Head to head
Russellian Monism vs Searle’s Biological Naturalism
Russellian Monism and Searle’s Biological Naturalism, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Russellian Monism belongs to the Neutral Monism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Searle’s Biological Naturalism to Materialism.
- Russellian Monism treats consciousness as fundamental; Searle’s Biological Naturalism treats it as emergent.
- They give the same kind of answer on mind uploading.
- On AI consciousness, Russellian Monism says “Likely” and Searle’s Biological Naturalism says “Conditional”.
- On life after death, Russellian Monism says “Conditional” and Searle’s Biological Naturalism says “No”.
- On meaning and purpose, Russellian Monism says “Uncertain” and Searle’s Biological Naturalism says “Humanistic only”.
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The claim
In brief
Russellian MonismRussellian Monism posits that the physical world, described by physics only in terms of structure and relations, has an intrinsic nature (quiddities) that is phenomenal or proto-phenomenal. This approach integrates consciousness into the fundamental reality while avoiding the traditional problems of dualism and reductive materialism.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismBiological Naturalism posits that consciousness is a real, irreducible, subjective biological feature of the brain, entirely caused by lower-level neurobiological processes and realized as higher-level system features. This approach seeks to solve the mind-body problem by accepting the scientific worldview while acknowledging the first-person ontology of conscious experience.
What consciousness is
Russellian MonismConsciousness (or proto-consciousness) is the intrinsic, categorical nature or property ('quiddities' or 'inscrutables') underlying the relational structure of physical reality described by physics.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConscious states are identified as real parts of the real world that are higher-level, system features of the brain, defined as states of awareness, sentience, or feeling that persist during wakefulness.
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Russellian MonismLikelyIf consciousness is intrinsic to matter/energy, and the combination problem can be technologically harnessed, then artificial systems built from physical substrates should achieve consciousness.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConditionalSearle rejects consciousness via simulation (Chinese Room Argument) but argues that if the causally sufficient biological mechanism is known, an artificial machine that implements that same mechanism could be conscious, as consciousness does not strictly require biological neurons, only sufficient causal power.
Russellian MonismConditionalSurvival is unlikely for the individual conscious aggregate unless the combination mechanism is preserved or the theory aligns with a cosmic monist view, as individual consciousness (the macroscopic combination) would likely dissolve upon biological death.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismNoConsciousness is entirely physical and solely the product of biological brains; therefore, death of the brain and body means irrevocable, permanent non-existence.
Could a mind be uploaded?Both agree
Russellian MonismLikelyA single-stuff reality should permit virtual immortality, provided advanced technology can manipulate and harness the micropsychic properties to accurately reproduce the macroscopic conscious aggregate digitally.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismYesIf consciousness is entirely explainable by physical/biological states, then duplicating those states (and their causal relations) in a non-biological medium would, in principle, allow for the uploading and continuation of the first-person mental self.
Russellian MonismUncertainMonisms generally allow for ultimate meaning/purpose/value. If RM takes a priority monist form with evolving consciousness, cosmic purpose may be implied.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismHumanistic onlyAs a materialist theory, Biological Naturalism struggles to rationalize ultimate cosmic meaning or purpose, though humanistic meaning created by ourselves remains possible.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Russellian MonismNeutral Monism or Physical Monism or Phenomenal Monism (variant dependent); fundamentally Monistic.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismPhysicalism (Biological Naturalism). It holds that consciousness is part of nature as a subjective, qualitative biological property, rejecting attempts to 'naturalize' it by denying its subjective ontology.
Mind and body
Russellian MonismMind and physical world are deeply intertwined, with mental properties constituting the intrinsic nature of fundamental physical entities (the categorical bases of physical dispositions).
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConscious states are causally reduced to lower-level brain processes (causal reducibility), but are ontologically irreducible to these processes because consciousness has a subjective (first-person) ontology while its basis has an objective (third-person) ontology.
Fundamental or emergent
Russellian MonismPrimitive (at the fundamental level of reality, as phenomenal or proto-phenomenal properties of micro-entities).
Searle’s Biological NaturalismEmergent
Qualia
Russellian MonismQualia correspond to the phenomenal properties (or their precursors) that constitute the intrinsic nature of fundamental matter.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConscious states are inherently qualitative, in the sense that there is a distinct qualitative feel to being in any particular conscious state, and this qualitative feel is a real and irreducible part of the world.
How it works
Mechanism
Russellian MonismThe key principle is the existence of unobserved, intrinsic categorical properties ('quiddities') of matter that are phenomenal, thereby grounding consciousness in fundamental reality without expanding the physical ontology of relations.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismThe principle is that all conscious states are reliably and universally caused by lower-level brain processes and realized as system features, functioning as a real biological machine.
Where it is
Russellian MonismLocated in the intrinsic properties of fundamental micro-level physical entities or potentially instantiated by the universe as a whole (priority monism).
Searle’s Biological NaturalismLocalized in the biological brain, specifically realized in the brain as higher-level or system features.
What it does
Russellian MonismAvoids the causal exclusion problem of dualism by embedding consciousness into the fundamental properties of the physical world, meaning consciousness underlies physical reality itself.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConscious states function causally (causal efficacy) as real parts of the real world, providing a basis for intentional action and interaction with the environment.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Russellian MonismSpeculative/Conceptual. Its fundamental claims regarding intrinsic properties are generally beyond empirical access or mathematical modeling.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismEmpirically testable in principle, as the theory requires finding the exact causal details of how lower-level brain processes cause consciousness.
Tests so far
Russellian MonismNot stated
Searle’s Biological NaturalismThe theory is generally supported by empirical evidence from neuroscience showing the link between consciousness and brain activity (e.g., brain impairment, brain stimulation).
Criticisms
Russellian MonismThe primary challenge is the combination problem, which is critical: explaining how microphysical properties combine to form complex, integrated macro-level consciousness. If Panprotopsychism is assumed, it faces the problem of deriving consciousness (qualia) from proto-phenomenal properties.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismCritics dispute the claim that the causal connection between brain states and consciousness is fully established. Tension exists in maintaining materialism while arguing consciousness is ontologically subjective and irreducible to objective physical processes.
Sources
Key sources
Russellian Monism
- What is Russellian Monism?, T. Alter and Y. Nagasawa (2012)
- Russellian Monism, T. Alter and D. Pereboom (2019)
- Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism, D. Chalmers (2016)
Searle’s Biological Naturalism
- The Rediscovery of Mind (1992)
- Biological naturalism (2007)
- What things are conscious? (2007)
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