Head to head
Functionalism vs Strawson’s Panpsychism
Functionalism and Strawson’s Panpsychism Theory, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Functionalism belongs to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Strawson’s Panpsychism to Panpsychism.
- Functionalism treats consciousness as emergent; Strawson’s Panpsychism treats it as fundamental.
- They give the same kind of answer on AI consciousness and mind uploading.
- On life after death, Functionalism says “Conditional” and Strawson’s Panpsychism says “Unlikely”.
- On meaning and purpose, Functionalism says “Humanistic only” and Strawson’s Panpsychism says “Uncertain”.
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The claim
In brief
FunctionalismFunctionalism posits that mental states are defined by their causal relations to one another, to sensory inputs, and to behavioral outputs, independent of the physical medium (substrate) in which they are realized. The essence of consciousness is determined by how mental states function or operate, rather than by what they are materially composed of.
Strawson’s PanpsychismStrawson argues that any philosopher taking a realistic view of physicalism must accept that all physical phenomena are intrinsically experiential or phenomenal, leading to panpsychism (or panexperientialism) as a necessary conclusion of 'Real Materialism'. The existence of conscious experience, being the most certain fact, cannot be denied by genuine physicalism .
What consciousness is
FunctionalismMental states are identified as functional states, constituted by their causal relations, roles, results, and outputs, implying they are realizable in any substrate that supports those functions.
Strawson’s PanpsychismConsciousness (experience) is identified as an intrinsic, non-reducible phenomenal property of all fundamental physical stuff or energy (panexperientialism).
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Both agree
FunctionalismYesFunctionalism holds that consciousness is based on function, not biology. If the correct functions can be realized computationally in non-biological substrates, AI consciousness is possible in principle and certain if Materialism is true.
Strawson’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an irreducible property of every elementary physical entity, then AI, being composed of physical matter, should also have inner awareness, provided the combination problem can be solved and micropsychic aspects can be manipulated by advanced technology .
FunctionalismConditionalAs a physicalist theory, consciousness is tied to the substrate. Survival beyond death of the biological body is only possible if the functional mental state can be successfully transferred (uploaded) to a new, continuing substrate (virtual immortality).
Strawson’s PanpsychismUnlikelyAlthough the world is infused with consciousness, survival requires reversing the complex process of microscopic elements coalescing into macroscopic consciousness, which seems difficult for first-person survival upon brain dissolution .
Could a mind be uploaded?Both agree
FunctionalismLikelyFunctionalism serves as the theoretical basis for virtual immortality. If the functional role of the mental self can be perfectly duplicated and uploaded to a new medium, the first-person mental self is preserved.
Strawson’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an intrinsic, regular property of the fabric of reality, advanced technology could potentially learn the regularities needed to aggregate or manipulate micropsychic forces to duplicate or upload consciousness .
FunctionalismHumanistic onlyFunctionalism describes the mechanism by which mind/consciousness operates within a physical world, providing capacities for agency and reflection, but offers no rationale for ultimate cosmic meaning or teleology, aligning with the general stance of Materialism.
Strawson’s PanpsychismUncertainPanpsychism is positioned between Materialism (no ultimate purpose) and Dualism/Idealism (ultimate purpose), suggesting possible ultimate meaning/purpose/value .
Nature of mind
Ontology
FunctionalismPhysicalism (broadly, agnostic to substance). The theory is classified under Materialism, but it is metaphysically agnostic regarding nonphysical substances, focusing primarily on the functional description of mental states.
Strawson’s PanpsychismRealistic Monism / Real Materialism
Mind and body
FunctionalismMental states are functional states identical to the functional roles that are realized or instantiated in a physical substrate, leading to 'functional state identity theses'.
Strawson’s PanpsychismIdentity Theory (Strong Sense). Mental phenomena are considered concrete physical phenomena because real physicalism encompasses all real phenomena, including experience.
Fundamental or emergent
FunctionalismEmergent. Consciousness arises from the functional organization realized by a sufficiently complex substrate (like neural tissue or computer chips).
Strawson’s PanpsychismPrimitive/Fundamental
Qualia
FunctionalismThe theory traditionally struggles to account for phenomenal qualia, often addressing them by asserting that the qualitative feel is entirely exhausted by the functional role, or by coupling with representational theories.
Strawson’s PanpsychismQualia are real, concrete, and physical properties of the world; their denial is considered the 'silliest claim ever made'.
How it works
Mechanism
FunctionalismThe principle of multiple realizability, stating that mental state realization is independent of the physical substrate, contingent only upon the required function being instantiated.
Strawson’s PanpsychismThe principle that all concrete phenomena are physical, combined with the fact that experience is a concrete phenomenon and cannot radically emerge, dictates that experience is intrinsic to fundamental physics.
Where it is
FunctionalismDistributed wherever the functional organization is successfully realized, regardless of whether the substrate is neural tissue or hardwired computing components.
Strawson’s PanpsychismUbiquitous, associated with every part or aspect of physical reality, akin to fundamental fields and particles .
What it does
FunctionalismFunctions, roles, and outputs are dispositive. Mental states are causally effective because they are defined by their causal relations within the system (functional role).
Strawson’s PanpsychismConsciousness, being physical, fits unproblematically into the natural world. (The specific causal role of individual experiences is implied through their physical status but not detailed in the sources).
Evidence and criticism
Testability
FunctionalismConceptually and empirically testable. Thought experiments (like substrate replacement) probe its conceptual limits, and computational realization (AI) tests its empirical application.
Strawson’s PanpsychismConceptually testable. It is a metaphysical proposal derived from philosophical premises about the nature of the physical world. Nagasawa notes that panpsychism, even if true, may reach a 'cognitive dead end' because it cannot be proven .
Tests so far
FunctionalismThe silicon chip replacement thought experiment is used conceptually to test whether phenomenal consciousness is preserved when the functional role is maintained across a change in substrate.
Strawson’s PanpsychismNot stated
Criticisms
FunctionalismIt is criticized heavily for failing to account for phenomenal consciousness (qualia) by describing only the functional role, leading to the 'hard problem' challenge that functional roles may not exhaust the nature of conscious experience.
Strawson’s PanpsychismWidely held to be 'absurd' by some critics . It suffers from the combination problem, requiring an explanation of how micro-level experiences aggregate to yield macrophenomenal properties.
Sources
Key sources
Functionalism
- What is functionalism? (N. Block) (1980)
- What Is Functionalism? Consciousness, Function, and Representation (N. Block) (2007)
- Functionalism (J. Levin) (2023)
Strawson’s Panpsychism
- Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism, Galen Strawson (2009)
- Real Materialism and Other Essays, Galen Strawson (2008)
- The Consciousness Deniers, Galen Strawson (2018)