff’s PanpsychismPanpsychism (often formalized as a variant of Russellian Monism, leading to Hybrid Panpsychism or Agentive Cosmopsychism, where the universe is a conscious agent)
Mind and body
EpiphenomenalismMental states are entirely the product of biological brains. Physical states cause phenomenal states, but phenomenal states have no causal effect on the physical (one-directional causation).
Goff’s PanpsychismMind (consciousness/protoconsciousness) is the intrinsic nature of the physical world. This relationship avoids the causal difficulties of Dualism by positing that mental properties are inseparable from the physical fabric, aligning with extended materialism.
Fundamental or emergent
EpiphenomenalismEmergent. Consciousness is solely the product of biological brains.
Goff’s PanpsychismConsciousness is Primitive/Fundamental at the lowest level of reality. However, human subjects of experience are considered Strongly Emergent entities, while their phenomenal properties are Weakly Emergent (Hybrid Panpsychism).
Qualia
EpiphenomenalismPhenomenal properties (qualia) are real and ontologically distinct from physical properties , but they are epiphenomena and thus causally inert.
Goff’s PanpsychismQualia (sensory qualities or qualitivity) are fundamental properties of reality and cannot be reduced to the purely quantitative language of physics, which has an inherent explanatory limitation. Panpsychism solves the hard problem by postulating that these qualities exist fundamentally.

How it works

Mechanism
EpiphenomenalismThe principle of the 'causal closure of the physical' dictates that mental states, whatever their nature, must be entirely inert byproducts.
Goff’s PanpsychismThe primary principle is metaphysical necessity: consciousness must be fundamental to avoid the explanatory gap and solve the hard problem. In Agentive Cosmopsychism, teleological causation (goal-directed intent) by the conscious cosmos explains fine-tuning.
Where it is
EpiphenomenalismEntirely located in the physical, biological brain.
Goff’s PanpsychismConsciousness is ubiquitous, permeating the physical world. In Cosmopsychism, the fundamental consciousness is located in the universe as a whole.
What it does
EpiphenomenalismMental states have no causal powers. The mind is entirely inert and there is no 'top-down causation'; consciousness is a non-functional byproduct.
Goff’s PanpsychismAt the cosmic level (Agentive Cosmopsychism), consciousness functions as an agent explaining cosmic fine-tuning and the emergence of life/mind. For individual subjects, consciousness is the source of value and identity. The combination problem must be resolved to establish coherent causation from micro- to macro-subjects.

Evidence and criticism

Testability
EpiphenomenalismConceptually challenged. Its primary claim—that conscious states lack causal force—is counterintuitive and difficult to test empirically, as it involves proving a negative causal link.
Goff’s PanpsychismSpeculative. The theory aims to solve conceptual and metaphysical tensions (like the hard problem) , but the fundamental claim that consciousness is ubiquitous is difficult to test empirically, leading to critiques that panpsychism reaches a 'cognitive dead end'.
Tests so far
EpiphenomenalismNot stated
Goff’s PanpsychismNot stated
Criticisms
EpiphenomenalismThe theory is counterintuitive because it strongly seems to us that our phenomenally conscious states causally matter. It forces the acceptance that our sense of mental causation (thoughts causing things) is a 'kind of illusion or trick'.
Goff’s PanpsychismThe main tension is the Combination Problem: how do micro-phenomenal properties combine or aggregate to form complex macro-phenomenal properties (such as human consciousness). Goff's rejection of quantitative descriptions being able to capture quality is also critiqued by proponents of information-based theories.

Sources

Key sources
Epiphenomenalism
  • Consciousness (2019)
  • Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness (1995)
  • What Is Consciousness? (Little Debates about Big Questions), A. Kind and D. Stoljar (2023)
Goff’s Panpsychism
  • Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness, Philip Goff (2019)
  • Why? the Purpose of the Universe, Philip Goff (2023)
  • Putting consciousness first: replies to critics, Philip Goff (2021)

More comparisons

All head-to-head comparisons →