Head to head
Frankish’s Illusionism vs Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos
Frankish’s Illusionism and Nagel's Mind and Cosmos, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Frankish’s Illusionism belongs to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos to Challenge.
- Frankish’s Illusionism treats consciousness as emergent; Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos treats it as fundamental.
- On AI consciousness, Frankish’s Illusionism says “Possible” and Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos says “Uncertain”.
- On life after death, Frankish’s Illusionism says “No” and Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos says “Conditional”.
- On meaning and purpose, Frankish’s Illusionism says “Humanistic only” and Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos says “Cosmic/Ultimate”.
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The claim
In brief
Frankish’s IllusionismKeith Frankish holds that conscious experiences are real but not what they seem: the irreducibly subjective ‘phenomenal properties’ or qualia we ascribe to them are an introspective illusion. Introspection builds a simplified, schematic model of the brain’s complex reactions to stimulation, and we mistake that model for direct awareness of inner qualities, so the hard problem gives way to an ‘illusion problem’.
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosThis perspective challenges the prevailing materialist Neo-Darwinian conception of nature, arguing that it fails to account for the irreducible nature of subjective experience, or 'what it is like' to be a conscious organism. It proposes that mind must be incorporated as a fundamental principle of nature itself.
What consciousness is
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states are complex functional states of the brain that sustain rich sensory engagement with the world and flexible control of behavior. Their distinctive features are functional, which Frankish calls quasi-phenomenal properties.
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosConsciousness is fundamentally subjective experience—'how it is for the subject himself'—which resists reduction to purely physical, third-person descriptions.
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Frankish’s IllusionismPossibleSince consciousness is a complex functional state, a system with the right reactive and sensory organization could have it, though Frankish does not address machines directly.
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosUncertainAs a critique of functionalism and reductionism, Nagel's view suggests that purely computational entities lacking fundamental mental properties are likely philosophical zombies; outcome depends on whether future AI can instantiate the hypothesized universal mental principles.
Frankish’s IllusionismNoSince conscious states are functional states of a living brain, they end when the brain stops functioning.
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosConditionalIf consciousness is a universal, fundamental property rather than a biological emergent, its essence may persist after bodily dissolution (inferred from panpsychist leanings), though likely without retention of personal identity.
Frankish’s IllusionismNo position
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosUnlikelyThe irreducibility of subjective experience means duplication of physical/functional patterns alone would fail to transfer the original first-person consciousness.
Frankish’s IllusionismHumanistic onlyFrankish grounds value in what creatures are motivated to seek or avoid and argues that illusionism widens ethical concern to other animals across a graded ‘consciousness space’.
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosCosmic/UltimateExplicitly seeks to incorporate mind as a fundamental natural principle to overcome the 'pointlessness' implied by materialism, suggesting a non-theistic, inherent cosmic purpose or value.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Frankish’s IllusionismPhysicalism (strong illusionism)
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosPhilosophical Challenge (leaning towards Universal Monism/Panpsychism)
Mind and body
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious experiences are physically realized functional states. Phenomenal properties are intentional objects, represented but never instantiated, like the impossible objects Nicholas Humphrey compares them to.
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosCritiques the current conception of the mind-body relationship, asserting that we lack any conception of how physical and phenomenological aspects could be related or identical.
Fundamental or emergent
Frankish’s IllusionismEmergent
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosPrimitive (or fundamental)
Qualia
Frankish’s IllusionismQualia do not exist. Introspection misrepresents brain states, as perception misrepresents some features of the world, and introspective information bound to perception makes external things seem to carry vivid sensory qualities, such as an apple’s redness, that reflect their significance for us.
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosQualia (felt qualities) are the core of the problem, and Nagel argues that no objective or physicalist explanation currently formulated can account for their subjective reality.
How it works
Mechanism
Frankish’s IllusionismThe reactivity schema: introspective systems track the overall psychological impact of stimulation without representing its detail, and this simplified model is mistaken for direct acquaintance with qualities. Frankish borrows Daniel Dennett’s image of a computer’s user illusion, whose icons have no literal counterparts in the machine.
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosPrimarily focuses on exposing the conceptual limits of physical reductionism rather than positing a definitive mechanism. Mechanistically, his solution suggests consciousness arises through the composition of fundamental, panpsychic-like elements.
Where it is
Frankish’s IllusionismDistributed across the brain. The subject of the illusion is the whole organism, and the work of registering and reacting to it is shared among many unconscious subsystems, with no Cartesian theater.
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosUniversal/Systemic (inferred from universal monism/panpsychism leanings) or inherent in the fabric of nature.
What it does
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states guide flexible, intelligent behavior. The illusion itself is made of physical representations and so has causal effects, which may be adaptive, as Nicholas Humphrey argues; this avoids the threat of epiphenomenalism.
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosPrimarily critical, arguing against the materialist view that consciousness is an inert epiphenomenon. If mind is a fundamental principle, it implies an irreducible, organizing role in the cosmos.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Frankish’s IllusionismConceptually testable
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosUncertain/Primarily Conceptual. The theory's strength lies in its diagnosis of the explanatory gap, not in empirical verification. His suggested alternative (panpsychism) is highly speculative.
Tests so far
Frankish’s IllusionismFrankish holds that the reactive changes constituting experience are in principle experimentally detectable, which opens the experiences of other creatures to study.
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosNot stated
Criticisms
Frankish’s IllusionismThe central objection, a version of Descartes’ cogito, holds that our own phenomenal states are indubitable data. Galen Strawson argues that illusionism denies the main source of ethical value. Others object that an illusion needs an audience.
Nagel’s Mind and CosmosCriticized for retreating to 'mysterianism' and for rejecting established scientific frameworks (Neo-Darwinian materialism) without offering a concrete, robust, and detailed secular ontology as an alternative.
Sources
Key sources
Frankish’s Illusionism
- Frankish’s Illusionism (Landscape of Consciousness), Keith Frankish (2021)
Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos
- What Is It Like to Be a Bat? (1974)
- The View from Nowhere (1986)
- Mind & Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False (2012)