Head to head
Frankish’s Illusionism vs Tegmark’s State of Matter
Frankish’s Illusionism and Tegmark’s State of Matter, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Frankish’s Illusionism belongs to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Tegmark’s State of Matter to Neutral Monism.
- Both treat consciousness as emergent.
- They give the same kind of answer on life after death and meaning and purpose.
- On AI consciousness, Frankish’s Illusionism says “Possible” and Tegmark’s State of Matter says “Yes”.
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The claim
In brief
Frankish’s IllusionismKeith Frankish holds that conscious experiences are real but not what they seem: the irreducibly subjective ‘phenomenal properties’ or qualia we ascribe to them are an introspective illusion. Introspection builds a simplified, schematic model of the brain’s complex reactions to stimulation, and we mistake that model for direct awareness of inner qualities, so the hard problem gives way to an ‘illusion problem’.
Tegmark’s State of MatterTegmark proposes that consciousness can be understood as a specific state of matter, coined 'perceptronium,' which is defined by distinctive information-processing abilities. Starting from the premise that all existence is physical, the theory seeks principles that distinguish conscious, complex information processing from non-conscious processing.
What consciousness is
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states are complex functional states of the brain that sustain rich sensory engagement with the world and flexible control of behavior. Their distinctive features are functional, which Frankish calls quasi-phenomenal properties.
Tegmark’s State of MatterConsciousness is identified as the subjective experience or 'feeling' that arises when information is being processed in certain complex ways, constituting the state of matter termed 'perceptronium'.
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Frankish’s IllusionismPossibleSince consciousness is a complex functional state, a system with the right reactive and sensory organization could have it, though Frankish does not address machines directly.
Tegmark’s State of MatterYesThe theory is strictly physicalist ('It's all physics') and defines consciousness as a state of matter achievable through complex information processing. Therefore, artificial systems can achieve this state in principle.
Does consciousness survive death?Both agree
Frankish’s IllusionismNoSince conscious states are functional states of a living brain, they end when the brain stops functioning.
Tegmark’s State of MatterNoConsciousness is an emergent state of matter (perceptronium) of the physical brain. The irreversible death and dissolution of the physical substrate would entail the cessation of consciousness.
Frankish’s IllusionismNo position
Tegmark’s State of MatterLikelyIf consciousness is a specific informational state of matter defined by mathematical/physical principles, that state could potentially be perfectly duplicated or uploaded into a non-biological medium by advanced technology.
Does it give life meaning?Both agree
Frankish’s IllusionismHumanistic onlyFrankish grounds value in what creatures are motivated to seek or avoid and argues that illusionism widens ethical concern to other animals across a graded ‘consciousness space’.
Tegmark’s State of MatterHumanistic onlyThe foundation in physics and mathematical structure typically suggests no ultimate cosmic purpose, consistent with deflationary physicalist views. The theory does not explicitly propose cosmic teleology.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Frankish’s IllusionismPhysicalism (strong illusionism)
Tegmark’s State of MatterPhysicalism / Monism
Mind and body
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious experiences are physically realized functional states. Phenomenal properties are intentional objects, represented but never instantiated, like the impossible objects Nicholas Humphrey compares them to.
Tegmark’s State of MatterAn identity relationship is implied, where subjective experience (mind) is identified as a specific physical state (a state of matter/information processing).
Fundamental or emergent
Frankish’s IllusionismEmergent
Tegmark’s State of MatterEmergent
Qualia
Frankish’s IllusionismQualia do not exist. Introspection misrepresents brain states, as perception misrepresents some features of the world, and introspective information bound to perception makes external things seem to carry vivid sensory qualities, such as an apple’s redness, that reflect their significance for us.
Tegmark’s State of MatterQualia are implicitly the 'feeling' (subjective experience) associated with perceptronium's specific information processing configurations, formalized through four principles: information, integration, independence, and dynamics.
How it works
Mechanism
Frankish’s IllusionismThe reactivity schema: introspective systems track the overall psychological impact of stimulation without representing its detail, and this simplified model is mistaken for direct acquaintance with qualities. Frankish borrows Daniel Dennett’s image of a computer’s user illusion, whose icons have no literal counterparts in the machine.
Tegmark’s State of MatterThe definition of perceptronium via the application of four distinct principles (information, integration, independence, and dynamics) to information processing in physical systems.
Where it is
Frankish’s IllusionismDistributed across the brain. The subject of the illusion is the whole organism, and the work of registering and reacting to it is shared among many unconscious subsystems, with no Cartesian theater.
Tegmark’s State of MatterLocalized to physical systems (e.g., neural networks or arbitrary quantum systems) that achieve the specific information-processing criteria defining perceptronium.
What it does
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states guide flexible, intelligent behavior. The illusion itself is made of physical representations and so has causal effects, which may be adaptive, as Nicholas Humphrey argues; this avoids the threat of epiphenomenalism.
Tegmark’s State of MatterConsciousness is crucial for information assessment and is viewed as functionally important for critical needs like caring for comatose patients or communicating with advanced AI. Causation is strictly physical.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Frankish’s IllusionismConceptually testable
Tegmark’s State of MatterEmpirically testable
Tests so far
Frankish’s IllusionismFrankish holds that the reactive changes constituting experience are in principle experimentally detectable, which opens the experiences of other creatures to study.
Tegmark’s State of MatterThe generalization of Integrated Information Theory implies relevance to IIT's measurement function (quantifying degrees of consciousness). The theory is intended to address concrete problems like assessing comatose patients and advanced AI.
Criticisms
Frankish’s IllusionismThe central objection, a version of Descartes’ cogito, holds that our own phenomenal states are indubitable data. Galen Strawson argues that illusionism denies the main source of ethical value. Others object that an illusion needs an audience.
Tegmark’s State of MatterAs a generalization of IIT, it inherits existing critiques, such as the difficulty in explaining subjective feeling purely through physical and informational principles.
Sources
Key sources
Frankish’s Illusionism
- Frankish’s Illusionism (Landscape of Consciousness), Keith Frankish (2021)
Tegmark’s State of Matter
- Consciousness is a state of matter (2015)
- Our Mathematical Universe: My Quest for the Ultimate Nature of Reality (2014)