Head to head
Epiphenomenalism vs Recurrent Processing Theory
Epiphenomenalism Theory and Lamme's Recurrent Processing Theory, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Epiphenomenalism belongs to the Dualism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Recurrent Processing Theory to Materialism.
- Both treat consciousness as emergent.
- They give the same kind of answer on AI consciousness, life after death, mind uploading and meaning and purpose.
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The claim
In brief
EpiphenomenalismThis theory posits that consciousness is a non-reducible product of the biological brain, but mental states have absolutely no causal power over physical reality. Our subjective awareness is real, yet our perception that our thoughts cause actions is mistaken, as consciousness is entirely inert, like foam on an ocean wave.
Recurrent Processing TheoryLamme's Recurrent Processing Theory (RPT) posits that consciousness is both necessary and sufficient when reciprocal (recurrent) feedback connections occur among neural areas, particularly in sensory systems. This processing, which happens locally in sensory and post-sensory areas (Stage 3), generates phenomenal experience without requiring global broadcast access.
What consciousness is
EpiphenomenalismConsciousness is identified as phenomenal properties that are ontologically distinct from physical properties but are causally dependent on them (Physical → Phenomenal).
Recurrent Processing TheoryConsciousness is identified as a specific recurrent processing state holding within relevant neural circuitry, such as the visual system.
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Both agree
EpiphenomenalismLikelyIf consciousness is merely a non-causal byproduct (foam) of physical processes in the brain , replicating those physical processes in AI should produce the same conscious states without the non-causal mental states hindering functional replication.
Recurrent Processing TheoryLikelyAs a Materialism Theory, AI consciousness must, in principle, be possible if the requisite pattern of recurrent processing could be artificially duplicated in a non-biological substrate.
Does consciousness survive death?Both agree
EpiphenomenalismNoConsciousness is entirely physical and solely the product of biological brains. This physical dependence precludes survival beyond bodily death.
Recurrent Processing TheoryNoConsciousness is tied to physical brain activity and specific neural circuitry (recurrent processing states), suggesting cessation upon bodily death.
Could a mind be uploaded?Both agree
EpiphenomenalismLikelyThe inert nature of consciousness means that uploading the physical states would necessarily duplicate the epiphenomenal mental states. The inert 'foam' should have little impact on achieving virtual immortality.
Recurrent Processing TheoryYesSince consciousness is the recurrent processing state itself, a perfect duplication of that process onto a new medium (upload) would generate the first-person self, enabling virtual immortality.
Does it give life meaning?Both agree
EpiphenomenalismHumanistic onlyAs a philosophical materialism theory, it provides no ultimate meaning or purpose. Since consciousness is causally inert, it cannot confer cosmic teleological value.
Recurrent Processing TheoryHumanistic onlyThe theory focuses on a purely physicalist, neurobiological explanation of phenomenal experience and does not support any ultimate cosmic meaning or purpose.
Nature of mind
Ontology
EpiphenomenalismWeak form of Dualism or Non-Reductive Physicalism. It affirms the complete causal closure of the physical.
Recurrent Processing TheoryPhysicalism
Mind and body
EpiphenomenalismMental states are entirely the product of biological brains. Physical states cause phenomenal states, but phenomenal states have no causal effect on the physical (one-directional causation).
Recurrent Processing TheoryIdentity/Reductionist approach, arguing that the notion of mind must move toward that of the brain, and consciousness is identical to a recurrent processing state in physical circuitry.
Fundamental or emergent
EpiphenomenalismEmergent. Consciousness is solely the product of biological brains.
Recurrent Processing TheoryEmergent
Qualia
EpiphenomenalismPhenomenal properties (qualia) are real and ontologically distinct from physical properties , but they are epiphenomena and thus causally inert.
Recurrent Processing TheoryQualia are generated when a certain recurrent processing state holds of the relevant visual circuitry, making the visual state conscious.
How it works
Mechanism
EpiphenomenalismThe principle of the 'causal closure of the physical' dictates that mental states, whatever their nature, must be entirely inert byproducts.
Recurrent Processing TheoryRecurrent processing (feedback connections) in sensory and post-sensory areas (Stage 3) is considered sufficient for consciousness.
Where it is
EpiphenomenalismEntirely located in the physical, biological brain.
Recurrent Processing TheoryLocalized in sensory and post-sensory areas, specifically recurrent activations in the 'back of the head'.
What it does
EpiphenomenalismMental states have no causal powers. The mind is entirely inert and there is no 'top-down causation'; consciousness is a non-functional byproduct.
Recurrent Processing TheoryConsciousness is the specific recurrent processing state itself. The underlying purpose is implied to move the understanding of mind toward the brain.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
EpiphenomenalismConceptually challenged. Its primary claim—that conscious states lack causal force—is counterintuitive and difficult to test empirically, as it involves proving a negative causal link.
Recurrent Processing TheoryEmpirically testable
Tests so far
EpiphenomenalismNot stated
Recurrent Processing TheoryNot stated
Criticisms
EpiphenomenalismThe theory is counterintuitive because it strongly seems to us that our phenomenally conscious states causally matter. It forces the acceptance that our sense of mental causation (thoughts causing things) is a 'kind of illusion or trick'.
Recurrent Processing TheoryCritiques Global Workspace Theory (GWT) as being 'all about access but not about seeing'. Is itself criticized by Ned Block as a 'truncated form of the global workspace account'.
Sources
Key sources
Epiphenomenalism
- Consciousness (2019)
- Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness (1995)
- What Is Consciousness? (Little Debates about Big Questions), A. Kind and D. Stoljar (2023)
Recurrent Processing Theory
- Towards a true neural stance on consciousness, Victor Lamme (2006)
- How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness, Victor Lamme (2010)
- Wu, 2018 (Discussing Lamme's RPT) (2018)