Head to head
Global Workspace Theory vs Dennett’s Illusionism
Baars’s and Dehaene’s Global Workspace Theory and Dennett’s Illusionism, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Both belong to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness.
- Both treat consciousness as emergent.
- They give the same kind of answer on life after death and meaning and purpose.
- On AI consciousness, Global Workspace Theory says “Yes” and Dennett’s Illusionism says “Possible”.
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The claim
In brief
Global Workspace TheoryThis theory posits that conscious awareness is constituted by specific multi-sensory, multi-cognitive information that achieves brain-wide presence and broad accessibility. It conceptualizes consciousness as an inner 'theater' where this information is globally broadcast, reconciling the limited capacity of momentary conscious content with vast long-term memory access.
Dennett’s IllusionismDaniel Dennett argues that qualia, conceived as intrinsic, ineffable, private, and immediately known properties of experience, do not exist; they are philosophers’ inventions. Experience is real, but it is not what it seems from the inside: the brain’s unconscious processes produce a benign ‘user illusion’, and there is nothing to consciousness beyond the functions and dispositions involved.
What consciousness is
Global Workspace TheoryConsciousness is identified as the instantaneous global availability and broad accessibility of specific, integrated information across numerous specialized modular systems in the brain.
Dennett’s IllusionismConsciousness is the functional activity of the brain, which presents itself to us as a user illusion. ‘There are no qualia.’
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Global Workspace TheoryYesSince the theory defines consciousness in terms of information-processing computations and architectures, and proponents suggest novel machine architectures could be based on these computations, AI consciousness is possible in principle.
Dennett’s IllusionismPossibleSince consciousness is nothing beyond functions and dispositions, a machine with the right functional organization could have it; Dennett does not take this up here.
Does consciousness survive death?Both agree
Global Workspace TheoryNoConsciousness is understood as being entirely dependent on specific, complex biological brain processes, which cease upon biological death.
Dennett’s IllusionismNoSince consciousness is a product of the brain’s processes, it ends when they end.
Global Workspace TheoryYesIf consciousness is wholly explained by the computational organization and information flow of the brain, a perfect duplication or uploading of these mechanisms into a non-biological substrate should preserve the first-person mental self.
Dennett’s IllusionismNo position
Does it give life meaning?Both agree
Global Workspace TheoryHumanistic onlyAs a Materialist/Neurobiological theory, it does not mandate ultimate cosmic meaning or purpose, but consciousness provides essential functions (like memory reconciliation and integrated awareness) that underpin human agency and self-created value.
Dennett’s IllusionismHumanistic onlyDennett’s materialism, and his place among the New Atheists, leave no room for cosmic purpose.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Global Workspace TheoryPhysicalism
Dennett’s IllusionismPhysicalism (illusionist)
Mind and body
Global Workspace TheoryIdentity/Correlation. The mind (conscious awareness) is identified as, or strongly correlates with, the specific, biologically realized processes of global information broadcasting in the brain.
Dennett’s IllusionismConsciousness is wholly a product of the brain’s unconscious processes. Dennett rejects any inner, non-physical domain of felt properties.
Fundamental or emergent
Global Workspace TheoryEmergent
Dennett’s IllusionismEmergent
Qualia
Global Workspace TheoryPhenomenal experience (qualia) is accounted for by proposing a strictly biological mechanism for conscious awareness. Qualia correspond to the content of the integrated, reportable multi-sensory information that is broadly accessible within the global workspace.
Dennett’s IllusionismThere are no qualia in the traditional sense. Dennett calls the supposed intrinsic, ineffable, private properties ‘nothing but philosophers’ inventions’.
How it works
Mechanism
Global Workspace TheoryGlobal broadcasting and accessibility of information, allowing a single coherent content to be made available to many specialized, unconscious modules simultaneously.
Dennett’s IllusionismThe user illusion. As a computer’s desktop icons stand in for complex underlying processes, the brain presents itself to us in a simplified form we mistake for an inner world of qualities.
Where it is
Global Workspace TheoryBrain-wide, encompassing widespread areas, particularly associated with frontal and parietal regions (often characterized as a 'front of the head' theory in contrast to 'back of the head' theories like IIT).
Dennett’s IllusionismIn the brain’s unconscious processes, with no inner theater.
What it does
Global Workspace TheoryGlobal broadcasting constitutes consciousness. Functionally, it allows for flexible control and reconciliation between limited momentary conscious content and long-term memory resources.
Dennett’s IllusionismThe user illusion is benign: it lets us manage ourselves without access to the brain’s underlying complexity.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Global Workspace TheoryEmpirically testable
Dennett’s IllusionismConceptually testable
Tests so far
Global Workspace TheoryNeuroimaging and computer modeling studies used to investigate its claims. It is implicitly subject to the 'neurogeographic' debate contrasting 'front of the head' theories with posterior theories.
Dennett’s IllusionismNot stated
Criticisms
Global Workspace TheoryCriticized for focusing on 'access' rather than genuine phenomenal experience, exemplified by the critique that the theory is 'all about access but not about seeing'. It faces tension regarding whether global broadcasting is necessary or merely a consequence of consciousness.
Dennett’s IllusionismDennett is often read as denying that experience exists, and critics reply that an illusion of experience would itself be an experience. Dennett resisted the eliminativist label, though many philosophers apply it to his rejection of qualia.
Sources
Key sources
Global Workspace Theory
- A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness (1988)
- In the Theater of Consciousness (1997)
- Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework, Dehaene and Naccache (2000)
Dennett’s Illusionism
- Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett
- I've Been Thinking, Daniel Dennett (2023)
- Dennett’s Illusionism (Landscape of Consciousness), Daniel Dennett (1992)