Head to head
Epiphenomenalism vs Searle’s Biological Naturalism
Epiphenomenalism Theory and Searle’s Biological Naturalism, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Epiphenomenalism belongs to the Dualism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Searle’s Biological Naturalism to Materialism.
- Both treat consciousness as emergent.
- They give the same kind of answer on life after death, mind uploading and meaning and purpose.
- On AI consciousness, Epiphenomenalism says “Likely” and Searle’s Biological Naturalism says “Conditional”.
Add more theories to this comparisonCompare other theories
The claim
In brief
EpiphenomenalismThis theory posits that consciousness is a non-reducible product of the biological brain, but mental states have absolutely no causal power over physical reality. Our subjective awareness is real, yet our perception that our thoughts cause actions is mistaken, as consciousness is entirely inert, like foam on an ocean wave.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismBiological Naturalism posits that consciousness is a real, irreducible, subjective biological feature of the brain, entirely caused by lower-level neurobiological processes and realized as higher-level system features. This approach seeks to solve the mind-body problem by accepting the scientific worldview while acknowledging the first-person ontology of conscious experience.
What consciousness is
EpiphenomenalismConsciousness is identified as phenomenal properties that are ontologically distinct from physical properties but are causally dependent on them (Physical → Phenomenal).
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConscious states are identified as real parts of the real world that are higher-level, system features of the brain, defined as states of awareness, sentience, or feeling that persist during wakefulness.
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
EpiphenomenalismLikelyIf consciousness is merely a non-causal byproduct (foam) of physical processes in the brain , replicating those physical processes in AI should produce the same conscious states without the non-causal mental states hindering functional replication.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConditionalSearle rejects consciousness via simulation (Chinese Room Argument) but argues that if the causally sufficient biological mechanism is known, an artificial machine that implements that same mechanism could be conscious, as consciousness does not strictly require biological neurons, only sufficient causal power.
Does consciousness survive death?Both agree
EpiphenomenalismNoConsciousness is entirely physical and solely the product of biological brains. This physical dependence precludes survival beyond bodily death.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismNoConsciousness is entirely physical and solely the product of biological brains; therefore, death of the brain and body means irrevocable, permanent non-existence.
Could a mind be uploaded?Both agree
EpiphenomenalismLikelyThe inert nature of consciousness means that uploading the physical states would necessarily duplicate the epiphenomenal mental states. The inert 'foam' should have little impact on achieving virtual immortality.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismYesIf consciousness is entirely explainable by physical/biological states, then duplicating those states (and their causal relations) in a non-biological medium would, in principle, allow for the uploading and continuation of the first-person mental self.
Does it give life meaning?Both agree
EpiphenomenalismHumanistic onlyAs a philosophical materialism theory, it provides no ultimate meaning or purpose. Since consciousness is causally inert, it cannot confer cosmic teleological value.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismHumanistic onlyAs a materialist theory, Biological Naturalism struggles to rationalize ultimate cosmic meaning or purpose, though humanistic meaning created by ourselves remains possible.
Nature of mind
Ontology
EpiphenomenalismWeak form of Dualism or Non-Reductive Physicalism. It affirms the complete causal closure of the physical.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismPhysicalism (Biological Naturalism). It holds that consciousness is part of nature as a subjective, qualitative biological property, rejecting attempts to 'naturalize' it by denying its subjective ontology.
Mind and body
EpiphenomenalismMental states are entirely the product of biological brains. Physical states cause phenomenal states, but phenomenal states have no causal effect on the physical (one-directional causation).
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConscious states are causally reduced to lower-level brain processes (causal reducibility), but are ontologically irreducible to these processes because consciousness has a subjective (first-person) ontology while its basis has an objective (third-person) ontology.
Fundamental or emergent
EpiphenomenalismEmergent. Consciousness is solely the product of biological brains.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismEmergent
Qualia
EpiphenomenalismPhenomenal properties (qualia) are real and ontologically distinct from physical properties , but they are epiphenomena and thus causally inert.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConscious states are inherently qualitative, in the sense that there is a distinct qualitative feel to being in any particular conscious state, and this qualitative feel is a real and irreducible part of the world.
How it works
Mechanism
EpiphenomenalismThe principle of the 'causal closure of the physical' dictates that mental states, whatever their nature, must be entirely inert byproducts.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismThe principle is that all conscious states are reliably and universally caused by lower-level brain processes and realized as system features, functioning as a real biological machine.
Where it is
EpiphenomenalismEntirely located in the physical, biological brain.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismLocalized in the biological brain, specifically realized in the brain as higher-level or system features.
What it does
EpiphenomenalismMental states have no causal powers. The mind is entirely inert and there is no 'top-down causation'; consciousness is a non-functional byproduct.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConscious states function causally (causal efficacy) as real parts of the real world, providing a basis for intentional action and interaction with the environment.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
EpiphenomenalismConceptually challenged. Its primary claim—that conscious states lack causal force—is counterintuitive and difficult to test empirically, as it involves proving a negative causal link.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismEmpirically testable in principle, as the theory requires finding the exact causal details of how lower-level brain processes cause consciousness.
Tests so far
EpiphenomenalismNot stated
Searle’s Biological NaturalismThe theory is generally supported by empirical evidence from neuroscience showing the link between consciousness and brain activity (e.g., brain impairment, brain stimulation).
Criticisms
EpiphenomenalismThe theory is counterintuitive because it strongly seems to us that our phenomenally conscious states causally matter. It forces the acceptance that our sense of mental causation (thoughts causing things) is a 'kind of illusion or trick'.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismCritics dispute the claim that the causal connection between brain states and consciousness is fully established. Tension exists in maintaining materialism while arguing consciousness is ontologically subjective and irreducible to objective physical processes.
Sources
Key sources
Epiphenomenalism
- Consciousness (2019)
- Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness (1995)
- What Is Consciousness? (Little Debates about Big Questions), A. Kind and D. Stoljar (2023)
Searle’s Biological Naturalism
- The Rediscovery of Mind (1992)
- Biological naturalism (2007)
- What things are conscious? (2007)
More comparisons
Epiphenomenalism vs …
Searle’s Biological Naturalism vs …
- Searle’s Biological Naturalism vs Orch OR
- Searle’s Biological Naturalism vs Spira’s Non-Duality
- Searle’s Biological Naturalism vs Goff’s Panpsychism
- Searle’s Biological Naturalism vs Bentley Hart’s Monism
- Searle’s Biological Naturalism vs Kastrup’s Analytic Idealism
- Searle’s Biological Naturalism vs Christian Soul Theory