Head to head
Frankish’s Illusionism vs Seth’s Beast Machine Theory
Frankish’s Illusionism and Seth’s “Beast Machine” Theory, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Both belong to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness.
- Both treat consciousness as emergent.
- They give the same kind of answer on life after death and meaning and purpose.
- On AI consciousness, Frankish’s Illusionism says “Possible” and Seth’s Beast Machine Theory says “Likely”.
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The claim
In brief
Frankish’s IllusionismKeith Frankish holds that conscious experiences are real but not what they seem: the irreducibly subjective ‘phenomenal properties’ or qualia we ascribe to them are an introspective illusion. Introspection builds a simplified, schematic model of the brain’s complex reactions to stimulation, and we mistake that model for direct awareness of inner qualities, so the hard problem gives way to an ‘illusion problem’.
Seth’s Beast Machine TheoryThis theory posits that conscious experiences, including perceptions of the world and the self, are forms of brain-based perceptual prediction, metaphorically termed 'controlled hallucinations' . It roots the mechanism of consciousness in the fundamental biological imperative to regulate bodily physiology in order to stay alive .
What consciousness is
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states are complex functional states of the brain that sustain rich sensory engagement with the world and flexible control of behavior. Their distinctive features are functional, which Frankish calls quasi-phenomenal properties.
Seth’s Beast Machine TheoryConsciousness is identified as forms of brain-based perceptual prediction, where phenomenological properties are explained by the computational aspects of different forms of prediction .
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Frankish’s IllusionismPossibleSince consciousness is a complex functional state, a system with the right reactive and sensory organization could have it, though Frankish does not address machines directly.
Seth’s Beast Machine TheoryLikelyAs a materialist theory focusing on computational and information-processing mechanisms (perceptual prediction) , AI systems that instantiate similar complex mechanisms should be capable of achieving consciousness .
Does consciousness survive death?Both agree
Frankish’s IllusionismNoSince conscious states are functional states of a living brain, they end when the brain stops functioning.
Seth’s Beast Machine TheoryNoConsciousness is a product of biological brains and complex, physically instantiated predictive machinery . The death of the brain leads to the irrevocable and permanent non-existence of personal consciousness .
Frankish’s IllusionismNo position
Seth’s Beast Machine TheoryYesIf consciousness is entirely explicable by the computational processes of the brain , then, in principle, the first-person mental self could be duplicated and instantiated in a non-biological substrate, enabling virtual immortality .
Does it give life meaning?Both agree
Frankish’s IllusionismHumanistic onlyFrankish grounds value in what creatures are motivated to seek or avoid and argues that illusionism widens ethical concern to other animals across a graded ‘consciousness space’.
Seth’s Beast Machine TheoryHumanistic onlyCategorized as a Materialism Theory, it implies no ultimate or cosmic meaning or purpose, although it supports human-created meaning and value derived from individual agency and experience .
Nature of mind
Ontology
Frankish’s IllusionismPhysicalism (strong illusionism)
Seth’s Beast Machine TheoryPhysicalism / Materialism (Justified by its classification under Materialism Theories and its reliance on biological and computational explanations) .
Mind and body
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious experiences are physically realized functional states. Phenomenal properties are intentional objects, represented but never instantiated, like the impossible objects Nicholas Humphrey compares them to.
Seth’s Beast Machine TheoryConscious experiences are entirely brain-based and physically instantiated . The model supports a strong correlation or identity theory, where conscious properties arise from the physiological and computational architecture geared toward bodily regulation .
Fundamental or emergent
Frankish’s IllusionismEmergent
Seth’s Beast Machine TheoryEmergent
Qualia
Frankish’s IllusionismQualia do not exist. Introspection misrepresents brain states, as perception misrepresents some features of the world, and introspective information bound to perception makes external things seem to carry vivid sensory qualities, such as an apple’s redness, that reflect their significance for us.
Seth’s Beast Machine TheoryThe phenomenological properties of conscious experiences are explained by the computational aspects of the different forms of perceptual prediction utilized by the brain .
How it works
Mechanism
Frankish’s IllusionismThe reactivity schema: introspective systems track the overall psychological impact of stimulation without representing its detail, and this simplified model is mistaken for direct acquaintance with qualities. Frankish borrows Daniel Dennett’s image of a computer’s user illusion, whose icons have no literal counterparts in the machine.
Seth’s Beast Machine TheoryConsciousness is explained through predictive processing, where the brain generates a constant 'best guess' (prediction) of the causes of its sensory inputs . This mechanism is intrinsically tied to the regulation of bodily physiology .
Where it is
Frankish’s IllusionismDistributed across the brain. The subject of the illusion is the whole organism, and the work of registering and reacting to it is shared among many unconscious subsystems, with no Cartesian theater.
Seth’s Beast Machine TheoryLocated in the biological brain, tied to the predictive machinery that regulates bodily physiology .
What it does
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states guide flexible, intelligent behavior. The illusion itself is made of physical representations and so has causal effects, which may be adaptive, as Nicholas Humphrey argues; this avoids the threat of epiphenomenalism.
Seth’s Beast Machine TheoryConsciousness has a functional role tied to survival . It facilitates the regulation of bodily physiology and allows the organism to model, predict, and simulate the causes of sensory inputs .
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Frankish’s IllusionismConceptually testable
Seth’s Beast Machine TheoryEmpirically testable (Inferred, as the theory relies on concepts within the neurobiological and computational fields which emphasize development, testing, and comparison of theories) .
Tests so far
Frankish’s IllusionismFrankish holds that the reactive changes constituting experience are in principle experimentally detectable, which opens the experiences of other creatures to study.
Seth’s Beast Machine TheoryTests involving predictive processing accounts of brain perception, cognition, and action (Justified: Specific named tests are not provided, but the theory is explicitly positioned within the predictive processing framework) .
Criticisms
Frankish’s IllusionismThe central objection, a version of Descartes’ cogito, holds that our own phenomenal states are indubitable data. Galen Strawson argues that illusionism denies the main source of ethical value. Others object that an illusion needs an audience.
Seth’s Beast Machine TheoryNot explicitly detailed in the source, but generally subject to the tension inherent in deflationary accounts of consciousness .
Sources
Key sources
Frankish’s Illusionism
- Frankish’s Illusionism (Landscape of Consciousness), Keith Frankish (2021)
Seth’s Beast Machine Theory
- Being You: A New Science of Consciousness, Anil Seth (2021)
- Theories of consciousness, Anil Seth and Tim Bayne (2022)