Head to head
Buddhism vs Frankish’s Illusionism
Buddhism’s Empty, Illusory Phenomenal Consciousness and Frankish’s Illusionism, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Buddhism belongs to the Idealism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness, Frankish’s Illusionism to Materialism.
- On AI consciousness, Buddhism says “Uncertain” and Frankish’s Illusionism says “Possible”.
- On life after death, Buddhism says “Yes” and Frankish’s Illusionism says “No”.
- On meaning and purpose, Buddhism says “Cosmic/Ultimate” and Frankish’s Illusionism says “Humanistic only”.
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The claim
In brief
BuddhismThis theory suggests that the sense of phenomenal consciousness or 'what-it-is-like-ness' is an instance of cognitive illusion, rejecting the existence of a permanent, inner 'self' or 'soul'. It posits that consciousness, like all phenomena, is ultimately empty of intrinsic nature, and is better understood as a network of relational processes.
Frankish’s IllusionismKeith Frankish holds that conscious experiences are real but not what they seem: the irreducibly subjective ‘phenomenal properties’ or qualia we ascribe to them are an introspective illusion. Introspection builds a simplified, schematic model of the brain’s complex reactions to stimulation, and we mistake that model for direct awareness of inner qualities, so the hard problem gives way to an ‘illusion problem’.
What consciousness is
BuddhismConsciousness (in the phenomenal sense) is identified as a cognitive illusion or conventional reality constituted by a network of processes/relations (Madhyamaka) or as an inner subjective substrate of representations (Yogācāra).
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states are complex functional states of the brain that sustain rich sensory engagement with the world and flexible control of behavior. Their distinctive features are functional, which Frankish calls quasi-phenomenal properties.
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
BuddhismUncertainIf consciousness is fundamentally an illusion arising from a network of processes, it is unclear whether advanced computation (AI) can replicate the complex conventional reality or the specific non-self processes that generate this illusion, even though computation is not fundamentally ruled out.
Frankish’s IllusionismPossibleSince consciousness is a complex functional state, a system with the right reactive and sensory organization could have it, though Frankish does not address machines directly.
BuddhismYesThe eighth (store-house) consciousness persists after death, carrying karmic energy through cycles of reincarnation. However, survival often entails expansion back into cosmic consciousness, blurring or banishing individual first-person identity ('being sugar').
Frankish’s IllusionismNoSince conscious states are functional states of a living brain, they end when the brain stops functioning.
BuddhismNot neededThe theory already provides a mechanism for persistence (the eighth consciousness) or transcendence (ninth consciousness), making artificial, digital duplication (virtual immortality) philosophically moot.
Frankish’s IllusionismNo position
BuddhismCosmic/UltimateThe ultimate goal is spiritual attainment (reaching the ninth consciousness or Buddha nature), which serves as the core source of energy and ultimate fulfillment, moving beyond merely humanistic purpose.
Frankish’s IllusionismHumanistic onlyFrankish grounds value in what creatures are motivated to seek or avoid and argues that illusionism widens ethical concern to other animals across a graded ‘consciousness space’.
Nature of mind
Ontology
BuddhismIdealism (specifically the Yogācāra school) or Deflationary Relationalism (specifically the Madhyamaka school), where all things are conventionally real but ultimately empty of intrinsic nature.
Frankish’s IllusionismPhysicalism (strong illusionism)
Mind and body
BuddhismThe relationship is understood as interdependent and relational, lacking intrinsic self/substance. The illusion of a centralized mind or self is rejected.
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious experiences are physically realized functional states. Phenomenal properties are intentional objects, represented but never instantiated, like the impossible objects Nicholas Humphrey compares them to.
Fundamental or emergent
BuddhismConventional reality constituted by relations. It is neither a primitive substance nor an emergent property in the typical Western sense, as the phenomenal self it describes is fundamentally illusory.
Frankish’s IllusionismEmergent
Qualia
BuddhismQualia ('what-it-is-like-ness') are rejected as real, intrinsic properties and are instead viewed as illusory, dissolving away in favor of a network of underlying processes.
Frankish’s IllusionismQualia do not exist. Introspection misrepresents brain states, as perception misrepresents some features of the world, and introspective information bound to perception makes external things seem to carry vivid sensory qualities, such as an apple’s redness, that reflect their significance for us.
How it works
Mechanism
BuddhismThe principle of emptiness (lack of intrinsic nature) applied to all phenomena, resulting in the realization that phenomenal consciousness is a cognitive illusion.
Frankish’s IllusionismThe reactivity schema: introspective systems track the overall psychological impact of stimulation without representing its detail, and this simplified model is mistaken for direct acquaintance with qualities. Frankish borrows Daniel Dennett’s image of a computer’s user illusion, whose icons have no literal counterparts in the machine.
Where it is
BuddhismNon-localized. Consciousness is often understood relationally. The ninth consciousness (Buddha nature) is the fundamental, purest core.
Frankish’s IllusionismDistributed across the brain. The subject of the illusion is the whole organism, and the work of registering and reacting to it is shared among many unconscious subsystems, with no Cartesian theater.
What it does
BuddhismThe inward-directed seventh consciousness causes the concept of self, which is the source of deception. The eighth consciousness stores karmic energy and persists across death, thus enabling rebirth.
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states guide flexible, intelligent behavior. The illusion itself is made of physical representations and so has causal effects, which may be adaptive, as Nicholas Humphrey argues; this avoids the threat of epiphenomenalism.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
BuddhismLargely conceptual, based on internal philosophical coherence and phenomenological insights gained via meditative practices. Empirical studies sometimes correlate high-level meditation states (nirodha-samāpatti) with measurable brain changes (reduced synchronization).
Frankish’s IllusionismConceptually testable
Tests so far
BuddhismStudy of high meditative states (nirodha-samāpatti) showing reduced overall brain synchronization.
Frankish’s IllusionismFrankish holds that the reactive changes constituting experience are in principle experimentally detectable, which opens the experiences of other creatures to study.
Criticisms
BuddhismWestern philosophers often find the core claim—that phenomenal consciousness is illusory—counter-intuitive and untenable. Internally, tension exists between the idealistic Yogācāra school and the relational Madhyamaka school.
Frankish’s IllusionismThe central objection, a version of Descartes’ cogito, holds that our own phenomenal states are indubitable data. Galen Strawson argues that illusionism denies the main source of ethical value. Others object that an illusion needs an audience.
Sources
Key sources
Buddhism
- Engaging Buddhism, Jay L. Garfield (2015)
- Illusionism and givenness, Jay Garfield (2016)
- The Nine Consciousness (2022)
Frankish’s Illusionism
- Frankish’s Illusionism (Landscape of Consciousness), Keith Frankish (2021)