Head to head
Global Workspace Theory vs Epiphenomenalism
Baars’s and Dehaene’s Global Workspace Theory and Epiphenomenalism Theory, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Global Workspace Theory belongs to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Epiphenomenalism to Dualism.
- Both treat consciousness as emergent.
- They give the same kind of answer on AI consciousness, life after death, mind uploading and meaning and purpose.
Add more theories to this comparisonCompare other theories
The claim
In brief
Global Workspace TheoryThis theory posits that conscious awareness is constituted by specific multi-sensory, multi-cognitive information that achieves brain-wide presence and broad accessibility. It conceptualizes consciousness as an inner 'theater' where this information is globally broadcast, reconciling the limited capacity of momentary conscious content with vast long-term memory access.
EpiphenomenalismThis theory posits that consciousness is a non-reducible product of the biological brain, but mental states have absolutely no causal power over physical reality. Our subjective awareness is real, yet our perception that our thoughts cause actions is mistaken, as consciousness is entirely inert, like foam on an ocean wave.
What consciousness is
Global Workspace TheoryConsciousness is identified as the instantaneous global availability and broad accessibility of specific, integrated information across numerous specialized modular systems in the brain.
EpiphenomenalismConsciousness is identified as phenomenal properties that are ontologically distinct from physical properties but are causally dependent on them (Physical → Phenomenal).
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Both agree
Global Workspace TheoryYesSince the theory defines consciousness in terms of information-processing computations and architectures, and proponents suggest novel machine architectures could be based on these computations, AI consciousness is possible in principle.
EpiphenomenalismLikelyIf consciousness is merely a non-causal byproduct (foam) of physical processes in the brain , replicating those physical processes in AI should produce the same conscious states without the non-causal mental states hindering functional replication.
Does consciousness survive death?Both agree
Global Workspace TheoryNoConsciousness is understood as being entirely dependent on specific, complex biological brain processes, which cease upon biological death.
EpiphenomenalismNoConsciousness is entirely physical and solely the product of biological brains. This physical dependence precludes survival beyond bodily death.
Could a mind be uploaded?Both agree
Global Workspace TheoryYesIf consciousness is wholly explained by the computational organization and information flow of the brain, a perfect duplication or uploading of these mechanisms into a non-biological substrate should preserve the first-person mental self.
EpiphenomenalismLikelyThe inert nature of consciousness means that uploading the physical states would necessarily duplicate the epiphenomenal mental states. The inert 'foam' should have little impact on achieving virtual immortality.
Does it give life meaning?Both agree
Global Workspace TheoryHumanistic onlyAs a Materialist/Neurobiological theory, it does not mandate ultimate cosmic meaning or purpose, but consciousness provides essential functions (like memory reconciliation and integrated awareness) that underpin human agency and self-created value.
EpiphenomenalismHumanistic onlyAs a philosophical materialism theory, it provides no ultimate meaning or purpose. Since consciousness is causally inert, it cannot confer cosmic teleological value.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Global Workspace TheoryPhysicalism
EpiphenomenalismWeak form of Dualism or Non-Reductive Physicalism. It affirms the complete causal closure of the physical.
Mind and body
Global Workspace TheoryIdentity/Correlation. The mind (conscious awareness) is identified as, or strongly correlates with, the specific, biologically realized processes of global information broadcasting in the brain.
EpiphenomenalismMental states are entirely the product of biological brains. Physical states cause phenomenal states, but phenomenal states have no causal effect on the physical (one-directional causation).
Fundamental or emergent
Global Workspace TheoryEmergent
EpiphenomenalismEmergent. Consciousness is solely the product of biological brains.
Qualia
Global Workspace TheoryPhenomenal experience (qualia) is accounted for by proposing a strictly biological mechanism for conscious awareness. Qualia correspond to the content of the integrated, reportable multi-sensory information that is broadly accessible within the global workspace.
EpiphenomenalismPhenomenal properties (qualia) are real and ontologically distinct from physical properties , but they are epiphenomena and thus causally inert.
How it works
Mechanism
Global Workspace TheoryGlobal broadcasting and accessibility of information, allowing a single coherent content to be made available to many specialized, unconscious modules simultaneously.
EpiphenomenalismThe principle of the 'causal closure of the physical' dictates that mental states, whatever their nature, must be entirely inert byproducts.
Where it is
Global Workspace TheoryBrain-wide, encompassing widespread areas, particularly associated with frontal and parietal regions (often characterized as a 'front of the head' theory in contrast to 'back of the head' theories like IIT).
EpiphenomenalismEntirely located in the physical, biological brain.
What it does
Global Workspace TheoryGlobal broadcasting constitutes consciousness. Functionally, it allows for flexible control and reconciliation between limited momentary conscious content and long-term memory resources.
EpiphenomenalismMental states have no causal powers. The mind is entirely inert and there is no 'top-down causation'; consciousness is a non-functional byproduct.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Global Workspace TheoryEmpirically testable
EpiphenomenalismConceptually challenged. Its primary claim—that conscious states lack causal force—is counterintuitive and difficult to test empirically, as it involves proving a negative causal link.
Tests so far
Global Workspace TheoryNeuroimaging and computer modeling studies used to investigate its claims. It is implicitly subject to the 'neurogeographic' debate contrasting 'front of the head' theories with posterior theories.
EpiphenomenalismNot stated
Criticisms
Global Workspace TheoryCriticized for focusing on 'access' rather than genuine phenomenal experience, exemplified by the critique that the theory is 'all about access but not about seeing'. It faces tension regarding whether global broadcasting is necessary or merely a consequence of consciousness.
EpiphenomenalismThe theory is counterintuitive because it strongly seems to us that our phenomenally conscious states causally matter. It forces the acceptance that our sense of mental causation (thoughts causing things) is a 'kind of illusion or trick'.
Sources
Key sources
Global Workspace Theory
- A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness (1988)
- In the Theater of Consciousness (1997)
- Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework, Dehaene and Naccache (2000)
Epiphenomenalism
- Consciousness (2019)
- Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness (1995)
- What Is Consciousness? (Little Debates about Big Questions), A. Kind and D. Stoljar (2023)