Head to head
Frankish’s Illusionism vs Goff’s Panpsychism
Frankish’s Illusionism and Goff's Panpsychism, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Frankish’s Illusionism belongs to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Goff’s Panpsychism to Panpsychism.
- They give the same kind of answer on life after death.
- On AI consciousness, Frankish’s Illusionism says “Possible” and Goff’s Panpsychism says “Likely”.
- On meaning and purpose, Frankish’s Illusionism says “Humanistic only” and Goff’s Panpsychism says “Cosmic/Ultimate”.
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The claim
In brief
Frankish’s IllusionismKeith Frankish holds that conscious experiences are real but not what they seem: the irreducibly subjective ‘phenomenal properties’ or qualia we ascribe to them are an introspective illusion. Introspection builds a simplified, schematic model of the brain’s complex reactions to stimulation, and we mistake that model for direct awareness of inner qualities, so the hard problem gives way to an ‘illusion problem’.
Goff’s PanpsychismGoff argues that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world, positioning it as the best hope for solving the hard problem that materialism fails to address. He asserts that the physical sciences, with their purely quantitative language, cannot account for the qualitative nature (qualitivity) or subjective aspect of experience, requiring a change in our fundamental understanding of science (Galileo's Error).
What consciousness is
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states are complex functional states of the brain that sustain rich sensory engagement with the world and flexible control of behavior. Their distinctive features are functional, which Frankish calls quasi-phenomenal properties.
Goff’s PanpsychismConsciousness is identified as a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world. Specifically, Goff explores Panpsychism through the lens of Russellian Monism, where phenomenal or protomenal properties are the intrinsic nature of fundamental matter.
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Frankish’s IllusionismPossibleSince consciousness is a complex functional state, a system with the right reactive and sensory organization could have it, though Frankish does not address machines directly.
Goff’s PanpsychismLikelyIf consciousness is an intrinsic property of matter/energy, then the physical components of AI systems would possess proto-conscious properties. The realization of full AI consciousness would depend on whether advanced technology can resolve the combination problem in the artificial substrate.
Does consciousness survive death?Both agree
Frankish’s IllusionismNoSince conscious states are functional states of a living brain, they end when the brain stops functioning.
Goff’s PanpsychismUnlikelyWhile consciousness is fundamental, the survival of individual, unified, personal consciousness (the macro-subject) is challenging given the theory relies on a specific organizational structure (the brain) for macro-experience. Success depends on whether the emergent subject persists outside the biological mechanism.
Frankish’s IllusionismNo position
Goff’s PanpsychismLikelySince the physical substrate (digital hardware) is composed of fundamentally conscious components (proto-consciousness), virtual immortality is achievable if the conscious organization (solving the combination problem) can be perfectly replicated in the new medium.
Frankish’s IllusionismHumanistic onlyFrankish grounds value in what creatures are motivated to seek or avoid and argues that illusionism widens ethical concern to other animals across a graded ‘consciousness space’.
Goff’s PanpsychismCosmic/UltimateGoff's Agentive/Teleological Cosmopsychism implies that the universe itself is a conscious mind with goal-directed intent, suggesting an ultimate, cosmic meaning and purpose.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Frankish’s IllusionismPhysicalism (strong illusionism)
Goff’s PanpsychismPanpsychism (often formalized as a variant of Russellian Monism, leading to Hybrid Panpsychism or Agentive Cosmopsychism, where the universe is a conscious agent)
Mind and body
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious experiences are physically realized functional states. Phenomenal properties are intentional objects, represented but never instantiated, like the impossible objects Nicholas Humphrey compares them to.
Goff’s PanpsychismMind (consciousness/protoconsciousness) is the intrinsic nature of the physical world. This relationship avoids the causal difficulties of Dualism by positing that mental properties are inseparable from the physical fabric, aligning with extended materialism.
Fundamental or emergent
Frankish’s IllusionismEmergent
Goff’s PanpsychismConsciousness is Primitive/Fundamental at the lowest level of reality. However, human subjects of experience are considered Strongly Emergent entities, while their phenomenal properties are Weakly Emergent (Hybrid Panpsychism).
Qualia
Frankish’s IllusionismQualia do not exist. Introspection misrepresents brain states, as perception misrepresents some features of the world, and introspective information bound to perception makes external things seem to carry vivid sensory qualities, such as an apple’s redness, that reflect their significance for us.
Goff’s PanpsychismQualia (sensory qualities or qualitivity) are fundamental properties of reality and cannot be reduced to the purely quantitative language of physics, which has an inherent explanatory limitation. Panpsychism solves the hard problem by postulating that these qualities exist fundamentally.
How it works
Mechanism
Frankish’s IllusionismThe reactivity schema: introspective systems track the overall psychological impact of stimulation without representing its detail, and this simplified model is mistaken for direct acquaintance with qualities. Frankish borrows Daniel Dennett’s image of a computer’s user illusion, whose icons have no literal counterparts in the machine.
Goff’s PanpsychismThe primary principle is metaphysical necessity: consciousness must be fundamental to avoid the explanatory gap and solve the hard problem. In Agentive Cosmopsychism, teleological causation (goal-directed intent) by the conscious cosmos explains fine-tuning.
Where it is
Frankish’s IllusionismDistributed across the brain. The subject of the illusion is the whole organism, and the work of registering and reacting to it is shared among many unconscious subsystems, with no Cartesian theater.
Goff’s PanpsychismConsciousness is ubiquitous, permeating the physical world. In Cosmopsychism, the fundamental consciousness is located in the universe as a whole.
What it does
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states guide flexible, intelligent behavior. The illusion itself is made of physical representations and so has causal effects, which may be adaptive, as Nicholas Humphrey argues; this avoids the threat of epiphenomenalism.
Goff’s PanpsychismAt the cosmic level (Agentive Cosmopsychism), consciousness functions as an agent explaining cosmic fine-tuning and the emergence of life/mind. For individual subjects, consciousness is the source of value and identity. The combination problem must be resolved to establish coherent causation from micro- to macro-subjects.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Frankish’s IllusionismConceptually testable
Goff’s PanpsychismSpeculative. The theory aims to solve conceptual and metaphysical tensions (like the hard problem) , but the fundamental claim that consciousness is ubiquitous is difficult to test empirically, leading to critiques that panpsychism reaches a 'cognitive dead end'.
Tests so far
Frankish’s IllusionismFrankish holds that the reactive changes constituting experience are in principle experimentally detectable, which opens the experiences of other creatures to study.
Goff’s PanpsychismNot stated
Criticisms
Frankish’s IllusionismThe central objection, a version of Descartes’ cogito, holds that our own phenomenal states are indubitable data. Galen Strawson argues that illusionism denies the main source of ethical value. Others object that an illusion needs an audience.
Goff’s PanpsychismThe main tension is the Combination Problem: how do micro-phenomenal properties combine or aggregate to form complex macro-phenomenal properties (such as human consciousness). Goff's rejection of quantitative descriptions being able to capture quality is also critiqued by proponents of information-based theories.
Sources
Key sources
Frankish’s Illusionism
- Frankish’s Illusionism (Landscape of Consciousness), Keith Frankish (2021)
Goff’s Panpsychism
- Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness, Philip Goff (2019)
- Why? the Purpose of the Universe, Philip Goff (2023)
- Putting consciousness first: replies to critics, Philip Goff (2021)