Open the map

Head to head

Free Energy Principle vs Searle’s Biological Naturalism

Friston’s free-energy principle and active inference and Searle’s Biological Naturalism, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.

At a glance

Add more theories to this comparisonCompare other theories

The claim

In brief
Free Energy PrincipleThis theory conceptualizes consciousness as a natural process arising from the minimization of 'free energy,' which is the difference between an organism's internal model (perceptual expectations) and real-time sensory inputs. Consciousness, therefore, functions as the evolved mechanism for simulating scenarios of the world and reducing prediction error to ensure survival and maintain homeostasis.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismBiological Naturalism posits that consciousness is a real, irreducible, subjective biological feature of the brain, entirely caused by lower-level neurobiological processes and realized as higher-level system features. This approach seeks to solve the mind-body problem by accepting the scientific worldview while acknowledging the first-person ontology of conscious experience.
What consciousness is
Free Energy PrincipleConsciousness is identified as a natural process of inference, specifically the internal emergent model that monitors and minimizes the free energy principle (surprise), thereby optimizing the representational capacities of physical/brain systems.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConscious states are identified as real parts of the real world that are higher-level, system features of the brain, defined as states of awareness, sentience, or feeling that persist during wakefulness.

Big questions

Free Energy PrincipleYesAs a strong materialist theory, if consciousness is fully explained by computational processes of inference and representation minimization, then non-biological systems capable of executing these processes must eventually attain consciousness in principle.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConditionalSearle rejects consciousness via simulation (Chinese Room Argument) but argues that if the causally sufficient biological mechanism is known, an artificial machine that implements that same mechanism could be conscious, as consciousness does not strictly require biological neurons, only sufficient causal power.
Free Energy PrincipleNoConsciousness is an emergent natural process tied directly to the functional dynamics and physical substrate of the biological brain; thus, it cannot survive bodily decay.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismNoConsciousness is entirely physical and solely the product of biological brains; therefore, death of the brain and body means irrevocable, permanent non-existence.
Free Energy PrincipleYesSince consciousness is understood as an emergent, formalized process of inference optimization, perfect duplication of the brain's information processing and representational dynamics in a non-biological medium should be sufficient for the continuation of the mental self.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismYesIf consciousness is entirely explainable by physical/biological states, then duplicating those states (and their causal relations) in a non-biological medium would, in principle, allow for the uploading and continuation of the first-person mental self.
Free Energy PrincipleHumanistic onlyThe foundational imperative of the conscious process is survival (minimizing surprise/maintaining homeostasis). The theory does not rationalize ultimate cosmic meaning or purpose, aligning with general materialist perspectives.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismHumanistic onlyAs a materialist theory, Biological Naturalism struggles to rationalize ultimate cosmic meaning or purpose, though humanistic meaning created by ourselves remains possible.

Nature of mind

Ontology
Free Energy PrinciplePhysicalism; often referred to as Markovian Monism, which views mind/matter distinction as dialectical rather than ontological.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismPhysicalism (Biological Naturalism). It holds that consciousness is part of nature as a subjective, qualitative biological property, rejecting attempts to 'naturalize' it by denying its subjective ontology.
Mind and body
Free Energy PrincipleMonistic/Identity. The theory proposes that consciousness is the natural outcome of the physical/brain system's self-organizing processes, dissolving familiar dialectics between mind and matter.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConscious states are causally reduced to lower-level brain processes (causal reducibility), but are ontologically irreducible to these processes because consciousness has a subjective (first-person) ontology while its basis has an objective (third-person) ontology.
Fundamental or emergent
Free Energy PrincipleEmergent
Searle’s Biological NaturalismEmergent
Qualia
Free Energy PrincipleThe theory is highly deflationary regarding the Hard Problem, treating consciousness as a process to be understood rather than a 'thing' whose qualitative attributes need definition. Qualia, if acknowledged, would be epiphenomena or aspects of the internal generative model required for inference.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConscious states are inherently qualitative, in the sense that there is a distinct qualitative feel to being in any particular conscious state, and this qualitative feel is a real and irreducible part of the world.

How it works

Mechanism
Free Energy PrincipleThe Free-Energy Principle (FEP), which states that all self-organizing systems must minimize free energy (or 'surprise'), driving action and perception through active inference.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismThe principle is that all conscious states are reliably and universally caused by lower-level brain processes and realized as system features, functioning as a real biological machine.
Where it is
Free Energy PrincipleLocalized in the physical brain system; cortical responses are seen as the brain’s attempt to minimize free energy.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismLocalized in the biological brain, specifically realized in the brain as higher-level or system features.
What it does
Free Energy PrincipleConsciousness serves an adaptive and functional role as the evolved mechanism for simulating scenarios, monitoring, and minimizing free energy to promote survival (homeostasis) and navigate the world.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismConscious states function causally (causal efficacy) as real parts of the real world, providing a basis for intentional action and interaction with the environment.

Evidence and criticism

Testability
Free Energy PrincipleConceptually and empirically linked to testable models (e.g., in neurobiology and psychology) through its reliance on formalizing representational capacities of physical systems.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismEmpirically testable in principle, as the theory requires finding the exact causal details of how lower-level brain processes cause consciousness.
Tests so far
Free Energy PrincipleThe principles of FEP form the basis for models utilized in empirical work concerning altered states (e.g., the Entropic Brain Hypothesis under psychedelics) and related theories of perception and cognition.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismThe theory is generally supported by empirical evidence from neuroscience showing the link between consciousness and brain activity (e.g., brain impairment, brain stimulation).
Criticisms
Free Energy PrincipleCriticized for being highly deflationary and difficult to reconcile with the first-person reality of phenomenal experience (the Hard Problem), viewing consciousness merely as a mathematical process or 'natural outcome.' Friston finds engaging with the philosophical premise of consciousness as a 'thing' difficult.
Searle’s Biological NaturalismCritics dispute the claim that the causal connection between brain states and consciousness is fully established. Tension exists in maintaining materialism while arguing consciousness is ontologically subjective and irreducible to objective physical processes.

Sources

Key sources
Free Energy Principle
  • A theory of cortical responses, K. Friston (2005)
  • Active interference: a process theory, K. Friston et al (2017)
  • The Mathematics of Mind-Time, K. Friston (2017)
Searle’s Biological Naturalism
  • The Rediscovery of Mind (1992)
  • Biological naturalism (2007)
  • What things are conscious? (2007)

More comparisons

All head-to-head comparisons →