Head to head
Frankish’s Illusionism vs Attention Schema Theory
Frankish’s Illusionism and Attention Schema Theory, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Both belong to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness.
- Both treat consciousness as emergent.
- They give the same kind of answer on life after death and meaning and purpose.
- On AI consciousness, Frankish’s Illusionism says “Possible” and Attention Schema Theory says “Likely”.
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The claim
In brief
Frankish’s IllusionismKeith Frankish holds that conscious experiences are real but not what they seem: the irreducibly subjective ‘phenomenal properties’ or qualia we ascribe to them are an introspective illusion. Introspection builds a simplified, schematic model of the brain’s complex reactions to stimulation, and we mistake that model for direct awareness of inner qualities, so the hard problem gives way to an ‘illusion problem’.
Attention Schema TheoryThis theory posits that consciousness arises when the brain constructs a quick, simplified, internal model—an attention schema—of its own process of attention. The brain mistakenly interprets and reports this internal representation as a subjective, non-physical essence or a 'self-caricature,' even though it is fundamentally a computational product.
What consciousness is
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states are complex functional states of the brain that sustain rich sensory engagement with the world and flexible control of behavior. Their distinctive features are functional, which Frankish calls quasi-phenomenal properties.
Attention Schema TheoryConsciousness is identified as the brain’s internal representation or simplified model of its own mechanism of attention (the attention schema), which is a specific example of higher-order thought.
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Frankish’s IllusionismPossibleSince consciousness is a complex functional state, a system with the right reactive and sensory organization could have it, though Frankish does not address machines directly.
Attention Schema TheoryLikelySince consciousness is defined as a computational process (the creation of an attention schema), in principle, artificial systems that implement the necessary computational architecture could become conscious. Furthermore, observers will inevitably make the social attribution of consciousness to sufficiently complex AI systems that act like they are conscious.
Does consciousness survive death?Both agree
Frankish’s IllusionismNoSince conscious states are functional states of a living brain, they end when the brain stops functioning.
Attention Schema TheoryNoAs a Materialist/Neurobiological theory, consciousness is tied to the physical substrate (the biological, information-processing machine), precluding survival beyond the decay of the body.
Frankish’s IllusionismNo position
Attention Schema TheoryPossibleIf the consciousness is realized as a computational structure (the attention schema), and if this structure and the relevant information processing systems can be accurately uploaded to a non-biological medium, virtual immortality is theoretically possible.
Does it give life meaning?Both agree
Frankish’s IllusionismHumanistic onlyFrankish grounds value in what creatures are motivated to seek or avoid and argues that illusionism widens ethical concern to other animals across a graded ‘consciousness space’.
Attention Schema TheoryHumanistic onlyConsciousness provides an adaptive, evolutionary purpose (monitoring and regulating attention for action control), but does not imply any ultimate or cosmic meaning, consistent with Materialism.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Frankish’s IllusionismPhysicalism (strong illusionism)
Attention Schema TheoryPhysicalism
Mind and body
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious experiences are physically realized functional states. Phenomenal properties are intentional objects, represented but never instantiated, like the impossible objects Nicholas Humphrey compares them to.
Attention Schema TheoryConsciousness is the report generated by a biological, information processing machine (the brain) through the assessment of its internal data, meaning mental states are computational and wholly physical.
Fundamental or emergent
Frankish’s IllusionismEmergent
Attention Schema TheoryEmergent
Qualia
Frankish’s IllusionismQualia do not exist. Introspection misrepresents brain states, as perception misrepresents some features of the world, and introspective information bound to perception makes external things seem to carry vivid sensory qualities, such as an apple’s redness, that reflect their significance for us.
Attention Schema TheoryConsciousness is described as a 'self-caricature' or an illusory report of a non-physical essence, suggesting a deflationary or illusionist account of qualia, akin to Daniel Dennett’s view.
How it works
Mechanism
Frankish’s IllusionismThe reactivity schema: introspective systems track the overall psychological impact of stimulation without representing its detail, and this simplified model is mistaken for direct acquaintance with qualities. Frankish borrows Daniel Dennett’s image of a computer’s user illusion, whose icons have no literal counterparts in the machine.
Attention Schema TheoryThe construction and maintenance of a simplified internal model (the attention schema) of the process of attention, rooted in principles from control engineering.
Where it is
Frankish’s IllusionismDistributed across the brain. The subject of the illusion is the whole organism, and the work of registering and reacting to it is shared among many unconscious subsystems, with no Cartesian theater.
Attention Schema TheoryLocated within the biological, information-processing system of the brain.
What it does
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states guide flexible, intelligent behavior. The illusion itself is made of physical representations and so has causal effects, which may be adaptive, as Nicholas Humphrey argues; this avoids the threat of epiphenomenalism.
Attention Schema TheoryThe functional role of the attention schema is to monitor and regulate the brain's attention in order to control actions in the world. The resulting capacity allows the system to claim consciousness.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Frankish’s IllusionismConceptually testable
Attention Schema TheoryEmpirically testable
Tests so far
Frankish’s IllusionismFrankish holds that the reactive changes constituting experience are in principle experimentally detectable, which opens the experiences of other creatures to study.
Attention Schema TheoryNot stated
Criticisms
Frankish’s IllusionismThe central objection, a version of Descartes’ cogito, holds that our own phenomenal states are indubitable data. Galen Strawson argues that illusionism denies the main source of ethical value. Others object that an illusion needs an audience.
Attention Schema TheoryThe theory explains how a system can *claim* consciousness but faces the general limitation, shared by similar functionalist models, of conclusively proving or explaining the actual subjective feel (the 'anybody home' problem) which remains eternally uncertain, even by the proponent's admission.
Sources
Key sources
Frankish’s Illusionism
- Frankish’s Illusionism (Landscape of Consciousness), Keith Frankish (2021)
Attention Schema Theory
- True nature of consciousness: solving the biggest mystery of your mind, M. Graziano (2019)
- Rethinking Consciousness: A Scientific Theory of Subjective Experience, M. Graziano (2019)
- Can consciousness be non-biological?, M. Graziano (2014)