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Buddhism vs Chalmers’s Panpsychism

Buddhism’s Empty, Illusory Phenomenal Consciousness and Chalmers’s Panpsychism, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.

At a glance

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The claim

In brief
BuddhismThis theory suggests that the sense of phenomenal consciousness or 'what-it-is-like-ness' is an instance of cognitive illusion, rejecting the existence of a permanent, inner 'self' or 'soul'. It posits that consciousness, like all phenomena, is ultimately empty of intrinsic nature, and is better understood as a network of relational processes.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismDavid Chalmers argues that consciousness may be a fundamental feature of physical reality, carried by the intrinsic properties of its most basic entities. He treats panpsychism, and its cousin panprotopsychism, as a synthesis of materialism and dualism, and holds that it would become the most promising answer to the mind-body problem if someone solves the combination problem.
What consciousness is
BuddhismConsciousness (in the phenomenal sense) is identified as a cognitive illusion or conventional reality constituted by a network of processes/relations (Madhyamaka) or as an inner subjective substrate of representations (Yogācāra).
Chalmers’s PanpsychismChalmers identifies consciousness with the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities, the categorical bases of the dispositions that physics describes. Physics tells us what basic entities do; on this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are what they are.

Big questions

BuddhismUncertainIf consciousness is fundamentally an illusion arising from a network of processes, it is unclear whether advanced computation (AI) can replicate the complex conventional reality or the specific non-self processes that generate this illusion, even though computation is not fundamentally ruled out.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismConditionalSince every physical system has phenomenal or protophenomenal properties at its base, an AI is built from the same ingredients as a brain. Whether it forms a unified conscious subject depends on how the unsolved combination problem is answered.
BuddhismYesThe eighth (store-house) consciousness persists after death, carrying karmic energy through cycles of reincarnation. However, survival often entails expansion back into cosmic consciousness, blurring or banishing individual first-person identity ('being sugar').
Chalmers’s PanpsychismUncertainThe fundamental properties outlast any body, but nothing in the view says whether the particular combined subject survives once the brain's structure breaks down.
BuddhismNot neededThe theory already provides a mechanism for persistence (the eighth consciousness) or transcendence (ninth consciousness), making artificial, digital duplication (virtual immortality) philosophically moot.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismUncertainAn upload would be made of the same fundamental properties, but whether it reconstitutes the same subject turns on the unsolved combination problem.
BuddhismCosmic/UltimateThe ultimate goal is spiritual attainment (reaching the ninth consciousness or Buddha nature), which serves as the core source of energy and ultimate fulfillment, moving beyond merely humanistic purpose.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismUncertainPlacing experience in the basic fabric of nature gives it a cosmic footing, but Chalmers draws no conclusions about meaning or purpose.

Nature of mind

Ontology
BuddhismIdealism (specifically the Yogācāra school) or Deflationary Relationalism (specifically the Madhyamaka school), where all things are conventionally real but ultimately empty of intrinsic nature.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismPanpsychism (Russellian monism)
Mind and body
BuddhismThe relationship is understood as interdependent and relational, lacking intrinsic self/substance. The illusion of a centralized mind or self is rejected.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismMind and matter are two sides of one fundamental stuff that has both physical and phenomenal properties. Chalmers places this ‘monism’ in the sixth of his six classes of views, the nonreductive ones that expand or reconceive physical ontology.
Fundamental or emergent
BuddhismConventional reality constituted by relations. It is neither a primitive substance nor an emergent property in the typical Western sense, as the phenomenal self it describes is fundamentally illusory.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismPrimitive
Qualia
BuddhismQualia ('what-it-is-like-ness') are rejected as real, intrinsic properties and are instead viewed as illusory, dissolving away in favor of a network of underlying processes.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismQualia are real and irreducible. In the panpsychist version they exist in simple form at the fundamental level; in the panprotopsychist version, basic entities have protophenomenal properties that are not themselves experiences but can ground them.

How it works

Mechanism
BuddhismThe principle of emptiness (lack of intrinsic nature) applied to all phenomena, resulting in the realization that phenomenal consciousness is a cognitive illusion.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismChalmers reasons dialectically. Materialism (thesis) meets dualism (antithesis) and yields panpsychism; panprotopsychism challenges it and yields Russellian monism; the combination problem then challenges Russellian monism, with no settled resolution yet.
Where it is
BuddhismNon-localized. Consciousness is often understood relationally. The ninth consciousness (Buddha nature) is the fundamental, purest core.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismThroughout physical reality, at the level of its most basic entities.
What it does
BuddhismThe inward-directed seventh consciousness causes the concept of self, which is the source of deception. The eighth consciousness stores karmic energy and persists across death, thus enabling rebirth.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismBecause phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are the categorical bases of physical dispositions, consciousness sits at the base of physical causation itself.

Evidence and criticism

Testability
BuddhismLargely conceptual, based on internal philosophical coherence and phenomenological insights gained via meditative practices. Empirical studies sometimes correlate high-level meditation states (nirodha-samāpatti) with measurable brain changes (reduced synchronization).
Chalmers’s PanpsychismConceptually testable
Tests so far
BuddhismStudy of high meditative states (nirodha-samāpatti) showing reduced overall brain synchronization.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismNot stated
Criticisms
BuddhismWestern philosophers often find the core claim—that phenomenal consciousness is illusory—counter-intuitive and untenable. Internally, tension exists between the idealistic Yogācāra school and the relational Madhyamaka school.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismThe combination problem is the central difficulty, and Chalmers concedes it is unsolved. He also calls panpsychism initially counterintuitive, holding that the sense of oddity fades on reflection.

Sources

Key sources
Buddhism
  • Engaging Buddhism, Jay L. Garfield (2015)
  • Illusionism and givenness, Jay Garfield (2016)
  • The Nine Consciousness (2022)
Chalmers’s Panpsychism
  • Chalmers’s Panpsychism, David Chalmers (Landscape of Consciousness entry)

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