Head to head
Bentley Hart’s Monism vs Frankish’s Illusionism
Bentley Hart’s Monism: Consciousness, Being, God and Frankish’s Illusionism, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Bentley Hart’s Monism belongs to the Idealism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Frankish’s Illusionism to Materialism.
- Bentley Hart’s Monism treats consciousness as fundamental; Frankish’s Illusionism treats it as emergent.
- On AI consciousness, Bentley Hart’s Monism says “No” and Frankish’s Illusionism says “Possible”.
- On life after death, Bentley Hart’s Monism says “Yes” and Frankish’s Illusionism says “No”.
- On meaning and purpose, Bentley Hart’s Monism says “Cosmic/Ultimate” and Frankish’s Illusionism says “Humanistic only”.
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The claim
In brief
Bentley Hart’s MonismThis is a metaphysical theory that constructs an ultimate unified monism by asserting the profound inseparability of consciousness (mind) and being (existence) itself. It posits that ultimate reality is God, who is the absolute unity of consciousness and being, fundamentally rejecting reductive physicalist explanations.
Frankish’s IllusionismKeith Frankish holds that conscious experiences are real but not what they seem: the irreducibly subjective ‘phenomenal properties’ or qualia we ascribe to them are an introspective illusion. Introspection builds a simplified, schematic model of the brain’s complex reactions to stimulation, and we mistake that model for direct awareness of inner qualities, so the hard problem gives way to an ‘illusion problem’.
What consciousness is
Bentley Hart’s MonismConsciousness and being (existence) are two inseparable aspects of a single, ultimate ontological reality.
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states are complex functional states of the brain that sustain rich sensory engagement with the world and flexible control of behavior. Their distinctive features are functional, which Frankish calls quasi-phenomenal properties.
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Bentley Hart’s MonismNoConsciousness is a restricted instance of infinite mind (God) and is not reducible to computation or physical processing. Therefore, artificial systems based purely on physical mechanisms cannot instantiate true consciousness.
Frankish’s IllusionismPossibleSince consciousness is a complex functional state, a system with the right reactive and sensory organization could have it, though Frankish does not address machines directly.
Bentley Hart’s MonismYesConsciousness is identified with ultimate being and God, meaning it is fundamental and cannot be destroyed. Hart’s theology suggests individuals are destined for union with God, becoming 'uncreated'.
Frankish’s IllusionismNoSince conscious states are functional states of a living brain, they end when the brain stops functioning.
Bentley Hart’s MonismNoConsciousness is metaphysically unified, physically infrangible mental agency , making it impossible to capture, duplicate, or upload via computational means, which would only replicate 'third-person' processes.
Frankish’s IllusionismNo position
Bentley Hart’s MonismCosmic/UltimateThe entire reality is rationally coherent and grounded in God, the ultimate reason and consciousness, inherently supplying ultimate meaning, purpose, and value.
Frankish’s IllusionismHumanistic onlyFrankish grounds value in what creatures are motivated to seek or avoid and argues that illusionism widens ethical concern to other animals across a graded ‘consciousness space’.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Bentley Hart’s MonismIdealist Monism/Theistic Monism
Frankish’s IllusionismPhysicalism (strong illusionism)
Mind and body
Bentley Hart’s MonismNon-reductive correlation/Theistic interaction (Justification: Hart argues the causal descriptions of material and mental spheres are radically disparate and incommensurable, making reductionism incoherent. Interaction, while problematic for materialists, is possible, perhaps through the power of God).
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious experiences are physically realized functional states. Phenomenal properties are intentional objects, represented but never instantiated, like the impossible objects Nicholas Humphrey compares them to.
Fundamental or emergent
Bentley Hart’s MonismPrimitive
Frankish’s IllusionismEmergent
Qualia
Bentley Hart’s MonismQualitative aspects of experience (mental reality) are irreducible. The irreducibility of mind is the same as the irreducibility of being, suggesting qualia are grounded in ultimate intelligibility.
Frankish’s IllusionismQualia do not exist. Introspection misrepresents brain states, as perception misrepresents some features of the world, and introspective information bound to perception makes external things seem to carry vivid sensory qualities, such as an apple’s redness, that reflect their significance for us.
How it works
Mechanism
Bentley Hart’s MonismThe unification of the conditions for knowledge (mind) and the conditions for existence (being) into a single, simple, ultimate act or reality (God).
Frankish’s IllusionismThe reactivity schema: introspective systems track the overall psychological impact of stimulation without representing its detail, and this simplified model is mistaken for direct acquaintance with qualities. Frankish borrows Daniel Dennett’s image of a computer’s user illusion, whose icons have no literal counterparts in the machine.
Where it is
Bentley Hart’s MonismUbiquitous/Cosmic (Justification: Consciousness, being unified with ultimate Being/God, is the ground of all reality, aligning with Idealist metaphysics).
Frankish’s IllusionismDistributed across the brain. The subject of the illusion is the whole organism, and the work of registering and reacting to it is shared among many unconscious subsystems, with no Cartesian theater.
What it does
Bentley Hart’s MonismMind holds causal priority over matter. Conscious, unified mental acts depend upon the infinite mind (God). The theory rejects the causal closure of the physical.
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states guide flexible, intelligent behavior. The illusion itself is made of physical representations and so has causal effects, which may be adaptive, as Nicholas Humphrey argues; this avoids the threat of epiphenomenalism.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Bentley Hart’s MonismSpeculative/Conceptually Testable (Justification: The theory is a high-level metaphysical framework founded on philosophical critiques; Hart questions the possibility of a science of mental reality under physicalist assumptions).
Frankish’s IllusionismConceptually testable
Tests so far
Bentley Hart’s MonismNot stated
Frankish’s IllusionismFrankish holds that the reactive changes constituting experience are in principle experimentally detectable, which opens the experiences of other creatures to study.
Criticisms
Bentley Hart’s MonismCritics find the conclusion to unify consciousness, being, and God 'strange'. The theory faces the standard challenge of articulating the continuity or interaction between the disparate mental and material spheres without invoking rejected concepts like strong emergence.
Frankish’s IllusionismThe central objection, a version of Descartes’ cogito, holds that our own phenomenal states are indubitable data. Galen Strawson argues that illusionism denies the main source of ethical value. Others object that an illusion needs an audience.
Sources
Key sources
Bentley Hart’s Monism
- Mind, Being, God - Spiritual Science and the Science of Mind, Part Four (2022)
- Science, consciousness, information: spiritual science and the science of mind, Part One (2021)
- Does consciousness defeat materialism (Part 2) (2019)
Frankish’s Illusionism
- Frankish’s Illusionism (Landscape of Consciousness), Keith Frankish (2021)