Head to head
Searle’s Biological Naturalism vs Strawson’s Panpsychism
Searle’s Biological Naturalism and Strawson’s Panpsychism Theory, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Searle’s Biological Naturalism belongs to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Strawson’s Panpsychism to Panpsychism.
- Searle’s Biological Naturalism treats consciousness as emergent; Strawson’s Panpsychism treats it as fundamental.
- They give the same kind of answer on life after death and mind uploading.
- On AI consciousness, Searle’s Biological Naturalism says “Conditional” and Strawson’s Panpsychism says “Likely”.
- On meaning and purpose, Searle’s Biological Naturalism says “Humanistic only” and Strawson’s Panpsychism says “Uncertain”.
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The claim
In brief
Searle’s Biological NaturalismBiological Naturalism posits that consciousness is a real, irreducible, subjective biological feature of the brain, entirely caused by lower-level neurobiological processes and realized as higher-level system features. This approach seeks to solve the mind-body problem by accepting the scientific worldview while acknowledging the first-person ontology of conscious experience.
Strawson’s PanpsychismStrawson argues that any philosopher taking a realistic view of physicalism must accept that all physical phenomena are intrinsically experiential or phenomenal, leading to panpsychism (or panexperientialism) as a necessary conclusion of 'Real Materialism'. The existence of conscious experience, being the most certain fact, cannot be denied by genuine physicalism .
What consciousness is
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConscious states are identified as real parts of the real world that are higher-level, system features of the brain, defined as states of awareness, sentience, or feeling that persist during wakefulness.
Strawson’s PanpsychismConsciousness (experience) is identified as an intrinsic, non-reducible phenomenal property of all fundamental physical stuff or energy (panexperientialism).
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConditionalSearle rejects consciousness via simulation (Chinese Room Argument) but argues that if the causally sufficient biological mechanism is known, an artificial machine that implements that same mechanism could be conscious, as consciousness does not strictly require biological neurons, only sufficient causal power.
Strawson’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an irreducible property of every elementary physical entity, then AI, being composed of physical matter, should also have inner awareness, provided the combination problem can be solved and micropsychic aspects can be manipulated by advanced technology .
Does consciousness survive death?Both agree
Searle’s Biological NaturalismNoConsciousness is entirely physical and solely the product of biological brains; therefore, death of the brain and body means irrevocable, permanent non-existence.
Strawson’s PanpsychismUnlikelyAlthough the world is infused with consciousness, survival requires reversing the complex process of microscopic elements coalescing into macroscopic consciousness, which seems difficult for first-person survival upon brain dissolution .
Could a mind be uploaded?Both agree
Searle’s Biological NaturalismYesIf consciousness is entirely explainable by physical/biological states, then duplicating those states (and their causal relations) in a non-biological medium would, in principle, allow for the uploading and continuation of the first-person mental self.
Strawson’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an intrinsic, regular property of the fabric of reality, advanced technology could potentially learn the regularities needed to aggregate or manipulate micropsychic forces to duplicate or upload consciousness .
Searle’s Biological NaturalismHumanistic onlyAs a materialist theory, Biological Naturalism struggles to rationalize ultimate cosmic meaning or purpose, though humanistic meaning created by ourselves remains possible.
Strawson’s PanpsychismUncertainPanpsychism is positioned between Materialism (no ultimate purpose) and Dualism/Idealism (ultimate purpose), suggesting possible ultimate meaning/purpose/value .
Nature of mind
Ontology
Searle’s Biological NaturalismPhysicalism (Biological Naturalism). It holds that consciousness is part of nature as a subjective, qualitative biological property, rejecting attempts to 'naturalize' it by denying its subjective ontology.
Strawson’s PanpsychismRealistic Monism / Real Materialism
Mind and body
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConscious states are causally reduced to lower-level brain processes (causal reducibility), but are ontologically irreducible to these processes because consciousness has a subjective (first-person) ontology while its basis has an objective (third-person) ontology.
Strawson’s PanpsychismIdentity Theory (Strong Sense). Mental phenomena are considered concrete physical phenomena because real physicalism encompasses all real phenomena, including experience.
Fundamental or emergent
Searle’s Biological NaturalismEmergent
Strawson’s PanpsychismPrimitive/Fundamental
Qualia
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConscious states are inherently qualitative, in the sense that there is a distinct qualitative feel to being in any particular conscious state, and this qualitative feel is a real and irreducible part of the world.
Strawson’s PanpsychismQualia are real, concrete, and physical properties of the world; their denial is considered the 'silliest claim ever made'.
How it works
Mechanism
Searle’s Biological NaturalismThe principle is that all conscious states are reliably and universally caused by lower-level brain processes and realized as system features, functioning as a real biological machine.
Strawson’s PanpsychismThe principle that all concrete phenomena are physical, combined with the fact that experience is a concrete phenomenon and cannot radically emerge, dictates that experience is intrinsic to fundamental physics.
Where it is
Searle’s Biological NaturalismLocalized in the biological brain, specifically realized in the brain as higher-level or system features.
Strawson’s PanpsychismUbiquitous, associated with every part or aspect of physical reality, akin to fundamental fields and particles .
What it does
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConscious states function causally (causal efficacy) as real parts of the real world, providing a basis for intentional action and interaction with the environment.
Strawson’s PanpsychismConsciousness, being physical, fits unproblematically into the natural world. (The specific causal role of individual experiences is implied through their physical status but not detailed in the sources).
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Searle’s Biological NaturalismEmpirically testable in principle, as the theory requires finding the exact causal details of how lower-level brain processes cause consciousness.
Strawson’s PanpsychismConceptually testable. It is a metaphysical proposal derived from philosophical premises about the nature of the physical world. Nagasawa notes that panpsychism, even if true, may reach a 'cognitive dead end' because it cannot be proven .
Tests so far
Searle’s Biological NaturalismThe theory is generally supported by empirical evidence from neuroscience showing the link between consciousness and brain activity (e.g., brain impairment, brain stimulation).
Strawson’s PanpsychismNot stated
Criticisms
Searle’s Biological NaturalismCritics dispute the claim that the causal connection between brain states and consciousness is fully established. Tension exists in maintaining materialism while arguing consciousness is ontologically subjective and irreducible to objective physical processes.
Strawson’s PanpsychismWidely held to be 'absurd' by some critics . It suffers from the combination problem, requiring an explanation of how micro-level experiences aggregate to yield macrophenomenal properties.
Sources
Key sources
Searle’s Biological Naturalism
- The Rediscovery of Mind (1992)
- Biological naturalism (2007)
- What things are conscious? (2007)
Strawson’s Panpsychism
- Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism, Galen Strawson (2009)
- Real Materialism and Other Essays, Galen Strawson (2008)
- The Consciousness Deniers, Galen Strawson (2018)
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