Head to head
Chalmers’s Panpsychism vs Epiphenomenalism
Chalmers’s Panpsychism and Epiphenomenalism Theory, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Chalmers’s Panpsychism belongs to the Panpsychism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Epiphenomenalism to Dualism.
- Chalmers’s Panpsychism treats consciousness as fundamental; Epiphenomenalism treats it as emergent.
- On AI consciousness, Chalmers’s Panpsychism says “Conditional” and Epiphenomenalism says “Likely”.
- On life after death, Chalmers’s Panpsychism says “Uncertain” and Epiphenomenalism says “No”.
- On mind uploading, Chalmers’s Panpsychism says “Uncertain” and Epiphenomenalism says “Likely”.
- On meaning and purpose, Chalmers’s Panpsychism says “Uncertain” and Epiphenomenalism says “Humanistic only”.
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The claim
In brief
Chalmers’s PanpsychismDavid Chalmers argues that consciousness may be a fundamental feature of physical reality, carried by the intrinsic properties of its most basic entities. He treats panpsychism, and its cousin panprotopsychism, as a synthesis of materialism and dualism, and holds that it would become the most promising answer to the mind-body problem if someone solves the combination problem.
EpiphenomenalismThis theory posits that consciousness is a non-reducible product of the biological brain, but mental states have absolutely no causal power over physical reality. Our subjective awareness is real, yet our perception that our thoughts cause actions is mistaken, as consciousness is entirely inert, like foam on an ocean wave.
What consciousness is
Chalmers’s PanpsychismChalmers identifies consciousness with the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities, the categorical bases of the dispositions that physics describes. Physics tells us what basic entities do; on this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are what they are.
EpiphenomenalismConsciousness is identified as phenomenal properties that are ontologically distinct from physical properties but are causally dependent on them (Physical → Phenomenal).
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Chalmers’s PanpsychismConditionalSince every physical system has phenomenal or protophenomenal properties at its base, an AI is built from the same ingredients as a brain. Whether it forms a unified conscious subject depends on how the unsolved combination problem is answered.
EpiphenomenalismLikelyIf consciousness is merely a non-causal byproduct (foam) of physical processes in the brain , replicating those physical processes in AI should produce the same conscious states without the non-causal mental states hindering functional replication.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismUncertainThe fundamental properties outlast any body, but nothing in the view says whether the particular combined subject survives once the brain's structure breaks down.
EpiphenomenalismNoConsciousness is entirely physical and solely the product of biological brains. This physical dependence precludes survival beyond bodily death.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismUncertainAn upload would be made of the same fundamental properties, but whether it reconstitutes the same subject turns on the unsolved combination problem.
EpiphenomenalismLikelyThe inert nature of consciousness means that uploading the physical states would necessarily duplicate the epiphenomenal mental states. The inert 'foam' should have little impact on achieving virtual immortality.
Chalmers’s PanpsychismUncertainPlacing experience in the basic fabric of nature gives it a cosmic footing, but Chalmers draws no conclusions about meaning or purpose.
EpiphenomenalismHumanistic onlyAs a philosophical materialism theory, it provides no ultimate meaning or purpose. Since consciousness is causally inert, it cannot confer cosmic teleological value.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Chalmers’s PanpsychismPanpsychism (Russellian monism)
EpiphenomenalismWeak form of Dualism or Non-Reductive Physicalism. It affirms the complete causal closure of the physical.
Mind and body
Chalmers’s PanpsychismMind and matter are two sides of one fundamental stuff that has both physical and phenomenal properties. Chalmers places this ‘monism’ in the sixth of his six classes of views, the nonreductive ones that expand or reconceive physical ontology.
EpiphenomenalismMental states are entirely the product of biological brains. Physical states cause phenomenal states, but phenomenal states have no causal effect on the physical (one-directional causation).
Fundamental or emergent
Chalmers’s PanpsychismPrimitive
EpiphenomenalismEmergent. Consciousness is solely the product of biological brains.
Qualia
Chalmers’s PanpsychismQualia are real and irreducible. In the panpsychist version they exist in simple form at the fundamental level; in the panprotopsychist version, basic entities have protophenomenal properties that are not themselves experiences but can ground them.
EpiphenomenalismPhenomenal properties (qualia) are real and ontologically distinct from physical properties , but they are epiphenomena and thus causally inert.
How it works
Mechanism
Chalmers’s PanpsychismChalmers reasons dialectically. Materialism (thesis) meets dualism (antithesis) and yields panpsychism; panprotopsychism challenges it and yields Russellian monism; the combination problem then challenges Russellian monism, with no settled resolution yet.
EpiphenomenalismThe principle of the 'causal closure of the physical' dictates that mental states, whatever their nature, must be entirely inert byproducts.
Where it is
Chalmers’s PanpsychismThroughout physical reality, at the level of its most basic entities.
EpiphenomenalismEntirely located in the physical, biological brain.
What it does
Chalmers’s PanpsychismBecause phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are the categorical bases of physical dispositions, consciousness sits at the base of physical causation itself.
EpiphenomenalismMental states have no causal powers. The mind is entirely inert and there is no 'top-down causation'; consciousness is a non-functional byproduct.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Chalmers’s PanpsychismConceptually testable
EpiphenomenalismConceptually challenged. Its primary claim—that conscious states lack causal force—is counterintuitive and difficult to test empirically, as it involves proving a negative causal link.
Tests so far
Chalmers’s PanpsychismNot stated
EpiphenomenalismNot stated
Criticisms
Chalmers’s PanpsychismThe combination problem is the central difficulty, and Chalmers concedes it is unsolved. He also calls panpsychism initially counterintuitive, holding that the sense of oddity fades on reflection.
EpiphenomenalismThe theory is counterintuitive because it strongly seems to us that our phenomenally conscious states causally matter. It forces the acceptance that our sense of mental causation (thoughts causing things) is a 'kind of illusion or trick'.
Sources
Key sources
Chalmers’s Panpsychism
- Chalmers’s Panpsychism, David Chalmers (Landscape of Consciousness entry)
Epiphenomenalism
- Consciousness (2019)
- Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness (1995)
- What Is Consciousness? (Little Debates about Big Questions), A. Kind and D. Stoljar (2023)