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Epiphenomenalism vs Attention Schema Theory

Epiphenomenalism Theory and Attention Schema Theory, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.

At a glance

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Dualism Epiphenomenalism Theory David Chalmers (Classifier), Frank Jackson (Related Thinker)

The claim

In brief
EpiphenomenalismThis theory posits that consciousness is a non-reducible product of the biological brain, but mental states have absolutely no causal power over physical reality. Our subjective awareness is real, yet our perception that our thoughts cause actions is mistaken, as consciousness is entirely inert, like foam on an ocean wave.
Attention Schema TheoryThis theory posits that consciousness arises when the brain constructs a quick, simplified, internal model—an attention schema—of its own process of attention. The brain mistakenly interprets and reports this internal representation as a subjective, non-physical essence or a 'self-caricature,' even though it is fundamentally a computational product.
What consciousness is
EpiphenomenalismConsciousness is identified as phenomenal properties that are ontologically distinct from physical properties but are causally dependent on them (Physical → Phenomenal).
Attention Schema TheoryConsciousness is identified as the brain’s internal representation or simplified model of its own mechanism of attention (the attention schema), which is a specific example of higher-order thought.

Big questions

EpiphenomenalismLikelyIf consciousness is merely a non-causal byproduct (foam) of physical processes in the brain , replicating those physical processes in AI should produce the same conscious states without the non-causal mental states hindering functional replication.
Attention Schema TheoryLikelySince consciousness is defined as a computational process (the creation of an attention schema), in principle, artificial systems that implement the necessary computational architecture could become conscious. Furthermore, observers will inevitably make the social attribution of consciousness to sufficiently complex AI systems that act like they are conscious.
EpiphenomenalismNoConsciousness is entirely physical and solely the product of biological brains. This physical dependence precludes survival beyond bodily death.
Attention Schema TheoryNoAs a Materialist/Neurobiological theory, consciousness is tied to the physical substrate (the biological, information-processing machine), precluding survival beyond the decay of the body.
EpiphenomenalismLikelyThe inert nature of consciousness means that uploading the physical states would necessarily duplicate the epiphenomenal mental states. The inert 'foam' should have little impact on achieving virtual immortality.
Attention Schema TheoryPossibleIf the consciousness is realized as a computational structure (the attention schema), and if this structure and the relevant information processing systems can be accurately uploaded to a non-biological medium, virtual immortality is theoretically possible.
EpiphenomenalismHumanistic onlyAs a philosophical materialism theory, it provides no ultimate meaning or purpose. Since consciousness is causally inert, it cannot confer cosmic teleological value.
Attention Schema TheoryHumanistic onlyConsciousness provides an adaptive, evolutionary purpose (monitoring and regulating attention for action control), but does not imply any ultimate or cosmic meaning, consistent with Materialism.

Nature of mind

Ontology
EpiphenomenalismWeak form of Dualism or Non-Reductive Physicalism. It affirms the complete causal closure of the physical.
Attention Schema TheoryPhysicalism
Mind and body
EpiphenomenalismMental states are entirely the product of biological brains. Physical states cause phenomenal states, but phenomenal states have no causal effect on the physical (one-directional causation).
Attention Schema TheoryConsciousness is the report generated by a biological, information processing machine (the brain) through the assessment of its internal data, meaning mental states are computational and wholly physical.
Fundamental or emergent
EpiphenomenalismEmergent. Consciousness is solely the product of biological brains.
Attention Schema TheoryEmergent
Qualia
EpiphenomenalismPhenomenal properties (qualia) are real and ontologically distinct from physical properties , but they are epiphenomena and thus causally inert.
Attention Schema TheoryConsciousness is described as a 'self-caricature' or an illusory report of a non-physical essence, suggesting a deflationary or illusionist account of qualia, akin to Daniel Dennett’s view.

How it works

Mechanism
EpiphenomenalismThe principle of the 'causal closure of the physical' dictates that mental states, whatever their nature, must be entirely inert byproducts.
Attention Schema TheoryThe construction and maintenance of a simplified internal model (the attention schema) of the process of attention, rooted in principles from control engineering.
Where it is
EpiphenomenalismEntirely located in the physical, biological brain.
Attention Schema TheoryLocated within the biological, information-processing system of the brain.
What it does
EpiphenomenalismMental states have no causal powers. The mind is entirely inert and there is no 'top-down causation'; consciousness is a non-functional byproduct.
Attention Schema TheoryThe functional role of the attention schema is to monitor and regulate the brain's attention in order to control actions in the world. The resulting capacity allows the system to claim consciousness.

Evidence and criticism

Testability
EpiphenomenalismConceptually challenged. Its primary claim—that conscious states lack causal force—is counterintuitive and difficult to test empirically, as it involves proving a negative causal link.
Attention Schema TheoryEmpirically testable
Tests so far
EpiphenomenalismNot stated
Attention Schema TheoryNot stated
Criticisms
EpiphenomenalismThe theory is counterintuitive because it strongly seems to us that our phenomenally conscious states causally matter. It forces the acceptance that our sense of mental causation (thoughts causing things) is a 'kind of illusion or trick'.
Attention Schema TheoryThe theory explains how a system can *claim* consciousness but faces the general limitation, shared by similar functionalist models, of conclusively proving or explaining the actual subjective feel (the 'anybody home' problem) which remains eternally uncertain, even by the proponent's admission.

Sources

Key sources
Epiphenomenalism
  • Consciousness (2019)
  • Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness (1995)
  • What Is Consciousness? (Little Debates about Big Questions), A. Kind and D. Stoljar (2023)
Attention Schema Theory
  • True nature of consciousness: solving the biggest mystery of your mind, M. Graziano (2019)
  • Rethinking Consciousness: A Scientific Theory of Subjective Experience, M. Graziano (2019)
  • Can consciousness be non-biological?, M. Graziano (2014)

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