Head to head
Frankish’s Illusionism vs Recurrent Processing Theory
Frankish’s Illusionism and Lamme's Recurrent Processing Theory, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Both belong to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness.
- Both treat consciousness as emergent.
- They give the same kind of answer on life after death and meaning and purpose.
- On AI consciousness, Frankish’s Illusionism says “Possible” and Recurrent Processing Theory says “Likely”.
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The claim
In brief
Frankish’s IllusionismKeith Frankish holds that conscious experiences are real but not what they seem: the irreducibly subjective ‘phenomenal properties’ or qualia we ascribe to them are an introspective illusion. Introspection builds a simplified, schematic model of the brain’s complex reactions to stimulation, and we mistake that model for direct awareness of inner qualities, so the hard problem gives way to an ‘illusion problem’.
Recurrent Processing TheoryLamme's Recurrent Processing Theory (RPT) posits that consciousness is both necessary and sufficient when reciprocal (recurrent) feedback connections occur among neural areas, particularly in sensory systems. This processing, which happens locally in sensory and post-sensory areas (Stage 3), generates phenomenal experience without requiring global broadcast access.
What consciousness is
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states are complex functional states of the brain that sustain rich sensory engagement with the world and flexible control of behavior. Their distinctive features are functional, which Frankish calls quasi-phenomenal properties.
Recurrent Processing TheoryConsciousness is identified as a specific recurrent processing state holding within relevant neural circuitry, such as the visual system.
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Frankish’s IllusionismPossibleSince consciousness is a complex functional state, a system with the right reactive and sensory organization could have it, though Frankish does not address machines directly.
Recurrent Processing TheoryLikelyAs a Materialism Theory, AI consciousness must, in principle, be possible if the requisite pattern of recurrent processing could be artificially duplicated in a non-biological substrate.
Does consciousness survive death?Both agree
Frankish’s IllusionismNoSince conscious states are functional states of a living brain, they end when the brain stops functioning.
Recurrent Processing TheoryNoConsciousness is tied to physical brain activity and specific neural circuitry (recurrent processing states), suggesting cessation upon bodily death.
Frankish’s IllusionismNo position
Recurrent Processing TheoryYesSince consciousness is the recurrent processing state itself, a perfect duplication of that process onto a new medium (upload) would generate the first-person self, enabling virtual immortality.
Does it give life meaning?Both agree
Frankish’s IllusionismHumanistic onlyFrankish grounds value in what creatures are motivated to seek or avoid and argues that illusionism widens ethical concern to other animals across a graded ‘consciousness space’.
Recurrent Processing TheoryHumanistic onlyThe theory focuses on a purely physicalist, neurobiological explanation of phenomenal experience and does not support any ultimate cosmic meaning or purpose.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Frankish’s IllusionismPhysicalism (strong illusionism)
Recurrent Processing TheoryPhysicalism
Mind and body
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious experiences are physically realized functional states. Phenomenal properties are intentional objects, represented but never instantiated, like the impossible objects Nicholas Humphrey compares them to.
Recurrent Processing TheoryIdentity/Reductionist approach, arguing that the notion of mind must move toward that of the brain, and consciousness is identical to a recurrent processing state in physical circuitry.
Fundamental or emergent
Frankish’s IllusionismEmergent
Recurrent Processing TheoryEmergent
Qualia
Frankish’s IllusionismQualia do not exist. Introspection misrepresents brain states, as perception misrepresents some features of the world, and introspective information bound to perception makes external things seem to carry vivid sensory qualities, such as an apple’s redness, that reflect their significance for us.
Recurrent Processing TheoryQualia are generated when a certain recurrent processing state holds of the relevant visual circuitry, making the visual state conscious.
How it works
Mechanism
Frankish’s IllusionismThe reactivity schema: introspective systems track the overall psychological impact of stimulation without representing its detail, and this simplified model is mistaken for direct acquaintance with qualities. Frankish borrows Daniel Dennett’s image of a computer’s user illusion, whose icons have no literal counterparts in the machine.
Recurrent Processing TheoryRecurrent processing (feedback connections) in sensory and post-sensory areas (Stage 3) is considered sufficient for consciousness.
Where it is
Frankish’s IllusionismDistributed across the brain. The subject of the illusion is the whole organism, and the work of registering and reacting to it is shared among many unconscious subsystems, with no Cartesian theater.
Recurrent Processing TheoryLocalized in sensory and post-sensory areas, specifically recurrent activations in the 'back of the head'.
What it does
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states guide flexible, intelligent behavior. The illusion itself is made of physical representations and so has causal effects, which may be adaptive, as Nicholas Humphrey argues; this avoids the threat of epiphenomenalism.
Recurrent Processing TheoryConsciousness is the specific recurrent processing state itself. The underlying purpose is implied to move the understanding of mind toward the brain.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Frankish’s IllusionismConceptually testable
Recurrent Processing TheoryEmpirically testable
Tests so far
Frankish’s IllusionismFrankish holds that the reactive changes constituting experience are in principle experimentally detectable, which opens the experiences of other creatures to study.
Recurrent Processing TheoryNot stated
Criticisms
Frankish’s IllusionismThe central objection, a version of Descartes’ cogito, holds that our own phenomenal states are indubitable data. Galen Strawson argues that illusionism denies the main source of ethical value. Others object that an illusion needs an audience.
Recurrent Processing TheoryCritiques Global Workspace Theory (GWT) as being 'all about access but not about seeing'. Is itself criticized by Ned Block as a 'truncated form of the global workspace account'.
Sources
Key sources
Frankish’s Illusionism
- Frankish’s Illusionism (Landscape of Consciousness), Keith Frankish (2021)
Recurrent Processing Theory
- Towards a true neural stance on consciousness, Victor Lamme (2006)
- How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness, Victor Lamme (2010)
- Wu, 2018 (Discussing Lamme's RPT) (2018)