Head to head
Frankish’s Illusionism vs Kastrup’s Analytic Idealism
Frankish’s Illusionism and Analytic Idealism, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Frankish’s Illusionism belongs to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Kastrup’s Analytic Idealism to Idealism.
- Frankish’s Illusionism treats consciousness as emergent; Kastrup’s Analytic Idealism treats it as fundamental.
- On AI consciousness, Frankish’s Illusionism says “Possible” and Kastrup’s Analytic Idealism says “No”.
- On life after death, Frankish’s Illusionism says “No” and Kastrup’s Analytic Idealism says “Likely”.
- On meaning and purpose, Frankish’s Illusionism says “Humanistic only” and Kastrup’s Analytic Idealism says “Cosmic/Ultimate”.
Add more theories to this comparisonCompare other theories
The claim
In brief
Frankish’s IllusionismKeith Frankish holds that conscious experiences are real but not what they seem: the irreducibly subjective ‘phenomenal properties’ or qualia we ascribe to them are an introspective illusion. Introspection builds a simplified, schematic model of the brain’s complex reactions to stimulation, and we mistake that model for direct awareness of inner qualities, so the hard problem gives way to an ‘illusion problem’.
Kastrup’s Analytic IdealismAnalytic Idealism is a consciousness-only ontology asserting that phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, the singular primitive of reality. Everything else in nature, including the physical world and individual minds, is grounded in patterns of excitation or expressions of this spatially unbound cosmic consciousness.
What consciousness is
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states are complex functional states of the brain that sustain rich sensory engagement with the world and flexible control of behavior. Their distinctive features are functional, which Frankish calls quasi-phenomenal properties.
Kastrup’s Analytic IdealismConsciousness is identified as the singular, spatially unbound, fundamental ontological primitive (cosmic consciousness).
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Frankish’s IllusionismPossibleSince consciousness is a complex functional state, a system with the right reactive and sensory organization could have it, though Frankish does not address machines directly.
Kastrup’s Analytic IdealismNoKastrup suggests conscious AI is a fantasy, arguing that consciousness is not reducible to computation or information processing that current computers perform. Consciousness is tied to fundamental phenomenal reality, not hardware function.
Frankish’s IllusionismNoSince conscious states are functional states of a living brain, they end when the brain stops functioning.
Kastrup’s Analytic IdealismLikelyBodily death is predicted to result in the cessation of the local boundary (dissociated alter), causing conscious inner life to expand back into the underlying universal consciousness. This is supported circumstantially by reports of near-death experiences (NDEs).
Frankish’s IllusionismNo position
Kastrup’s Analytic IdealismNoConsciousness is not an algorithm or software program reducible to physical structure; therefore, uploading neural patterns (simulated continuation) would only result in a functional duplication ('deep fake') lacking true subjective experience.
Frankish’s IllusionismHumanistic onlyFrankish grounds value in what creatures are motivated to seek or avoid and argues that illusionism widens ethical concern to other animals across a graded ‘consciousness space’.
Kastrup’s Analytic IdealismCosmic/UltimateAs consciousness is ultimate reality, existence is fundamentally grounded in mind/awareness, intrinsically providing meaning and purpose rooted in the singular, fundamental consciousness.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Frankish’s IllusionismPhysicalism (strong illusionism)
Kastrup’s Analytic IdealismIdealism (Modern analytic metaphysics)
Mind and body
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious experiences are physically realized functional states. Phenomenal properties are intentional objects, represented but never instantiated, like the impossible objects Nicholas Humphrey compares them to.
Kastrup’s Analytic IdealismIndividual minds are dissociated alters of the cosmic consciousness. The inanimate physical world is the extrinsic view of thoughts and emotions within this universal consciousness, meaning a physical world independent of consciousness is a mistaken intellectual abstraction.
Fundamental or emergent
Frankish’s IllusionismEmergent
Kastrup’s Analytic IdealismPrimitive (Fundamental)
Qualia
Frankish’s IllusionismQualia do not exist. Introspection misrepresents brain states, as perception misrepresents some features of the world, and introspective information bound to perception makes external things seem to carry vivid sensory qualities, such as an apple’s redness, that reflect their significance for us.
Kastrup’s Analytic IdealismQualia are intrinsically real and fundamental, constituting patterns of excitation within the fundamental phenomenal consciousness.
How it works
Mechanism
Frankish’s IllusionismThe reactivity schema: introspective systems track the overall psychological impact of stimulation without representing its detail, and this simplified model is mistaken for direct acquaintance with qualities. Frankish borrows Daniel Dennett’s image of a computer’s user illusion, whose icons have no literal counterparts in the machine.
Kastrup’s Analytic IdealismThe principle of dissociation, which localizes the unitary cosmic consciousness into seemingly isolated subjects (alters).
Where it is
Frankish’s IllusionismDistributed across the brain. The subject of the illusion is the whole organism, and the work of registering and reacting to it is shared among many unconscious subsystems, with no Cartesian theater.
Kastrup’s Analytic IdealismUbiquitous; consciousness is fundamental and spatially unbound. Individual conscious subjects are localized boundary conditions (dissociated alters).
What it does
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states guide flexible, intelligent behavior. The illusion itself is made of physical representations and so has causal effects, which may be adaptive, as Nicholas Humphrey argues; this avoids the threat of epiphenomenalism.
Kastrup’s Analytic IdealismCausation is grounded in consciousness itself. The inanimate world is the extrinsic manifestation of universal mentation, while the brain serves to constrain or mediate individual consciousness.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Frankish’s IllusionismConceptually testable
Kastrup’s Analytic IdealismSpeculative/Conceptual. Testable primarily by demonstrating the incoherence or lack of parsimony of rival metaphysical theories and by predicting experiential outcomes in extreme states.
Tests so far
Frankish’s IllusionismFrankish holds that the reactive changes constituting experience are in principle experimentally detectable, which opens the experiences of other creatures to study.
Kastrup’s Analytic IdealismCites neuroimaging of psychedelic states (rich experience correlating with reduced brain activity) to critique physicalist theories.
Criticisms
Frankish’s IllusionismThe central objection, a version of Descartes’ cogito, holds that our own phenomenal states are indubitable data. Galen Strawson argues that illusionism denies the main source of ethical value. Others object that an illusion needs an audience.
Kastrup’s Analytic IdealismThe main critical challenge is the 'decomposition problem': explaining how seemingly distinct phenomenal inner lives of subjects can arise within a fundamentally unitary phenomenal field. Also must reconcile the independence of the common external world from personal volition.
Sources
Key sources
Frankish’s Illusionism
- Frankish’s Illusionism (Landscape of Consciousness), Keith Frankish (2021)
Kastrup’s Analytic Idealism
- An ontological solution to the mind-body problem (2017)
- The universe in consciousness (2018)
- Analytic Idealism: A Consciousness-Only Ontology, Dissertation (2019)