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Goff’s Panpsychism vs Integrated Information Theory

Goff's Panpsychism and Integrated Information Theory (IIT), compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.

At a glance

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The claim

In brief
Goff’s PanpsychismGoff argues that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world, positioning it as the best hope for solving the hard problem that materialism fails to address. He asserts that the physical sciences, with their purely quantitative language, cannot account for the qualitative nature (qualitivity) or subjective aspect of experience, requiring a change in our fundamental understanding of science (Galileo's Error).
Integrated Information TheoryIIT is an original, radical model that proposes a definition for conscious experience and specifies which physical systems can possess it, starting from the phenomenology of consciousness (axioms). It translates these axioms into physical postulates based on intrinsic cause-effect power, featuring a mathematical measure Φ(Phi) to quantify a system's capacity for informational integration, which correlates with the degree of consciousness.
What consciousness is
Goff’s PanpsychismConsciousness is identified as a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world. Specifically, Goff explores Panpsychism through the lens of Russellian Monism, where phenomenal or protomenal properties are the intrinsic nature of fundamental matter.
Integrated Information TheoryConsciousness is identified as a Φ-structure, a maximally reduced conceptual structure existing in 'qualia space'. An experience is identical to this conceptual structure, meaning its phenomenal properties correspond precisely to the physical properties of the cause-effect structure unfolded from the physical substrate of consciousness (PSC).

Big questions

Goff’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an intrinsic property of matter/energy, then the physical components of AI systems would possess proto-conscious properties. The realization of full AI consciousness would depend on whether advanced technology can resolve the combination problem in the artificial substrate.
Integrated Information TheoryNoKoch, a proponent, argues that consciousness is not computable. Digital computers have negligible integrated information (Φ(Phi)) due to hardware structure, meaning they can never be sentient, regardless of intelligence.
Goff’s PanpsychismUnlikelyWhile consciousness is fundamental, the survival of individual, unified, personal consciousness (the macro-subject) is challenging given the theory relies on a specific organizational structure (the brain) for macro-experience. Success depends on whether the emergent subject persists outside the biological mechanism.
Integrated Information TheoryUncertainIf phenomenal consciousness requires a radically new structure (like IIT's postulates), the potential permanence of these 'inscrutable things' cannot be rejected, leaving the possibility of survival open, even though IIT does not explicitly espouse life after death.
Goff’s PanpsychismLikelySince the physical substrate (digital hardware) is composed of fundamentally conscious components (proto-consciousness), virtual immortality is achievable if the conscious organization (solving the combination problem) can be perfectly replicated in the new medium.
Integrated Information TheoryNoIf consciousness is a fundamental property tied to real cause-effect power, a digital simulation (uploading) would only create a 'perfect zombie'—an entity that acts like the original but lacks subjective consciousness—because the simulation is virtual, lacking the required real cause-effect power.
Goff’s PanpsychismCosmic/UltimateGoff's Agentive/Teleological Cosmopsychism implies that the universe itself is a conscious mind with goal-directed intent, suggesting an ultimate, cosmic meaning and purpose.
Integrated Information TheoryUncertainWhile the measurement and analysis of consciousness do not convey ultimate meaning, the speculative nature and novelty of the innumerable nth dimensional conceptual structures (conscious percepts) warrants suspending judgment on ultimate meaning/purpose/value.

Nature of mind

Ontology
Goff’s PanpsychismPanpsychism (often formalized as a variant of Russellian Monism, leading to Hybrid Panpsychism or Agentive Cosmopsychism, where the universe is a conscious agent)
Integrated Information TheoryIIT's fundamental ontology is the ontological primacy of phenomenal existence, based on an intrinsic powers view where what truly exists in physical terms are intrinsic entities capable of cause and effect. Koch notes that the theory insists consciousness must be incorporated into the basic description of reality at the rock-bottom level.
Mind and body
Goff’s PanpsychismMind (consciousness/protoconsciousness) is the intrinsic nature of the physical world. This relationship avoids the causal difficulties of Dualism by positing that mental properties are inseparable from the physical fabric, aligning with extended materialism.
Integrated Information TheoryIIT asserts an explanatory identity: an experience is identical to a Φ-structure. It contends that the conscious entity is the Φ-structure expressing its causal powers, not the neural substrate itself. This framework leaves no room for emergence or dualism.
Fundamental or emergent
Goff’s PanpsychismConsciousness is Primitive/Fundamental at the lowest level of reality. However, human subjects of experience are considered Strongly Emergent entities, while their phenomenal properties are Weakly Emergent (Hybrid Panpsychism).
Integrated Information TheoryConsciousness is defined by intrinsic existence and characterized as belonging to the basic description of reality. The theory rejects emergence.
Qualia
Goff’s PanpsychismQualia (sensory qualities or qualitivity) are fundamental properties of reality and cannot be reduced to the purely quantitative language of physics, which has an inherent explanatory limitation. Panpsychism solves the hard problem by postulating that these qualities exist fundamentally.
Integrated Information TheoryDistinct conscious experiences are conceptual structures in a 'qualia space'. The qualitative feel (phenomenal properties) corresponds one-to-one to the physical properties of the maximally irreducible cause-effect structure, which is also called a quale.

