Head to head
Global Workspace Theory vs Frankish’s Illusionism
Baars’s and Dehaene’s Global Workspace Theory and Frankish’s Illusionism, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Both belong to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness.
- Both treat consciousness as emergent.
- They give the same kind of answer on life after death and meaning and purpose.
- On AI consciousness, Global Workspace Theory says “Yes” and Frankish’s Illusionism says “Possible”.
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The claim
In brief
Global Workspace TheoryThis theory posits that conscious awareness is constituted by specific multi-sensory, multi-cognitive information that achieves brain-wide presence and broad accessibility. It conceptualizes consciousness as an inner 'theater' where this information is globally broadcast, reconciling the limited capacity of momentary conscious content with vast long-term memory access.
Frankish’s IllusionismKeith Frankish holds that conscious experiences are real but not what they seem: the irreducibly subjective ‘phenomenal properties’ or qualia we ascribe to them are an introspective illusion. Introspection builds a simplified, schematic model of the brain’s complex reactions to stimulation, and we mistake that model for direct awareness of inner qualities, so the hard problem gives way to an ‘illusion problem’.
What consciousness is
Global Workspace TheoryConsciousness is identified as the instantaneous global availability and broad accessibility of specific, integrated information across numerous specialized modular systems in the brain.
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states are complex functional states of the brain that sustain rich sensory engagement with the world and flexible control of behavior. Their distinctive features are functional, which Frankish calls quasi-phenomenal properties.
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Global Workspace TheoryYesSince the theory defines consciousness in terms of information-processing computations and architectures, and proponents suggest novel machine architectures could be based on these computations, AI consciousness is possible in principle.
Frankish’s IllusionismPossibleSince consciousness is a complex functional state, a system with the right reactive and sensory organization could have it, though Frankish does not address machines directly.
Does consciousness survive death?Both agree
Global Workspace TheoryNoConsciousness is understood as being entirely dependent on specific, complex biological brain processes, which cease upon biological death.
Frankish’s IllusionismNoSince conscious states are functional states of a living brain, they end when the brain stops functioning.
Global Workspace TheoryYesIf consciousness is wholly explained by the computational organization and information flow of the brain, a perfect duplication or uploading of these mechanisms into a non-biological substrate should preserve the first-person mental self.
Frankish’s IllusionismNo position
Does it give life meaning?Both agree
Global Workspace TheoryHumanistic onlyAs a Materialist/Neurobiological theory, it does not mandate ultimate cosmic meaning or purpose, but consciousness provides essential functions (like memory reconciliation and integrated awareness) that underpin human agency and self-created value.
Frankish’s IllusionismHumanistic onlyFrankish grounds value in what creatures are motivated to seek or avoid and argues that illusionism widens ethical concern to other animals across a graded ‘consciousness space’.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Global Workspace TheoryPhysicalism
Frankish’s IllusionismPhysicalism (strong illusionism)
Mind and body
Global Workspace TheoryIdentity/Correlation. The mind (conscious awareness) is identified as, or strongly correlates with, the specific, biologically realized processes of global information broadcasting in the brain.
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious experiences are physically realized functional states. Phenomenal properties are intentional objects, represented but never instantiated, like the impossible objects Nicholas Humphrey compares them to.
Fundamental or emergent
Global Workspace TheoryEmergent
Frankish’s IllusionismEmergent
Qualia
Global Workspace TheoryPhenomenal experience (qualia) is accounted for by proposing a strictly biological mechanism for conscious awareness. Qualia correspond to the content of the integrated, reportable multi-sensory information that is broadly accessible within the global workspace.
Frankish’s IllusionismQualia do not exist. Introspection misrepresents brain states, as perception misrepresents some features of the world, and introspective information bound to perception makes external things seem to carry vivid sensory qualities, such as an apple’s redness, that reflect their significance for us.
How it works
Mechanism
Global Workspace TheoryGlobal broadcasting and accessibility of information, allowing a single coherent content to be made available to many specialized, unconscious modules simultaneously.
Frankish’s IllusionismThe reactivity schema: introspective systems track the overall psychological impact of stimulation without representing its detail, and this simplified model is mistaken for direct acquaintance with qualities. Frankish borrows Daniel Dennett’s image of a computer’s user illusion, whose icons have no literal counterparts in the machine.
Where it is
Global Workspace TheoryBrain-wide, encompassing widespread areas, particularly associated with frontal and parietal regions (often characterized as a 'front of the head' theory in contrast to 'back of the head' theories like IIT).
Frankish’s IllusionismDistributed across the brain. The subject of the illusion is the whole organism, and the work of registering and reacting to it is shared among many unconscious subsystems, with no Cartesian theater.
What it does
Global Workspace TheoryGlobal broadcasting constitutes consciousness. Functionally, it allows for flexible control and reconciliation between limited momentary conscious content and long-term memory resources.
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states guide flexible, intelligent behavior. The illusion itself is made of physical representations and so has causal effects, which may be adaptive, as Nicholas Humphrey argues; this avoids the threat of epiphenomenalism.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Global Workspace TheoryEmpirically testable
Frankish’s IllusionismConceptually testable
Tests so far
Global Workspace TheoryNeuroimaging and computer modeling studies used to investigate its claims. It is implicitly subject to the 'neurogeographic' debate contrasting 'front of the head' theories with posterior theories.
Frankish’s IllusionismFrankish holds that the reactive changes constituting experience are in principle experimentally detectable, which opens the experiences of other creatures to study.
Criticisms
Global Workspace TheoryCriticized for focusing on 'access' rather than genuine phenomenal experience, exemplified by the critique that the theory is 'all about access but not about seeing'. It faces tension regarding whether global broadcasting is necessary or merely a consequence of consciousness.
Frankish’s IllusionismThe central objection, a version of Descartes’ cogito, holds that our own phenomenal states are indubitable data. Galen Strawson argues that illusionism denies the main source of ethical value. Others object that an illusion needs an audience.
Sources
Key sources
Global Workspace Theory
- A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness (1988)
- In the Theater of Consciousness (1997)
- Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework, Dehaene and Naccache (2000)
Frankish’s Illusionism
- Frankish’s Illusionism (Landscape of Consciousness), Keith Frankish (2021)