Head to head
Frankish’s Illusionism vs Hoffman’s Conscious Realism
Frankish’s Illusionism and Hoffman’s Conscious Realism: The Case Against Reality, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Frankish’s Illusionism belongs to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Hoffman’s Conscious Realism to Idealism.
- Frankish’s Illusionism treats consciousness as emergent; Hoffman’s Conscious Realism treats it as fundamental.
- On AI consciousness, Frankish’s Illusionism says “Possible” and Hoffman’s Conscious Realism says “Likely”.
- On life after death, Frankish’s Illusionism says “No” and Hoffman’s Conscious Realism says “Likely”.
- On meaning and purpose, Frankish’s Illusionism says “Humanistic only” and Hoffman’s Conscious Realism says “Cosmic/Ultimate”.
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The claim
In brief
Frankish’s IllusionismKeith Frankish holds that conscious experiences are real but not what they seem: the irreducibly subjective ‘phenomenal properties’ or qualia we ascribe to them are an introspective illusion. Introspection builds a simplified, schematic model of the brain’s complex reactions to stimulation, and we mistake that model for direct awareness of inner qualities, so the hard problem gives way to an ‘illusion problem’.
Hoffman’s Conscious RealismThis theory asserts that evolution selects for survival and reproductive fitness, not for veridical perception of reality; consequently, spacetime and physical objects function merely as an 'interface' or illusion guiding adaptive behavior. Ultimate reality is fundamentally composed of interacting conscious agents and their experiences, which are primary to, and generative of, the physical world.
What consciousness is
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states are complex functional states of the brain that sustain rich sensory engagement with the world and flexible control of behavior. Their distinctive features are functional, which Frankish calls quasi-phenomenal properties.
Hoffman’s Conscious RealismConsciousness is identified as the fundamental reality, structured as a vast social network of interacting 'conscious agents' and their experiences.
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Frankish’s IllusionismPossibleSince consciousness is a complex functional state, a system with the right reactive and sensory organization could have it, though Frankish does not address machines directly.
Hoffman’s Conscious RealismLikelyAs consciousness is fundamental (Idealism), it is not restricted to biological matter. If an artificial system achieves the organizational complexity characteristic of a 'conscious agent', it could potentially tap into the fundamental consciousness field, regardless of its physical substrate.
Frankish’s IllusionismNoSince conscious states are functional states of a living brain, they end when the brain stops functioning.
Hoffman’s Conscious RealismLikelySince consciousness is fundamental and generates the physical interface, the individual conscious agent is likely to persist beyond the disintegration of the biological body/interface.
Frankish’s IllusionismNo position
Hoffman’s Conscious RealismLikelyIf the brain is merely an interface for fundamental consciousness, virtual immortality becomes a matter of reproducing the necessary structures or functions (the 'icon' or interface) needed to manifest the individual conscious agent in a non-biological medium.
Frankish’s IllusionismHumanistic onlyFrankish grounds value in what creatures are motivated to seek or avoid and argues that illusionism widens ethical concern to other animals across a graded ‘consciousness space’.
Hoffman’s Conscious RealismCosmic/UltimateIdealism fundamentally supports ultimate meaning and purpose. Reality is composed of interacting conscious agents whose existence and actions (influencing other agents) imply inherent value and purpose.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Frankish’s IllusionismPhysicalism (strong illusionism)
Hoffman’s Conscious RealismIdealism
Mind and body
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious experiences are physically realized functional states. Phenomenal properties are intentional objects, represented but never instantiated, like the impossible objects Nicholas Humphrey compares them to.
Hoffman’s Conscious RealismConsciousness is fundamental and creates spacetime and objects, reversing the conventional arrow of causation. Brain activity correlates with mental states because consciousness creates the brain activity/physical world interface.
Fundamental or emergent
Frankish’s IllusionismEmergent
Hoffman’s Conscious RealismPrimitive
Qualia
Frankish’s IllusionismQualia do not exist. Introspection misrepresents brain states, as perception misrepresents some features of the world, and introspective information bound to perception makes external things seem to carry vivid sensory qualities, such as an apple’s redness, that reflect their significance for us.
Hoffman’s Conscious RealismQualia are implied to be the fundamental experiences inherent to the conscious agents, which are then translated into simplistic icons (like colors or objects) within the spacetime interface.
How it works
Mechanism
Frankish’s IllusionismThe reactivity schema: introspective systems track the overall psychological impact of stimulation without representing its detail, and this simplified model is mistaken for direct acquaintance with qualities. Frankish borrows Daniel Dennett’s image of a computer’s user illusion, whose icons have no literal counterparts in the machine.
Hoffman’s Conscious RealismThe principle of evolution favoring fitness over veridical perception leads to the construction of a simplified, illusionary 'interface' (spacetime and physical objects) that guides adaptive behavior.
Where it is
Frankish’s IllusionismDistributed across the brain. The subject of the illusion is the whole organism, and the work of registering and reacting to it is shared among many unconscious subsystems, with no Cartesian theater.
Hoffman’s Conscious RealismConsciousness is fundamental in the universe. It is not a product of space and time or anything inside space and time; spacetime is merely a format for conscious experiences (the interface).
What it does
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states guide flexible, intelligent behavior. The illusion itself is made of physical representations and so has causal effects, which may be adaptive, as Nicholas Humphrey argues; this avoids the threat of epiphenomenalism.
Hoffman’s Conscious RealismConsciousness is causally fundamental. The functional role of the perceived physical world is solely to enhance fitness and reproductive success by guiding behavior.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Frankish’s IllusionismConceptually testable
Hoffman’s Conscious RealismHighly speculative/ontological. Conceptually testable via the mathematical formulation of consciousness agents. Empirical evidence relies on common perceptual illusions (reinterpreted to support Idealism).
Tests so far
Frankish’s IllusionismFrankish holds that the reactive changes constituting experience are in principle experimentally detectable, which opens the experiences of other creatures to study.
Hoffman’s Conscious RealismNot stated
Criticisms
Frankish’s IllusionismThe central objection, a version of Descartes’ cogito, holds that our own phenomenal states are indubitable data. Galen Strawson argues that illusionism denies the main source of ethical value. Others object that an illusion needs an audience.
Hoffman’s Conscious RealismCriticized for interpreting empirical evidence (like user illusions) diametrically opposite to materialist accounts (such as Dennett's and Graziano's eliminative materialism). It requires reversing the conventional causal relationship between brain and mind.
Sources
Key sources
Frankish’s Illusionism
- Frankish’s Illusionism (Landscape of Consciousness), Keith Frankish (2021)
Hoffman’s Conscious Realism
- The Case against Reality: How Evolution Hid the Truth from Our Eyes, D. Hoffman (2019)
- Conscious realism and the mind-body problem, D. Hoffman (2008)
- Fact, fiction, and fitness, C. Prakash, C. Fields, D.D. Hoffman, R. Prentner, M. Singh (2020)