How it works

Mechanism
Goff’s PanpsychismThe primary principle is metaphysical necessity: consciousness must be fundamental to avoid the explanatory gap and solve the hard problem. In Agentive Cosmopsychism, teleological causation (goal-directed intent) by the conscious cosmos explains fine-tuning.
Integrated Information TheoryThe core principle is Integrated Information (Φ(Phi)), which quantifies the system's irreducibility. The Exclusion Postulate ensures that only the maximally irreducible cause-effect structure (the Φ-structure) exists intrinsically, defining the boundaries and grain of consciousness.
Where it is
Goff’s PanpsychismConsciousness is ubiquitous, permeating the physical world. In Cosmopsychism, the fundamental consciousness is located in the universe as a whole.
Integrated Information TheoryConsciousness is not limited to biological brains. IIT predicts the conscious structure resides in the posterior cortex (occipital, parietal, and temporal cortices). Systems with maximally irreducible intrinsic cause-effect power possess consciousness.
What it does
Goff’s PanpsychismAt the cosmic level (Agentive Cosmopsychism), consciousness functions as an agent explaining cosmic fine-tuning and the emergence of life/mind. For individual subjects, consciousness is the source of value and identity. The combination problem must be resolved to establish coherent causation from micro- to macro-subjects.
Integrated Information TheoryConsciousness is identified as unfolded intrinsic causal power, which is the ability to effect change. Only this intrinsic entity (the Φ-structure) can cause, supporting the claim that true free will exists for systems with high Φ(Phi).

Evidence and criticism

Testability
Goff’s PanpsychismSpeculative. The theory aims to solve conceptual and metaphysical tensions (like the hard problem) , but the fundamental claim that consciousness is ubiquitous is difficult to test empirically, leading to critiques that panpsychism reaches a 'cognitive dead end'.
Integrated Information TheoryIIT claims scientific testability, employing quantitative measurement. However, critics argue that the theory is not truly empirically tested, and its core predictions may be idiosyncratic.
Tests so far
Goff’s PanpsychismNot stated
Integrated Information TheoryCalculating Φ(Phi) for specific neural networks (e.g., visual cortex).,Monitoring brain activity as subjects slip into anesthesia.,Adversarial collaboration experiments testing predictions about sustained activity in the posterior cortex.
Criticisms
Goff’s PanpsychismThe main tension is the Combination Problem: how do micro-phenomenal properties combine or aggregate to form complex macro-phenomenal properties (such as human consciousness). Goff's rejection of quantitative descriptions being able to capture quality is also critiqued by proponents of information-based theories.
Integrated Information TheoryThe theory faces criticism for anti-common sense predictions (imputing consciousness to simple objects). A public letter characterized IIT as 'pseudoscience'. Critics challenge that experiments test only idiosyncratic predictions and not the core metaphysical ideas. Chalmers noted the 'pseudoscience' label was disproportionate and caused vast collateral damage.

Sources

Key sources
Goff’s Panpsychism
  • Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness, Philip Goff (2019)
  • Why? the Purpose of the Universe, Philip Goff (2023)
  • Putting consciousness first: replies to critics, Philip Goff (2021)
Integrated Information Theory
  • From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: integrated information theory 3.0, Oizumi, Albantakis, Tononi (2014)
  • Consciousness: here, there and everywhere?, Tononi and Koch (2015)
  • Only what exists can cause: an intrinsic powers view of free will, Tononi et al. (2022)

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