Head to head
Frankish’s Illusionism vs Free Energy Principle
Frankish’s Illusionism and Friston’s free-energy principle and active inference, compared field by field from their entries in the Atlas.
At a glance
- Both belong to the Materialism family in Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness.
- Both treat consciousness as emergent.
- They give the same kind of answer on life after death and meaning and purpose.
- On AI consciousness, Frankish’s Illusionism says “Possible” and Free Energy Principle says “Yes”.
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The claim
In brief
Frankish’s IllusionismKeith Frankish holds that conscious experiences are real but not what they seem: the irreducibly subjective ‘phenomenal properties’ or qualia we ascribe to them are an introspective illusion. Introspection builds a simplified, schematic model of the brain’s complex reactions to stimulation, and we mistake that model for direct awareness of inner qualities, so the hard problem gives way to an ‘illusion problem’.
Free Energy PrincipleThis theory conceptualizes consciousness as a natural process arising from the minimization of 'free energy,' which is the difference between an organism's internal model (perceptual expectations) and real-time sensory inputs. Consciousness, therefore, functions as the evolved mechanism for simulating scenarios of the world and reducing prediction error to ensure survival and maintain homeostasis.
What consciousness is
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states are complex functional states of the brain that sustain rich sensory engagement with the world and flexible control of behavior. Their distinctive features are functional, which Frankish calls quasi-phenomenal properties.
Free Energy PrincipleConsciousness is identified as a natural process of inference, specifically the internal emergent model that monitors and minimizes the free energy principle (surprise), thereby optimizing the representational capacities of physical/brain systems.
Big questions
Can AI be conscious?Differ
Frankish’s IllusionismPossibleSince consciousness is a complex functional state, a system with the right reactive and sensory organization could have it, though Frankish does not address machines directly.
Free Energy PrincipleYesAs a strong materialist theory, if consciousness is fully explained by computational processes of inference and representation minimization, then non-biological systems capable of executing these processes must eventually attain consciousness in principle.
Does consciousness survive death?Both agree
Frankish’s IllusionismNoSince conscious states are functional states of a living brain, they end when the brain stops functioning.
Free Energy PrincipleNoConsciousness is an emergent natural process tied directly to the functional dynamics and physical substrate of the biological brain; thus, it cannot survive bodily decay.
Frankish’s IllusionismNo position
Free Energy PrincipleYesSince consciousness is understood as an emergent, formalized process of inference optimization, perfect duplication of the brain's information processing and representational dynamics in a non-biological medium should be sufficient for the continuation of the mental self.
Does it give life meaning?Both agree
Frankish’s IllusionismHumanistic onlyFrankish grounds value in what creatures are motivated to seek or avoid and argues that illusionism widens ethical concern to other animals across a graded ‘consciousness space’.
Free Energy PrincipleHumanistic onlyThe foundational imperative of the conscious process is survival (minimizing surprise/maintaining homeostasis). The theory does not rationalize ultimate cosmic meaning or purpose, aligning with general materialist perspectives.
Nature of mind
Ontology
Frankish’s IllusionismPhysicalism (strong illusionism)
Free Energy PrinciplePhysicalism; often referred to as Markovian Monism, which views mind/matter distinction as dialectical rather than ontological.
Mind and body
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious experiences are physically realized functional states. Phenomenal properties are intentional objects, represented but never instantiated, like the impossible objects Nicholas Humphrey compares them to.
Free Energy PrincipleMonistic/Identity. The theory proposes that consciousness is the natural outcome of the physical/brain system's self-organizing processes, dissolving familiar dialectics between mind and matter.
Fundamental or emergent
Frankish’s IllusionismEmergent
Free Energy PrincipleEmergent
Qualia
Frankish’s IllusionismQualia do not exist. Introspection misrepresents brain states, as perception misrepresents some features of the world, and introspective information bound to perception makes external things seem to carry vivid sensory qualities, such as an apple’s redness, that reflect their significance for us.
Free Energy PrincipleThe theory is highly deflationary regarding the Hard Problem, treating consciousness as a process to be understood rather than a 'thing' whose qualitative attributes need definition. Qualia, if acknowledged, would be epiphenomena or aspects of the internal generative model required for inference.
How it works
Mechanism
Frankish’s IllusionismThe reactivity schema: introspective systems track the overall psychological impact of stimulation without representing its detail, and this simplified model is mistaken for direct acquaintance with qualities. Frankish borrows Daniel Dennett’s image of a computer’s user illusion, whose icons have no literal counterparts in the machine.
Free Energy PrincipleThe Free-Energy Principle (FEP), which states that all self-organizing systems must minimize free energy (or 'surprise'), driving action and perception through active inference.
Where it is
Frankish’s IllusionismDistributed across the brain. The subject of the illusion is the whole organism, and the work of registering and reacting to it is shared among many unconscious subsystems, with no Cartesian theater.
Free Energy PrincipleLocalized in the physical brain system; cortical responses are seen as the brain’s attempt to minimize free energy.
What it does
Frankish’s IllusionismConscious states guide flexible, intelligent behavior. The illusion itself is made of physical representations and so has causal effects, which may be adaptive, as Nicholas Humphrey argues; this avoids the threat of epiphenomenalism.
Free Energy PrincipleConsciousness serves an adaptive and functional role as the evolved mechanism for simulating scenarios, monitoring, and minimizing free energy to promote survival (homeostasis) and navigate the world.
Evidence and criticism
Testability
Frankish’s IllusionismConceptually testable
Free Energy PrincipleConceptually and empirically linked to testable models (e.g., in neurobiology and psychology) through its reliance on formalizing representational capacities of physical systems.
Tests so far
Frankish’s IllusionismFrankish holds that the reactive changes constituting experience are in principle experimentally detectable, which opens the experiences of other creatures to study.
Free Energy PrincipleThe principles of FEP form the basis for models utilized in empirical work concerning altered states (e.g., the Entropic Brain Hypothesis under psychedelics) and related theories of perception and cognition.
Criticisms
Frankish’s IllusionismThe central objection, a version of Descartes’ cogito, holds that our own phenomenal states are indubitable data. Galen Strawson argues that illusionism denies the main source of ethical value. Others object that an illusion needs an audience.
Free Energy PrincipleCriticized for being highly deflationary and difficult to reconcile with the first-person reality of phenomenal experience (the Hard Problem), viewing consciousness merely as a mathematical process or 'natural outcome.' Friston finds engaging with the philosophical premise of consciousness as a 'thing' difficult.
Sources
Key sources
Frankish’s Illusionism
- Frankish’s Illusionism (Landscape of Consciousness), Keith Frankish (2021)
Free Energy Principle
- A theory of cortical responses, K. Friston (2005)
- Active interference: a process theory, K. Friston et al (2017)
- The Mathematics of Mind-Time, K. Friston (2017)