Head to head
Epiphenomenalism vs Tegmark’s State of Matter
Epiphenomenalism Theory and Tegmark’s State of Matter, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Epiphenomenalism belongs to the Dualism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Tegmark’s State of Matter to Neutral Monism.
- Both treat consciousness as emergent.
- They give the same kind of answer on AI consciousness, life after death, mind uploading and meaning and purpose.
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The claim
In brief
EpiphenomenalismThis theory posits that consciousness is a non-reducible product of the biological brain, but mental states have absolutely no causal power over physical reality. Our subjective awareness is real, yet our perception that our thoughts cause actions is mistaken, as consciousness is entirely inert, like foam on an ocean wave.
Tegmark’s State of MatterTegmark proposes that consciousness can be understood as a specific state of matter, coined 'perceptronium,' which is defined by distinctive information-processing abilities. Starting from the premise that all existence is physical, the theory seeks principles that distinguish conscious, complex information processing from non-conscious processing.
What consciousness is
EpiphenomenalismConsciousness is identified as phenomenal properties that are ontologically distinct from physical properties but are causally dependent on them (Physical → Phenomenal).
Tegmark’s State of MatterConsciousness is identified as the subjective experience or 'feeling' that arises when information is being processed in certain complex ways, constituting the state of matter termed 'perceptronium'.
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Both agree
EpiphenomenalismLikelyIf consciousness is merely a non-causal byproduct (foam) of physical processes in the brain , replicating those physical processes in AI should produce the same conscious states without the non-causal mental states hindering functional replication.
Tegmark’s State of MatterYesThe theory is strictly physicalist ('It's all physics') and defines consciousness as a state of matter achievable through complex information processing. Therefore, artificial systems can achieve this state in principle.
Does consciousness survive death?Both agree
EpiphenomenalismNoConsciousness is entirely physical and solely the product of biological brains. This physical dependence precludes survival beyond bodily death.
Tegmark’s State of MatterNoConsciousness is an emergent state of matter (perceptronium) of the physical brain. The irreversible death and dissolution of the physical substrate would entail the cessation of consciousness.
Could a mind be uploaded?Both agree
EpiphenomenalismLikelyThe inert nature of consciousness means that uploading the physical states would necessarily duplicate the epiphenomenal mental states. The inert 'foam' should have little impact on achieving virtual immortality.
Tegmark’s State of MatterLikelyIf consciousness is a specific informational state of matter defined by mathematical/physical principles, that state could potentially be perfectly duplicated or uploaded into a non-biological medium by advanced technology.
Does it give life meaning?Both agree
EpiphenomenalismHumanistic onlyAs a philosophical materialism theory, it provides no ultimate meaning or purpose. Since consciousness is causally inert, it cannot confer cosmic teleological value.
Tegmark’s State of MatterHumanistic onlyThe foundation in physics and mathematical structure typically suggests no ultimate cosmic purpose, consistent with deflationary physicalist views. The theory does not explicitly propose cosmic teleology.
Nature of mind
Ontology
EpiphenomenalismWeak form of Dualism or Non-Reductive Physicalism. It affirms the complete causal closure of the physical.
Tegmark’s State of MatterPhysicalism / Monism
Mind and body
EpiphenomenalismMental states are entirely the product of biological brains. Physical states cause phenomenal states, but phenomenal states have no causal effect on the physical (one-directional causation).
Tegmark’s State of MatterAn identity relationship is implied, where subjective experience (mind) is identified as a specific physical state (a state of matter/information processing).
Fundamental or emergent
EpiphenomenalismEmergent. Consciousness is solely the product of biological brains.
Tegmark’s State of MatterEmergent
Qualia
EpiphenomenalismPhenomenal properties (qualia) are real and ontologically distinct from physical properties , but they are epiphenomena and thus causally inert.
Tegmark’s State of MatterQualia are implicitly the 'feeling' (subjective experience) associated with perceptronium's specific information processing configurations, formalized through four principles: information, integration, independence, and dynamics.
How it works
Mechanism
EpiphenomenalismThe principle of the 'causal closure of the physical' dictates that mental states, whatever their nature, must be entirely inert byproducts.
Tegmark’s State of MatterThe definition of perceptronium via the application of four distinct principles (information, integration, independence, and dynamics) to information processing in physical systems.
Where it is
EpiphenomenalismEntirely located in the physical, biological brain.
Tegmark’s State of MatterLocalized to physical systems (e.g., neural networks or arbitrary quantum systems) that achieve the specific information-processing criteria defining perceptronium.
What it does
EpiphenomenalismMental states have no causal powers. The mind is entirely inert and there is no 'top-down causation'; consciousness is a non-functional byproduct.
Tegmark’s State of MatterConsciousness is crucial for information assessment and is viewed as functionally important for critical needs like caring for comatose patients or communicating with advanced AI. Causation is strictly physical.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
EpiphenomenalismConceptually challenged. Its primary claim—that conscious states lack causal force—is counterintuitive and difficult to test empirically, as it involves proving a negative causal link.
Tegmark’s State of MatterEmpirically testable
Tests so far
EpiphenomenalismNot stated
Tegmark’s State of MatterThe generalization of Integrated Information Theory implies relevance to IIT's measurement function (quantifying degrees of consciousness). The theory is intended to address concrete problems like assessing comatose patients and advanced AI.
Criticisms
EpiphenomenalismThe theory is counterintuitive because it strongly seems to us that our phenomenally conscious states causally matter. It forces the acceptance that our sense of mental causation (thoughts causing things) is a 'kind of illusion or trick'.
Tegmark’s State of MatterAs a generalization of IIT, it inherits existing critiques, such as the difficulty in explaining subjective feeling purely through physical and informational principles.
Sources
Key sources
Epiphenomenalism
- Consciousness (2019)
- Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness (1995)
- What Is Consciousness? (Little Debates about Big Questions), A. Kind and D. Stoljar (2023)
Tegmark’s State of Matter
- Consciousness is a state of matter (2015)
- Our Mathematical Universe: My Quest for the Ultimate Nature of Reality (2014)