Head to head
Frankish’s Illusionism vs Russellian Monism
Frankish’s Illusionism and Russellian Monism, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Frankish’s Illusionism belongs to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Russellian Monism to Neutral Monism.
- Frankish’s Illusionism treats consciousness as emergent; Russellian Monism treats it as fundamental.
- On AI consciousness, Frankish’s Illusionism says “Possible” and Russellian Monism says “Likely”.
- On life after death, Frankish’s Illusionism says “No” and Russellian Monism says “Conditional”.
- On meaning and purpose, Frankish’s Illusionism says “Humanistic only” and Russellian Monism says “Uncertain”.
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The claim
In brief
Frankish’s IllusionismKeith Frankish holds that conscious experiences are real but not what they seem: the irreducibly subjective ‘phenomenal properties’ or qualia we ascribe to them are an introspective illusion. Introspection builds a simplified, schematic model of the brain’s complex reactions to stimulation, and we mistake that model for direct awareness of inner qualities, so the hard problem gives way to an ‘illusion problem’.
Russellian MonismRussellian Monism posits that the physical world, described by physics only in terms of structure and relations, has an intrinsic nature (quiddities) that is phenomenal or proto-phenomenal. This approach integrates consciousness into the fundamental reality while avoiding the traditional problems of dualism and reductive materialism.
What consciousness is
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states are complex functional states of the brain that sustain rich sensory engagement with the world and flexible control of behavior. Their distinctive features are functional, which Frankish calls quasi-phenomenal properties.
Russellian MonismConsciousness (or proto-consciousness) is the intrinsic, categorical nature or property ('quiddities' or 'inscrutables') underlying the relational structure of physical reality described by physics.
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Frankish’s IllusionismPossibleSince consciousness is a complex functional state, a system with the right reactive and sensory organization could have it, though Frankish does not address machines directly.
Russellian MonismLikelyIf consciousness is intrinsic to matter/energy, and the combination problem can be technologically harnessed, then artificial systems built from physical substrates should achieve consciousness.
Frankish’s IllusionismNoSince conscious states are functional states of a living brain, they end when the brain stops functioning.
Russellian MonismConditionalSurvival is unlikely for the individual conscious aggregate unless the combination mechanism is preserved or the theory aligns with a cosmic monist view, as individual consciousness (the macroscopic combination) would likely dissolve upon biological death.
Frankish’s IllusionismNo position
Russellian MonismLikelyA single-stuff reality should permit virtual immortality, provided advanced technology can manipulate and harness the micropsychic properties to accurately reproduce the macroscopic conscious aggregate digitally.
Frankish’s IllusionismHumanistic onlyFrankish grounds value in what creatures are motivated to seek or avoid and argues that illusionism widens ethical concern to other animals across a graded ‘consciousness space’.
Russellian MonismUncertainMonisms generally allow for ultimate meaning/purpose/value. If RM takes a priority monist form with evolving consciousness, cosmic purpose may be implied.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Frankish’s IllusionismPhysicalism (strong illusionism)
Russellian MonismNeutral Monism or Physical Monism or Phenomenal Monism (variant dependent); fundamentally Monistic.
Mind and body
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious experiences are physically realized functional states. Phenomenal properties are intentional objects, represented but never instantiated, like the impossible objects Nicholas Humphrey compares them to.
Russellian MonismMind and physical world are deeply intertwined, with mental properties constituting the intrinsic nature of fundamental physical entities (the categorical bases of physical dispositions).
Fundamental or emergent
Frankish’s IllusionismEmergent
Russellian MonismPrimitive (at the fundamental level of reality, as phenomenal or proto-phenomenal properties of micro-entities).
Qualia
Frankish’s IllusionismQualia do not exist. Introspection misrepresents brain states, as perception misrepresents some features of the world, and introspective information bound to perception makes external things seem to carry vivid sensory qualities, such as an apple’s redness, that reflect their significance for us.
Russellian MonismQualia correspond to the phenomenal properties (or their precursors) that constitute the intrinsic nature of fundamental matter.
How it works
Mechanism
Frankish’s IllusionismThe reactivity schema: introspective systems track the overall psychological impact of stimulation without representing its detail, and this simplified model is mistaken for direct acquaintance with qualities. Frankish borrows Daniel Dennett’s image of a computer’s user illusion, whose icons have no literal counterparts in the machine.
Russellian MonismThe key principle is the existence of unobserved, intrinsic categorical properties ('quiddities') of matter that are phenomenal, thereby grounding consciousness in fundamental reality without expanding the physical ontology of relations.
Where it is
Frankish’s IllusionismDistributed across the brain. The subject of the illusion is the whole organism, and the work of registering and reacting to it is shared among many unconscious subsystems, with no Cartesian theater.
Russellian MonismLocated in the intrinsic properties of fundamental micro-level physical entities or potentially instantiated by the universe as a whole (priority monism).
What it does
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states guide flexible, intelligent behavior. The illusion itself is made of physical representations and so has causal effects, which may be adaptive, as Nicholas Humphrey argues; this avoids the threat of epiphenomenalism.
Russellian MonismAvoids the causal exclusion problem of dualism by embedding consciousness into the fundamental properties of the physical world, meaning consciousness underlies physical reality itself.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Frankish’s IllusionismConceptually testable
Russellian MonismSpeculative/Conceptual. Its fundamental claims regarding intrinsic properties are generally beyond empirical access or mathematical modeling.
Tests so far
Frankish’s IllusionismFrankish holds that the reactive changes constituting experience are in principle experimentally detectable, which opens the experiences of other creatures to study.
Russellian MonismNot stated
Criticisms
Frankish’s IllusionismThe central objection, a version of Descartes’ cogito, holds that our own phenomenal states are indubitable data. Galen Strawson argues that illusionism denies the main source of ethical value. Others object that an illusion needs an audience.
Russellian MonismThe primary challenge is the combination problem, which is critical: explaining how microphysical properties combine to form complex, integrated macro-level consciousness. If Panprotopsychism is assumed, it faces the problem of deriving consciousness (qualia) from proto-phenomenal properties.
Sources
Key sources
Frankish’s Illusionism
- Frankish’s Illusionism (Landscape of Consciousness), Keith Frankish (2021)
Russellian Monism
- What is Russellian Monism?, T. Alter and Y. Nagasawa (2012)
- Russellian Monism, T. Alter and D. Pereboom (2019)
- Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism, D. Chalmers (2016)